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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis contains an empirical study designed to reveal why initial public offerings 
(IPO) of common stocks (A-share) in China are on average under-priced from 
alternative angles as opposed to more established theories, using a dataset of 880 IPOs 
from January 1996 to December 2003.  
 
A much higher degree of under-pricing compared to developed markets and even 
other emerging markets is a distinct feature of China’s A-share IPOs. Previous 
literatures based on classical hypotheses have not been able to fully explain such high 
level of under-pricing. Hence, alternative explanations have been put forward by 
academics as well as practitioner. It is said that the Chinese government has big 
influences in China’s primary market through tightly controlled issuing system and 
opaque regulatory constraints. People speculate that such influences have been both 
intentionally and unintentionally exerted, causing IPO under-pricing. A major 
contribution of the thesis is to test some new hypotheses based on three untested 
statements in China’s IPO literatures i.e. speculation effect, “Western Region 
Development” policy effect and government protection effect, which are all 
associated with government direct or indirect influences. More specifically, 
speculation effect hypotheses assume that the government constraints and regulator 
drawbacks have caused high level of speculation, which in turn drives the IPO under-
pricing. “Western Region Development” policy effect hypotheses claim that 
government intentionally uses IPO under-pricing to lure investments into less 
developed and thus less favourable western region companies. Government protection 
effect hypotheses conjecture that IPO under-pricing is a compensation for investors’ 
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concern of potential government interference in the government-protected firms. The 
thesis finds that speculation effect hypothesis is largely supported by empirical data 
while the other two are not. 
 
The thesis has also re-tested hypotheses advanced in previous literatures including 
classical information asymmetry hypotheses, ex ante uncertainty hypotheses, 
investors’ behaviour hypotheses as well as existing China-specific hypothesis such as 
listing time lag hypothesis. Proxies such as government retention rate that have 
emerged in privatisation IPO literatures are also borrowed by Chinese researchers 
looking into China-specific institutional settings such as dominant government control. 
The thesis finds that information asymmetry hypotheses in general show more 
strength in explaining China’s IPO under-pricing while empirical evidence for other 
hypotheses are either mixed or weak. In the end, the thesis finds that alternative 
angles emerging from the tests of the three statements combined with some classical 
hypotheses supported by empirical data have a greater power to explain China’s high 
IPO under-pricing. 
 
The so-called “floatation game” hypothesis has been put forward by researchers such 
as Tian (2003) who claims that the Chinese government makes use of IPOs with 
different lengths of IPO listing time lag i.e. the time lag between IPO announcement 
date and actual listing date to adjust the equity market cycle. In other words, the 
government let go public the IPOs with longer listing time lag thus more likely higher 
initial returns in the bear market and vice versa. The thesis does not find support to 
the “floatation game” hypothesis, although the thesis does find that the market cycle is 
closely related to the IPO under-pricing and the number of IPOs issued. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Question 
 
 
“To facilitate such a process 1  and lure retail investors to 
companies of dubious quality - Beijing set rules that ensured 
initial public offerings were under-priced, thus guaranteeing 
investors handsome gains in the first few days of trading.” 
--- Financial Times, March 28th 2005 
The proceeding comment from the renowned Financial Times attracts our eyeballs 
once again to a well known phenomenon in finance that has confused researchers and 
practitioners for many years - the initial public offering (IPO) under-pricing. Feeding 
this puzzling phenomenon since the 70’s of last century, the ever going debate why 
the IPOs are on average under-priced is still waiting for a conclusive ending. Even 
with a short history of less than two decades, Chinese stock market has witnessed its 
IPOs inevitably being involved in the same debate. As early as in the 1990s 
researchers such as Datar and Mao (1998) have recognized and studied the average 
under-pricing of Chinese IPOs 2  and more researchers have joined them later on. 
However, a conclusive explanation is yet to be made, which prompts the core research 
question the thesis intends to answer: why Chinese IPOs are under-priced? 
 
                                                 
1
 The process is described in the same article by the news paper as “The listed companies raised money 
from moms and pops rather than from the banking system, which did the banks a huge favour by taking 
the burden of financing mediocre companies away from them.” Clearly, this quoted news report 
directly attributes the under-pricing of Chinese IPO new shares to the government interference and in 
fact it is one of the many publicly seen statements expressing the similar point of views.  As the thesis 
goes on, some of these statements will be demonstrated accordingly. 
2
 To be precise, the under-pricing in this thesis ought to be understood as an average measure. Indeed, 
this thesis finds that only a very small proportion of Chinese IPOs are over-priced or priced at par in 
the sample dataset. Detailed discussion about previous findings and the number of under-priced IPOs in 
this study’s sample can be found in the later chapters of literature review and data analysis. 
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Before embarking on the exploration for the answers, it is essential to recognize the 
importance of answering the question and it is even more imperative to clearly 
identify appropriate directions in which the exploration will be heading to. The 
following section will make obvious the reasons why answering the questions is 
important from both the academic and practical point of views. Indeed, for these same 
reasons this thesis is motivated. The next section of this chapter will sketch out the 
objectives of the thesis and the map this thesis is going to follow in order to find the 
answers. 
 
1.2 Research Motivations 
As said the IPO under-pricing is not a unique feature to the Chinese stock market. 
Besides, the topic has been studied by many researchers. The question is why it is still 
necessary and important to carry out research on this seemingly old enough topic. 
This section will demonstrate that in general IPO under-pricing has big economic, 
financial, geographic, political and academic implications. Also this section will show 
that the topic has specific implications to China in particular. 
 
1.2.1 General motivations for IPO under-pricing study in any country 
 
The practical economic implications of IPO under-pricing have been the major and 
ultimate motivation for any research on the topic in general. More specifically, the 
puzzling phenomenon presents a big inefficiency to nowadays financial market. Let 
us take a retrospective look at how IPO under-pricing happens. When financial 
sources such as private funding and bank loan are limited, a private company may 
resort to the pubic capital through the initial public offering to sustain its organic 
expansion or finance its new project. Ideally the IPO issuing company would like its 
new shares to be priced as high as possible in order to raise maximum capital from the 
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market, but in practice most IPO new shares are on average priced relatively lower 
than their subsequent trading price in the secondary market. Apart from conjectures of 
market imperfection (Benveniste and Spindt 1989 etc) or even market failure 
(Chambers 2005 etc), a common perception of this phenomenon is that the under-
pricing of IPOs is a challenge to market efficiency and it may hurt rising firms trying 
to raise capital for expansion (Loughran et al. 1994). Ljungqvist (2004) estimates that 
in 1999 and 2000 US issuers left an aggregate of 62 billion dollars on the table in 
IPOs in these two years alone. Since the new share discount is an immense cost to 
issuing firms in terms of the wealth loss to the IPO firm’s founding entrepreneur or 
shareholders (Ljungqvist 1999 and Ritter 1987), the IPO under-pricing has huge 
implications for issuing firms. On the other hand, as Schwert (2003) points out, 
although most of the literature on high average initial returns of IPOs focuses on the 
effects on the issuing firm, the evidence that the large returns are available to 
investors in the IPO3 has equivalent implications for abnormal profits to IPO investors. 
Simply speaking, the research on IPO under-pricing is beneficial to all the players in 
the game no matter sellers or buyers. 
 
Besides financial implications, the wide spreading nature of IPO under-pricing also 
prompts researches on the country-specific basis. It is not an exclusive attribute of 
Chinese IPOs. IPO under-pricing has been a notable feature in developing as well as 
in developed markets. In the US, IPO under-pricing has been documented as early as 
in the 1970’s by researchers, notably Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). Levis (1990) 
has reported that IPOs are on average under-priced in the UK. Meanwhile, empirical 
papers reveal that IPO under-pricing is a widespread trend in emerging markets too. 
                                                 
3
 Schwert (2003) is more specific to refer to firm commitment IPOs here, but as later will be seen, 
because the Chinese IPOs are mostly through online fixed price offer or firm commitment offer, this 
motivation has the same implication for the Chinese IPO under-pricing research. 
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Among them are studies from Thailand (Allen, Morkel-kingsbury and 
Piboonthanakiat 1999), Indian (Krishnamurti and Kumar 2002), Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaysia (Dawson 1987, Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston 1998), 
Chinese Taiwan (Huang 1999) and Korean (Kim, Krinsky and Lee 1995). As a result, 
the IPO under-pricing research has implications to a wide range of markets and 
geographic regions. That said, since all these markets presumably have different IPO 
pricing and issuing systems independent researches into individual markets or regions 
will help understand these markets and improve their financial systems. At the end of 
the day, all these countries and markets will benefit from the research. The research 
on Chinese IPO under-pricing is too justified in this sense.  
 
Thirdly, the IPO under-pricing has big political implications too. The privatisation 
waves since last century in the world join calls for researches of IPO under-pricing, as 
not only a private firm can seek public funding through IPO but a state-owned firm 
can also privatize itself through IPO. Even though the majority of IPO literatures 
concentrate on privately-owned IPOs, some researchers have noticed the crucial 
implication of privatisation IPOs to the government and the society. Politically 
speaking, any government trying to privatise state-owned enterprises through IPOs 
cannot ignore the impact of under-pricing to the government itself, to the employees 
in the firm, to the voters and literally to all walks of people in the country. Some 
noteworthy papers about privatisation IPOs are written by Perotti (1995) and 
Jenkinson and Mayer (1988). The privatisation issue is a quite encouraging 
motivation for the Chinese IPO under-pricing study because the vast majority of 
China’s IPOs are privatisation IPOs4. 
                                                 
4
 See footnote 6 for the information about China’s privatisation IPOs. 
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Lastly, being a long-time unsolved puzzle IPO under-pricing continuously attracts 
attentions from academic researchers around the world. Given that the IPO under-
pricing is a financial cost to the issuing firms, the question then boils down to why the 
issuing firm still allows this hurt to happen persistently. This puzzling phenomenon 
presents a big challenge to modern finance theories. A variety of theories have been 
put forward to address this apparently paradoxical corporate behaviour, such as 
Leland and Pyle’s (1977) insider signalling hypothesis, Baron’s (1982) principal-
agent hypothesis, Rock’s (1984) “Winner’s Curse” hypothesis, and Grinblatt and 
Hwang’s (1989) signalling hypothesis etc. The explanations, however, remain elusive. 
Under certain circumstances, one theory seems to get prevailing support from the 
market data while it may lose explanatory power to competing theories when 
circumstances have changed. Meanwhile discrepancies sometimes occur between the 
existing theories and the empirical evidence. One such example in particular in the 
Chinese IPO literature is the debate of the relationship between under-pricing and 
market cycle i.e. whether the market status has impact on the IPO under-pricing; if the 
market cycle does influence IPO pricing then what the real impact is? In fact, 
empirical evidence in reality may not only give little support to some existing theories 
but occasionally may even show contradictory implications to the theories. An 
example in the early IPO under-pricing literature is that empirical studies found that 
even investment banks that often work as underwriters under-price their own IPOs, 
which is conflicting with the original information asymmetry theory. To this end, 
researches on IPO under-pricing should never stop until a conclusive and definitive 
answer to the puzzle has been found. Chinese IPO under-pricing is therefore a case 
study for this thesis in above sense. 
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1.2.2 Particular motivations for Chinese IPO under-pricing study 
The most direct motive for Chinese IPO under-pricing study is that current under-
pricing theories are either insufficient or inapplicable to explain the under-pricing of 
Chinese IPOs. The reason for this is a combination of unique features of China’s 
primary market and IPOs, and the lack of consistency in Chinese IPO literature. 
Equally, this presents opportunity for the thesis to carry out further research on the 
topic. Meanwhile, the research on Chinese IPO under-pricing has its specific 
economic and political implications, which will all be discussed in this section. 
 
A striking fact about China’s IPOs is their high level of under-pricing compared to 
other markets. The under-pricing magnitude is so huge that maybe the word 
“handsome” in the opening remark of Financial Times is too modest to depict the 
enormity. For instance, Mok and Hui (1998) report an average under-pricing of 289% 
for a sample of 87 Shanghai IPOs listed from 1990 to 1993. Su and Fleisher (1999) 
find the under-pricing level as high as 948.6% for A-share IPOs before January 1, 
1996. A more recent study by Liu (2003) reports an average market-adjusted initial 
return of 132.49% for a sample of 354 issues from 1 January 1999 to 31 December 
2002. All these studies show an astonishingly higher IPO under-pricing degree than 
the normally perceived up to 17.4% under-pricing in the UK or 18.4% in the US 
(Loughran et al 1994), and the under-pricing level is even higher than the average 
level of 60% in the emerging markets (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 2001). These 
numbers from the China’s stock market indicate that a thorough investigation of the 
Chinese IPOs is necessary if the existing theories are only based on analysis of much 
less under-priced IPOs in the developed markets. For instance, test of “Winner’s 
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Curse” theory by Chi and Padgett (2005) and Liu (2003), test of signalling theory by 
Su and Fleisher (1999) and test of ex ante uncertainty theory by Yu and Tse (2003) 
using China’s IPO data all fail to fully explain the Chinese IPO under-pricing. 
 
Secondly, now that most of the classical IPO theories emerged from the more 
developed and hence more efficient markets, they may not be applicable in the newly 
emerged markets as these emerging markets such as China usually has totally 
different institutional and market settings, regulatory constraints and investors’ 
behaviours. For instance, later chapters will demonstrate that the classical advising 
agent quality theory and the western market-rooted theories such as legal issue and 
management strategic under-pricing theories are not suitable for explaining China’s 
IPO under-pricing. The lack of convincing theories based on the developing markets 
is also due to the short history and instability of these markets. Such instability may 
be somehow caused by the lack of consistency in the country’s government policy. 
One such example is the China’s transaction stamp duty tax change and it will be 
discussed in detail in the later parts of this thesis. Naturally all these insufficiency and 
inapplicability provide motivations to carrying out research on IPO under-pricing 
particularly in the fast developing China’s stock market.  
 
When more established theories failed to explain the extra under-pricing magnitudes, 
people tried to look for explanations from alternative angles. People try to explain 
China’s high degree of under-pricing from several possible perspectives such as 
regulatory constraints, supply and demand imbalance and investors’ irrational 
behaviour. Apparently, the government-imposed under-pricing referred to by the 
opening mark represents one such alternative view. It is not a fresh idea that the 
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Chinese government is responsible for China’s IPO under-pricing, as practitioners and 
academics such as Li Shi Quan (2004) and Chi and Padgett (2005) have come up with 
similar claims pointing fingers to the Chinese government. Trying to approach the 
explanations in different ways, Tian (2003) looks at supply and demand imbalance 
imposed by the government and some practitioners even claim that investors’ 
speculative behaviour is the suspect. Researchers even went beyond existing 
theoretical framework, looking for China-specific explanations for IPO under-pricing. 
For instance, the listing time lag between offering and listing dates is proposed by 
Tian (2003) as a policy tool for the government to adjust the market cycles, and he 
believes that this listing time lag accounts for the Chinese IPO under-pricing. But 
whether or not all these hypotheses are robust in explaining the phenomenon in 
addition to more traditional hypotheses? Only empirical test can prove that, which is 
exactly what this thesis intends to do. 
 
Despite of the immaturity of the developing markets and the lack of associated mis-
pricing theories, the IPO under-pricing implications are crucially important to 
economy policymakers of the developing markets, not only because IPO plays such 
key role in the privatisation process but also it fuels the economic growth of these 
markets by feeding the great capital demand. In this sense, studies focusing on the 
emerging markets IPOs become essentially indispensable. Being the world’s largest 
developing country China has seen its equity market expanding rapidly with the total 
number of listed companies increased more than 20 times within 10 years (China’s 
stock market started from the early 1990s)5 but still the IPO supply is lagged far 
behind the demand. In 1997, the Chinese government endorsed a plan to transform 
                                                 
5
 Exact numbers can be found in Sayuri (2002)’s paper, which includes firms that issue only A-shares, 
both A- and B-shares, and both A- and H-shares. 
 22 
more than 10,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into publicly listed companies. Yet 
as of year 2007, there are only about 1,500 companies listed in China’s two stock 
exchanges. The huge gap makes China potentially the largest IPO market in the world. 
Since the beginning of China’s stock market, IPO has become one of the most 
important capital sources for China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). If the under-
pricing is such a great cost to the issuing firm as mentioned and if the market is so 
enormous as China, then the research on the phenomenon is indispensable. 
 
China’s stock market stands for the biggest representative case of developing markets 
and is attracting research attentions increasingly. Meanwhile, being a traditional 
investment vehicle IPOs are getting more and more popularity in China especially 
after the country became one of the biggest foreign investment destination (FID) 
countries in the world. This trend has been strengthened after the Chinese government 
allows joint venture between foreign and domestic financial service companies. 
Therefore understanding the Chinese IPO pricing behaviour is beneficial to both the 
domestic and overseas investors who wish to invest in Chinese enterprises currently 
or in the future.  
 
Besides above economic implications, the Chinese IPO under-pricing could have 
some China-specific political implications too because of the unique government 
background of China’s stock market and Chinese IPOs. As China is being 
transformed from a previously government tightly controlled market into a semi-open 
market and because the vast majority of Chinese IPOs are privatisation IPOs that shift 
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ownership from previously government-controlled state companies to private sectors6, 
government influence is believed to be inevitably intervening with the IPO process. In 
the later part of this thesis, it will be shown that although the IPO shares are issued to 
the public the majority shareholder of most issuing companies are still the state. 
Therefore Chinese IPO under-pricing cases may well demonstrate the government 
politic influences in the IPO pricing process. 
 
In respect of the privatisation IPO, researchers have presented theories regarding 
political motives. For example, government could use the IPO under-pricing as a 
compensation for employees’ misgivings about the privatisation. Also researchers 
have indicated that the market-oriented government can allocate under-priced IPOs to 
median-class voters and align their interest with the government so that it won’t be 
voted out in favour of a left-wing government. Such theories basically come from 
western world and the Chinese IPO under-pricing may have different implications, 
but the research on Chinese IPO under-pricing will help us to gain a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between government’s political motive and the 
impact especially on the IPO pricing process. For example, researchers believe that 
Chinese government used IPO under-pricing to achieve dispersed distribution of 
shares in order to create a viable capital market.      
 
In fact, the government influences are born with the mission of the Chinese stock 
market, which is declared by the Chinese government as “to reform the unprofitable, 
inefficient state-owned enterprises”7.  As well as the Financial Times comment at the 
                                                 
6
 Above 90% of Chinese IPOs are privatisation IPOs. See the next page for the number of privatisation 
IPOs. But as Chi and Padgett (2005) pointed out, in China the vast majority of IPOs are partial 
privatisations, which are different from the privatisation IPOs in western countries. 
7
 See footnote 8 for more details. 
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very beginning of this thesis, in the same article the author stated that “the problems 
started with the companies chosen to list. From the very beginning of the China’s 
stock market, the authorities saw the primary market as a new source of funding for 
state-owned companies, including many struggling ones, and therefore a way to 
relieve the banks from their onerous role as providers of cheap funds to government 
corporations.” That said, the article claimed that although “estimates vary only 
between 30 and 130 of the 1,300 companies listed on the Chinese market have a 
private-sector background - and even some of those are in reality controlled by 
branches of the state.”   
 
With such huge state dominance in the Chinese stock market, many practitioners in 
the field believe that the Chinese government exerting power on the IPO process has 
led to the severe under-pricing of China’s IPOs. The prestigious Financial Times has 
only expressed an opinion broadly shared by many practitioners. For instance, equity 
analyst Li Shi Quan (2004) is quoted as saying in Cai Jing Times that “too much 
government interference in the Chinese IPO pricing process leads to the imbalance 
between the supply and demand at the China’s stock market, and it leads to the 
deviation of the IPO prices from the fair market price…and bad performance 
companies have wrongly got the market support.” His conviction about government’s 
powerful influences seems to be proved by a piece of news from Financial Times. 
When reporting on a government ban of IPOs, the newspaper says that “…when8 the 
authorities decided to introduce a fairer system for IPO pricing, they placed a six-
                                                 
8
 Here the time that the news paper refers to is year 2004. 
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month ban on new listings9. Yet it reinforced the impression that nothing in Chinese 
markets, not even an IPO, happens without Beijing's say-so.” 
 
Although the majority of academic researchers are still looking at the issue from 
classical theories’ perspectives which are focusing more on economic rationale rather 
than government influences, some others do have raised the question of whether or 
not the government have played active role in Chinese IPO pricing. For example, Tian 
(2003) suggests that the Chinese government frequently intervenes in the market in 
order to control investment risks. A vivid example of government intervention given 
in his paper is that a policy commentary on the high P/E ratios of the stock market at 
the end of 1996 brought down the stock index by 32% in two weeks. In respect of IPO 
pricing particularly, he suggests that the government may use administrative tools 
such as listing quotas and flotation delays to adjust the market in order to reach 
certain policy targets. Holding the similar viewpoints about government interference, 
Chi and Padgett (2005) emphasize that “in privatisation, the success of any IPO not 
only affects the individual company’s reputation but also the government credibility. 
The government cannot afford any possible failure in the IPO markets. That is why 
the government has to make the supply much less than the demand, even at the cost of 
under-pricing.” All these statements sound enlightening to understand the Chinese 
IPO under-pricing but apparently they need prudent investigation.  
 
All in all, to answer the question what causes the Chinese IPOs to be under-priced on 
average and furthermore whether or not the Chinese government has played direct 
                                                 
9
 The news paper claims that by doing so, the Chinese government is trying to give the regulators 
enough time to devise the new rules. 
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role of affecting the IPO prices, this study intends to use empirical dataset to testify 
the hypotheses that are set up according to existing theories and unproved statements.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Contributions to Literature 
1.3.1 To test brand new hypotheses based on unproved statements 
In Chinese IPO literature, people have related factors such as regulatory constraints, 
excess demand or irrational investors’ behaviour with the under-pricing. They believe 
these factors are all explicitly or implicitly government-driven. In particular, three 
statements regarding the causes of Chinese IPO under-pricing i.e. Western Region 
Development policy effect, government protection effect and investor speculation 
effect have come out of media reports and academic publications. The thesis will test 
these statements and the tests will show whether these claims are sensible or just 
purely speculative. 
 
In next chapter, background information about Western Region Development policy 
will be given in detail. As the policy is viewed as the start of a major shift of the 
Chinese government’s economic development emphasis from eastern coast regions to 
western inland regions, it is said that the government intentionally uses the IPO under-
pricing as a policy tool to encourage investment into western region companies. If this 
statement is proved to be correct by the empirical data, it is a significant progress 
towards proving the claim that the Chinese government does play active role in 
bringing the IPO under-pricing. At a higher level, it would also provide sensible 
alternative angles to explain Chinese IPO under-pricing. 
 
Secondly, since China’s economy is being transformed from socialist central-planned 
economy to capitalist market-oriented economy, it is believed that the government 
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still carries protection over certain companies that are usually of great strategic 
importance to the nation. When these companies go into the partial privatisation 
process via IPOs, some believe that the government protection will lead to under-
pricing due to government signalling intention etc. However, others argue that the 
opposite is true. No matter which statement is supported by the data, a link between 
the government protection and IPO under-pricing can be established in either case if 
the empirical test shows significant statistics. To this end, even if we are still not able 
to directly point finger at government interference in IPO pricing after the test, we can 
at least obtain evidence of whether or not the government behaviour has affected the 
IPO pricing. 
 
A third statement is based on the fact that the Chinese government’s control on IPOs 
has led to the imbalance between new share demand and supply and thus caused 
intensive short term speculation in the stock market. People believe that China’s 
highly speculative stock market pushes up the share price in the secondary market, 
together with the huge demand from retail investors causing the IPO under-pricing. If 
this statement can be tested, it is promising to demonstrate that the government policy 
has indirectly caused IPO under-pricing by introducing an artificial shortage of stock 
supply.  
 
By testing all these statements, we can investigate whether the government’s direct or 
indirect influence has been piped through to the issuing system thus causing IPO 
under-pricing. In fact, these three blocks of hypotheses represent the major original 
contributions of this thesis. If any test of these statements is successful, it is 
reasonable to believe an alternative hypothesis may be credited to explain the Chinese 
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IPO under-pricing in the future. On the other hand, if the empirical data does not 
support the test, it is also a progress to distinguish speculative assumptions from the 
true causes. 
 
1.3.2 To test existing classical and some China-specific hypotheses 
Meanwhile, classical theories are not excluded from the hypotheses test. With the 
largest dataset among all previous Chinese IPO under-pricing literatures at hand this 
thesis is going to test the hypotheses formulated according to the classical IPO under-
pricing theories such as Winner’s Curse theory, signalling theory and information 
revelation theory etc. As will be discussed in literature review, although these 
classical hypotheses have been put to test in early empirical studies the results are not 
quite consistent or sometimes even contradicting each other. Therefore, re-test of 
these classical hypotheses have two-folded meanings. The test can add more 
consistency to previous literature in addition to clarifying some contradictions. At the 
same time, the test of classical hypothesis provides a good starting point which 
naturally leads to tests of some hypotheses that are less frequently tested in Chinese 
literature such as the book building hypothesis. 
 
Early studies also try to borrow hypotheses of privatisation and government political 
motives to explain Chinese IPO under-pricing, although researchers normally 
categorize such hypotheses into China-specific hypotheses. The reason is that some of 
the proxies used to test these hypotheses such as government retention rate and IPO 
allocation rate (or IPO lottery winning ratio in China’s context) are extremely high or 
low in China. Researchers believe these extreme levels of ratios are unique 
characteristics of China’s stock market and they have led to Chinese IPO under-
 29 
pricing. For instance, Mock and Hui (1998) relate the “Chinese characteristic” of high 
government retention rate to the IPO under-pricing. What is more, models in previous 
studies with some real China-specific factors such as listing time lag hypothesis will 
be tested too. Comprehensive investigation and comparison of these models will 
demonstrate whether they are supported by the latest dataset, and whether these 
hypotheses provide credible alternative explanations to Chinese IPO under-pricing 
besides the classical hypotheses. 
 
In addition to above major objectives, this research will endeavour to testify and 
clarify some debate among previous studies. A good example is the debate of so-
called “floatation game”. Basically, it is about whether or not the government has 
used IPOs with different length of listing time lag – the period between the IPO 
announcement date and the actual listing date – to adjust the equity market cycle, 
because supposedly IPOs with longer listing time lags (and hence possibly higher IPO 
initial returns) will be given priority for floatation during bear market and vice versa. 
Some researchers believe the government has played such floatation time game to 
control the market volatility. It is claimed that because of the government intention 
the listing time laps of different IPOs vary and hence influence the IPO initial return, 
while other researchers decline to accept such statement based on their own studies. 
Therefore, it is necessary to find out which statement proves to be true by the 
empirical data. Along with test of listing time lag hypothesis, this thesis will examine 
whether this “floatation game” statement is a sensible claim.  
 
In summary, this thesis tries to shed light on the IPO under-pricing rationale from 
both general and China-specific perspectives. Researchers already have put forward 
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some hypotheses according to various IPO under-pricing theories. Some of these 
hypotheses have been tested by using the Chinese IPO data, while others are not. 
Meanwhile, in the Chinese literature some China-specific hypotheses have been 
proposed by researchers. This thesis will carry out tests on these hypotheses. In the 
mean time, because of the unique characteristics of Chinese IPOs empirical data have 
produced ambiguous or inconsistent evidence with regard to these hypotheses. This 
thesis will try to clarify the debates. Apart from the existing theories and hypotheses, 
there are several widely circulated statements and concepts. These statements or 
concepts have not been tested yet. For example, some people believe that China’s IPO 
under-pricing is partly speculation driven. Government protection is also sometimes 
regarded as one cause of China’s IPO under-pricing. Another example is that some 
people believe the Chinese government has used IPO under-pricing to lure investment 
into the western region companies. As yet no established hypotheses/theories have 
been set up based on these statements/concepts, to set up testable hypotheses in line 
with the statements would be a big step forward by the thesis. Alternative angles to 
explore the causes of Chinese IPO under-pricing hopefully would emerge from the 
empirical tests. Or otherwise, the tests could demonstrate that the statements are 
unfounded from the empirical evidence point of view. 
 
1.4  Thesis Structure 
Chapter 1 starts with the introduction of the IPO under-pricing phenomenon in 
general and specific Chinese IPO under-pricing respectively. The chapter reveals how 
this research is motivated by the puzzling phenomenon and it addresses what research 
questions this thesis is going to answer in the end. In detail, chapter 1 lists all the 
objectives this research is pursuing and briefly outlines how these objectives are going 
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to be achieved. To draw a big picture of the whole thesis, this chapter goes through 
the layout and the structure of this thesis.  
 
As the Chinese stock market is very different from the developed western markets, it 
is absolutely necessary to familiarise those, who have little knowledge about Chinese 
stock market, with some background information of the market. Chapter 2 will pave 
the way for later parts of literature review, hypothesis setting and data analysis by 
giving an introduction of the Chinese stock market’s history, characteristics, 
institutional and IPO procedural settings. Many of these characteristics will be 
mentioned repeatedly in the later chapters but only briefly when needed. 
 
Chapter 3 summarises all the previous literature about IPO under-pricing. It 
categorises existing theories and hypotheses of Chinese IPO under-pricing and it 
looks at the suitability or unsuitability of these theories in explaining Chinese IPO 
under-pricing. 
 
Chapter 4 summarises all empirical studies about China’s IPO under-pricing. 
Especially, this chapter collects all the related literatures and documents about the 
three statements that this thesis is going to test, i.e. the speculation effect, the Western 
Region Development Policy effect and the government protection effect. Chapter 3 
and chapter 4 build the foundation for hypothesis settings in chapter 5. 
 
Following the literature review, chapter 5 lists all the hypotheses to be tested. These 
hypotheses are grouped into basically three different categories. They are the classical 
general IPO under-pricing hypotheses, the existing China-specific hypotheses and 
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nascent China-specific hypotheses formulated in this study. All the alternative 
explanations proposed by this thesis will be put together in the nascent China-specific 
hypotheses. 
 
Chapter 6 shows how and from which sources the data are collected. It describes the 
dataset in more details such as data volume, observation period and selection criterion 
etc. The chapter also illustrates the basic benchmark model and variables to be used in 
the hypothesis test. Besides, the chapter makes a light touch on the data analysis by 
showing descriptive statistics of individual variables and possible indications of these 
data characteristics. The general data description leads to specific hypothesis test in 
the following chapters. 
 
From chapter 7 to chapter 11, all the hypothesis test results are demonstrated and 
explained one by one. Especially, the first three chapters will show the original 
findings of nascent hypotheses that are major contributions of this study. More 
specifically, chapter 7 will focus on the speculation effect hypotheses. Chapter 8 is 
devoted to the Western Region Development Policy hypotheses. Chapter 9 will 
concentrate on the government protection hypotheses. Apart from that, chapter 10 
summaries test results of all classical theories that can be adopted in the Chinese 
context and chapter 11 includes tests of the existing China-specific hypotheses. The 
different schools of theories and hypotheses contained in these five chapters will 
hopefully construct the main body of the Chinese IPO under-pricing theory universe.  
 
Chapter 12 is supposed to take an overview out of the box. This chapter shows how 
much extra power the alternative hypotheses emerging from the tests of the three 
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statements have added to the existing models. Meanwhile, it reveals the close tie 
between IPO under-pricing and market cycle in China, paving way for summary from 
a broader sense of the economy. 
 
Chapter 13 concludes the main body of text with all the findings and results. It 
summarises the contribution this thesis has made to the existing literature. It threshed 
out the implications the study has to a broader economy. In addition, this chapter also 
gives rise to future research questions sparkled during the hypotheses tests.  
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Chapter 2 Introduction of China’s Primary Market 
The China’s stock market was set up following the models of developed markets such 
as US, UK and Japanese and even Hong Kong stock market10 but at the same time it 
has many unique features. It is therefore worthwhile to give a brief introduction of the 
China’s stock market settings and the initial public offerings process before the 
literature review so as to avoid any misunderstanding or confusion of these plain facts 
afterwards.  
 
2.1 Institutional Settings 
In the early 1980s, China initiated a series of economic reform policies to help 
restructure its economy from a Soviet-style centrally planned socialist economy into a 
more market-oriented economy while remain within the political framework provided 
by the communist party 11 . Of all these policies, privatization of state owned 
enterprises (SOE’s) is the most fundamental step taken towards the reform objective. 
The privatization process involves carving out productive units which gradually 
become independent, profit-oriented entities with limited liability. The ownership of 
these carve-outs is represented by share capital. Then these privatized units issue new 
shares to the public through IPOs. But this scenario only exists in theory because 
these supposedly independent units are in fact still controlled by their parental 
companies or the state. For instance, Tian (2000) claims that he found the government 
directly owns 28% of all the shares of China’s public listed companies and ultimately 
controls 44% of China’s public listed companies, based on the method of La Porta et 
                                                 
10
 In his article The Development Path of China’s Stock Market (2005) Nian Qing Yuan, a significant 
figure among those specialists who participated in the drafting of China’s first stock market regulatory 
document - The Temporary Rules of Stock Issuing and Security Exchange (1989), recalled that the 
establishment of China’s stock market and relevant regulations have borrowed experience from the US, 
UK, Japan and Hong Kong stock market. The whole article can be found at www.business.sohu.com  
(November 28th, 2005). 
11
 The system has been called “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”. 
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al (1999). The first privatization wave took place in 1984 and there were less than 100 
issues before 1990. At that time since there was no organized stock exchange to trade 
the new shares and also because the companies’ leaders, who are at the same time 
government officials, were not willing to give up absolute control of the companies to 
shareholders, the IPOs were quite unpopular until the beginning of 1990s when the 
two stock exchanges were built up. 
 
The Shanghai Security Exchange (SSE) was founded in December 1990 and the 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in April 1991 respectively. The two exchanges are 
self-regulated and cross listing is forbidden. The stock exchanges were established 
mainly in two purposes as stated by the government itself, “1) to tap the domestic 
savings; and 2) to reform the unprofitable, inefficient state-owned enterprises”12. Both 
exchanges are non-profit legal entities. Originally when the two stock exchanges 
came into place, they were governed by the State Planning Committee, the People’s 
Bank of China (China’s central bank) and the China Security Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC). Later on the CSRC was granted the sole regulator status of the two 
exchanges. Nowadays, under the direct administration of the Chinese State Council 
the CSRC functions as an authorized government department to oversee the whole 
security and future markets. Since the very beginning of China’s stock market, the 
authority of approving IPOs has always been with the government and more 
specifically the CSRC. The stock exchanges themselves do not have the power to 
approve IPOs.   
 
Through stock market the state owned enterprises (SOE’s) disperse their share 
                                                 
12
 The stock market mainly serves to raise capital for enterprises and to reform the SOE’s, according to 
the speeches of Liu Hong Ru, the then CSRC chairman in January 1994 (e.g. SSE working conferences) 
and Li Peng, the then Prime Minister in September 1997.  
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holdings among both domestic and foreign investors, both state-owned and private-
owned firms. To separate, the government introduced five major categories of shares, 
which are: 1) State Shares (sometimes called Government Shares), shares obtained by 
an institution as a representative of the central government, on behalf of the state, and 
in exchange for the capital contribution made by the state. The institution can be the 
central government itself, local governments, or wholly government-owned 
institutions. State shares are not available for trading at the two stock exchanges but 
can be transferred to other domestic institutions on approval of the CSRC. 2) Legal 
Person Shares (sometimes called Legal Entity Shares or C-shares)13. Legal Person 
Shares are not tradable at the two stock exchanges but can be transferred to other 
domestic institutions upon approval of the CSRC. 3) Employee Shares, shares that are 
offered to workers and managers of a PLC, usually at a substantial discount. 
Employee shares are registered under the title of the labor union covering that 
company, which also represents the shareholding employees trying to exercise their 
rights. After a holding period of 6 to 12 months, the company may file with the CSRC 
to allow its employees to sell the shares at the open market, but the directors, 
supervisors and the general managers cannot transfer such shares during their tenure 
of office. 4) Ordinary Domestic Shares or A-shares. Tradable A-shares are held and 
traded mostly by domestic individuals and some by domestic institutions. There is no 
restriction on the number of shares that can be traded, but it is required that tradable 
A-shares should account for no less than 25% of total outstanding shares when a 
company makes its IPO. Tradable A-shares are the only shares allowed to be publicly 
traded on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. And 5) Foreign Shares, 
shares denominated in a foreign currency. This group of shares includes B-shares on 
                                                 
13
 A legal person is defined as a non-individual legal entity or institution. 
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domestic stock exchanges, H-shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and N-shares 
on the New York Stock Exchange. B-shares are available exclusively to foreign 
investors and some authorized domestic securities firms14. The B-share market is 
separated from A-share market, with SHSE B-shares denominated in US dollars and 
SZSE B-shares denominated in Hong Kong dollars. H-shares and N-shares carry the 
same rights and obligations as A-shares and B-shares, but they cannot be traded at 
domestic stock exchanges. In this way, the tradable A-shares are deliberately 
separated from other shares. Although there are some changes to these shares during 
the later stock market development, the main structure and definition of the shares 
remain the same. This research only focuses on the A-shares because the vast majority 
of Chinese tradable shares in China’s domestic market are A-shares. 
 
2.2 Listing Requirements 
According to the China’s Corporate Law, the following requirements have to be 
satisfied in order for a firm to go public. Firstly, the new issuance to the public has 
been proved by the State Council’s security regulator authority i.e. CSRC. Secondly, 
the total capitalization of the firm should not be less than RMB ¥50 million. Thirdly, 
the issuing firm has been in operation for more than 3 years and it should be profitable 
in the latest 3 consecutive years. If the issuing firm is a legally established state-
owned enterprise, or if the issuing firm is formed after the Corporate Law came into 
effect and the primary issuer is big or middle-sized state-owned enterprise, then the 3 
year rule can be calculated continuously from the year even before the corporation of 
                                                 
14
 Since February 19th 2001 the B-share market has been open to the domestic residents. Nevertheless, 
the B shares in Shanghai Security Exchange (SSE) are traded in US dollars and the B shares in 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) are traded in Hong Kong dollars. To trade B shares, the investor 
needs to have foreign currency deposit account with banks. The total trading volume and value of B 
shares are both very small compared to A shares, so A share is still the major tradable share in the 
Chinese stock market and thus the subject of this research. 
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the firm. Fourthly, there should be no less than 1000 shareholders whose shares’ face 
value is more than RMB ¥1000. The shares issued to public should account for more 
than 25% of the total shares of the firm. If the issuing firm’s capitalization is bigger 
than RMB ¥400 million, the shares issued to public should account for more than 
15% of the total shares of the firm. Fifthly, in the latest 3 years the issuing firm should 
have no big violation of laws and there should be no misstatements in its financial 
statements and accounting reports. Sixthly, other criterions set by the State Council. 
Apart from that, the listed firm should disclose its financial status and operation 
performance in time according to relevant laws and regulations. The firm should 
make its financial statements to the public in every half fiscal year. 
 
2.3 Issuing Process 
Normally, the issuing process will follow several steps. The issuing firm starts the 
process by firstly drafting the offering project reports and the offering feasibility 
reports. Then the lawyer will finish the due diligence regarding the re-structure of the 
firm’s organization and legal issues. Certified public accounts will then accomplish 
the auditing reports, financial statements and all necessary original certificates. 
Underwriters will then come in to give their recommendations and guidance. All legal 
documents and relevant documents will be presented to the CSRC for approval. After 
the regulatory approval, the firm gets listed in stock exchange. The firm should also 
receive certified public accounts’ auditing in the three years after listing. 
 
During the initial public offerings, the investment banks15 mostly work as brokers and 
                                                 
15
 In China’s case they are not the real investment banks in the conventional sense but are in fact 
investment companies and security companies. Some of these companies may be founded by the 
provincial government and other government controlled local financial institutions to underwrite the 
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lead the selling of shares to the public. The issuers often have the responsibility for 
unsold shares. However, the new shares are usually oversubscribed due to huge 
demand. In China there are more than 100 firms providing underwriting services. 
Most of them are associated with the government and are very well connected with 
the issuing regulatory authority, as pointed out by Tian (2003). International 
underwriters are rare. In most cases, China’s issuing firms do not hire international 
auditors either partly because the cost concerns but mostly because the local auditors 
have less strict stance on the auditing criterions. 
 
2.4 Pricing and Allocation of New Shares 
Before the stock exchanges were founded, there were no regulations about the pricing 
of issues, and the 90 PLC’s that issued shares in 1980’s usually took the face value of 
the shares as issuing price at that time. Since 1991, the lottery system has been 
established. Since 1994, the disclosure requirements for IPO firms have been enforced. 
The most commonly used pricing method after 1995 is the online fixed price offering, 
which was firstly introduced in 1994. By this method, the investors bid for fixed 
quantities at pre-set price, with prorate allocation in the event of over-subscription. 
Under-subscription is really rare. But if that happens, the underwriter has the 
responsibility to buy all unsold shares. Investors need to have a full subscription 
deposit, which will be refunded for unsuccessful applications in one week after the 
subscription. The issuer set the issue price but the offer price has to be validated by 
the CSRC. In fact, the offer price is set according to the product of the after tax profits 
per share multiplied by a price earning ratio (PE-ratio, the share price divided by the 
earnings per share in the previous year), the latter being set with the reference to the 
                                                                                                                                            
specific IPO. In other words, some of these investment companies were established only to serve the 
purpose of underwriting certain IPOs. 
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similar listing firms in the same region and industry. But in fact, the CSRC often 
imposes a multiplier as the ceiling of the PE ratio, which changes over times. 
Although CSRC never officially declares the PE ceiling ratio, the practitioners 
especially the underwriters managed to ‘guesstimate’ the average PE ceiling ratio 
across all industries over times. For example, before 1999 the ceiling was fixed at 15. 
In January 1999, the ceiling restriction was loosened and the PE ratio used in IPO 
pricing was raised to as high as 50. In 2002 a ceiling of 20 was re-imposed16. In this 
sense, the government effectively has kept to itself the power of say-so with respect to 
the final IPO price. In case of oversubscription investors are essentially chosen by 
balloting. The ballot ratio is determined by the amount of shares publicly offered and 
the amount of shares that investors subscribed. 
 
In July 1999, in the spirit of the Securities Law, the CSRC enacted a rule which 
permitted companies which were intending to issue more than 400 million total shares 
to negotiate the IPO price with the underwriter. The 400 million total shares limitation 
was removed in 2000 April, allowing all firms to negotiate the IPO price. Since 2001, 
the bookbuilding method has become popular in China’s primary market. This 
involves the company and the underwriter determining the preliminary offer prices 
range (file price range). The underwriter will then measure the demand of institutional 
investors for these particular shares, and revise the offer price according to demand. In 
China, almost all underwriters adjust the offer price upwards after the bookbuilding 
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 The price ceiling requirement has never been found in any official document but its existence is 
undoubtedly believed by all the academics and practitioners in the area. How to find this pricing cap in 
certain time period is another long story which will not be told in depth here. Basically, the 
underwriters (investment companies) will attempt to apply for an offer price as high as possible from 
the CSRC and usually this application will be rejected by the government if the application’s price 
exceeds the price cap. Until the price is modified to a reasonable level that the CSRC believes to be the 
government will not endorse the application. After a number of times of so trying, the industry will get 
a common and rough idea of what current price cap level is. The price ceiling numbers can be referred 
to Yu and Tse’s (2003) paper.  
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process. 
 
2.5 Issuing System Changes 
The whole issuing system has experienced several changes ever since the market was 
created. Before April 2001, the IPO procedure was tightly overseen according to a 
quota control policy. At that time, the Chinese stock market regulatory authorities 
including State Planning Committee, China’s central bank and the CSRC would 
annually determine the total amount of issues allowed and the total number of firms 
that could make offers. They only allow certain amount of new shares to be floated at 
the stock exchanges and then ration the sub-quotas to each of the 29 central 
government ministries that oversee various industries, and the 32 provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions17. Complying with the sub-quota, the local 
security regulatory authorities would invite enterprises to apply for listing and make 
selection among them under specific criteria. (Yau and Steele, 2000) Once approval 
for an issue had been obtained, an investment syndicate would be formed to draw up a 
detailed plan. Security companies then would perform the standard services of 
providing advice, underwriting and distributing shares to the public, as well as 
developing a secondary market.  
 
Since April 2001, the quota control system has been replaced by the recommending 
and approving system. The CSRC instead, is examining and approving the new IPOs 
recommended by the local government according to the market conditions rather than 
administrative quota. This change is considered as a symbol that China’s stock market 
                                                 
17
 The criteria used for allocation among provinces include the assessment of regional needs based on 
the production structure and industrial base and recognition of balanced regional development to attain 
distribution objectives. Within each regional quota, the local securities authorities invite enterprises to 
request a listing and then make a selection based on the criteria that combines good performance as 
well as sectional development objectives. See Chan et al (2004). 
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has moved a big step forward from a central-planned market to an economic-driven 
market. The market conditions driving government IPO decisions could include how 
volatile the market is, how speculative the market is and how the capital supply and 
demand balance is, although the government did not specify which particular 
‘conditions’ they would follow. Sometimes, to justify its policies or to clarify its 
intentions the government would claim which market conditions have prompted its 
decisions. One such example is the 6-month IPO ban in 2004 mentioned earlier where 
the government claimed that market speculation was its major concern in relation to 
the policy.  
 
The bookbuilding method became popular from then on 18 . Soon after that, the 
“channel system” came into effect. The channel system requires that to issue new 
shares an underwriting company need at least one empty channel, and in every empty 
channel only one new share can be issued at any time. Once the first issuing has been 
done, the channel then will be empty again for the next issuing. The total number of 
the channels for every underwriting company is allocated by the central government 
according to the company’s firm size, reputation and previous performance, etc.19  
 
Furthermore, a latest recommending person policy has been enforced on the base of 
the existing channel system. Under the recommending person policy the underwriting 
company has to appoint two qualified recommending representatives to take financial 
                                                 
18
 Unlike bookbuilding in advanced markets which involves hundreds of thousands of institutional 
investors, China's domestic bookbuilding process involves only some 190 qualified institutional 
investors. The issuer eventually has to consult the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the 
securities watchdog, about the indicative price range. See China CITIC Bank IPO Draws Keen 
Overseas Demand, Daisy Ku, Reuters (April 15, 2007). Effectively, the CSRC’s indication of the price 
range is a more reliable criterion to follow, which is exactly the case of China CITIC Bank IPO 
described in the Reuters’ news. On the other hand, as the majority of China’s investors are retail 
investors, the online fixed pricing method gained more popularity. 
19
 An underwriting company can only have up to 8 channels. 
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and legal advisory responsibilities in every channel. No matter what goals the 
government originally purported to achieve, these constantly changing regulatory 
policies reflect China’s unstable emerging market nature. And they enhance the 
practitioners’ impression that it is the government policy control rather than the 
market’s demands and supplies that directly influences the IPO process no matter 
whether these policies have taken into account the market condition or not. For 
example, Zheng Jing (2007) points out that China’s new issuing needs to go through 
layers after layers of government hierarchy and months after months of approving 
procedure to go public. He believes the government administrative control has led to 
the loss of the listing companies’ own right of decision making in capital raising 
related issues due to prolonged and stubborn issuing processes. 
 
In addition to these regulations and rules, the government also directly intervene the 
IPO market from time to time in for various reasons. For instance, in order to “prevent 
a flood of equity as companies converted non-tradable, mostly government holdings 
into common stock” (Bloomberg May 18th 2006) and to give the securities regulator 
enough time to stipulate new issuing rules, the CSRC halted the sale of all IPO shares 
in May 2005. Until one year later the ban was lifted after a government program to 
trade more than $200 billion of mostly state-owned stockholdings was implemented 
without causing a market slump. An investment expert is quoted in the same 
Bloomberg news as saying “it’s a testimony to the success (that the government 
successfully sold the non-tradable government stockholdings into market without 
adversely affecting the market) of their policy. That’s what the A share market is there 
for, to raise money.”  
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Some of the above unique characteristics of China’s stock market and issuing system 
will be revisited in the later chapters because they have unique impacts on China’s 
IPO under-pricing. Now that the market’s background knowledge has been given, 
there shall be a deeper understanding of China’s IPO pricing mechanism. It is now 
straightforward to look into the previous literatures in the field. 
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Chapter 3 Literature Review - Theories 
In general, average short-term IPO under-pricing has been widely noticed in many 
markets. People hold different views about this puzzle. For example, Loughran et al. 
(1994) believe that the under-pricing corresponds to a form of market inefficiency and 
is harmful to young firms trying to raise capital through the issuing. Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) stress that the IPO under-pricing happens in imperfect market is due to 
investment banks’ discriminative allocation of new shares. Representing an extreme 
view, Chambers’ (2005) paper argues that IPO under-pricing is the outcome of market 
failure. No matter which argument is correct the IPO under-pricing is a realistic 
concern of the issuing firm, which prompts studies on the causes of the under-pricing.  
 
Previous researchers have come up with some classical theories aiming to explain the 
IPO under-pricing. Although their theories may have gained empirical support from 
various markets not all these existing theories may suit China’s context, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter where empirical evidences of these classical theories 
will be explored. However, the existing theories form a solid base for any IPO 
research in terms of theoretical framework. This chapter therefore will go through the 
existing theories and especially explore their suitability and implications to the 
Chinese IPO under-pricing. At the end of the chapter, some literatures comprising 
China-specific factors and their validity will be explored because they are of 
particular relevance to the Chinese IPO under-pricing. 
 
3.1 Information Asymmetry Theories 
This is the earliest and the best established block of IPO under-pricing theories. Many 
of later theories are basically derived from the information asymmetry theories. 
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Broadly speaking, the information asymmetry theories include the “Winner’s Curse” 
theories, the information revelation theories, the principal-agent theories and the 
signaling theories. The underlying assumption of the information asymmetry theories 
is that one party in the IPO procedure, for example the underwriter, the issuer or even 
some investors, asymmetrically possesses some information which is hidden from the 
other party/parties. 
 
Based on the principal-agent structure in information economics, Baron (1982) points 
out that an information asymmetry between the underwriters and the issuers causes 
the large first-day return of IPOs. Because the underwriter possesses superior 
information concerning the possible demand for the shares being issued while the 
issuer is unable to observe the distribution efforts of the underwriter, the issuer must 
compensate the underwriter for the use of his information and the underwriter has an 
incentive to minimize his efforts in selling the issue by offering the shares at discount. 
In simple words, the under-priced IPOs provide compensatory discount to 
underwriters. However, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) find evidence that 
investment banks also under-price their own shares when going public. Baron’s (1982) 
theory needs more careful examination, but it does give rise to a whole block of IPO 
theories within the information asymmetry framework. 
 
Unlike Baron (1982) who looks at the information asymmetry between issuer and 
underwriter, some researchers look at the information asymmetry among investors 
themselves. Also attributing under-pricing to asymmetrically distributed information, 
Rock (1986) presents that only uninformed investors will buy the overpriced issues 
and they receive 100 percent of the shares, but both informed and uninformed 
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investors will attempt to buy under-priced issues and the shares are subsequently 
rationed between them. Thus, uninformed investors face a “Winner’s Curse” because 
they have a greater probability of being allocated all of the least desirable issues. To 
avoid this winner’s curse, the uninformed investors will only participate in the IPOs 
when the informed investors purchase the under-priced issues and the uninformed 
investors demand the under-pricing, of which the scale is sufficiently large to 
compensate them for the ex ante uncertainty or adverse selection bias. In other words, 
IPO under-pricing is a premium to keep the market liquidity by luring the uninformed 
investors to play along.  
 
The information revelation theories assume that the information asymmetry exists 
between underwriters and investors but this time the investors are more informed than 
the issuer, for example about the market demand for shares. During the book building 
process, the investment banks (as underwriters) collect information about the value of 
the stock in order to price the issue more accurately. However, in the absence of 
inducements, revealing positive information to the underwriter is not incentive-
compatible for the investors. Doing so would, presumably, result in a higher offer 
price and so a lower profit to the informed investors. Worse still, there is a strong 
incentive to actively misrepresent positive information – that is, to claim that the 
issuer’s future looks bleak when it doesn’t – to induce the underwriter to set a lower 
offer price. To compensate the investors who reveal information, the investment bank 
will favor them when allocating shares. This argument is supported by Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), and Spatt and Srivastava (1991). They 
argue that the underwriter may under-price the IPO to induce investors to reveal their 
valuations of the company during the pre-sale bookbuilding period. Benveniste and 
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Spindt (1989) also argue that by not announcing the allocation rule, the investment 
banker can use his discretion to reward regular investors, who act as a form of 
insurance by buying shares in both badly received and well received issues. Based on 
the theoretical settings the under-pricing required under the fixed pricing and 
bookbuilding offering methods, Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Spatt and Srivastava 
(1991) and Benvensite and Busaba (1997) and some other researchers believe the 
bookbuilding requires on average a lower discount. 
 
The last group of asymmetric information theories is the signaling theory which 
reverses Rock’s (1982) assumption regarding to the information asymmetry between 
issuing firms and investors. Ibbotson (1975) is regarded as the first researcher to come 
up with the original intuition for the signaling literature. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) all make contributions to the theory 
later on. They argue that IPO under-pricing is a mechanism to signal the issuing firms’ 
quality: because the issuers are more aware of their firm values than the investors at 
the time of offering, high quality issuers purposely under-price IPOs for more 
successful seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the future, which is too costly for the 
poor quality issuers to follow. The higher quality firms’ cost will be rewarded at the 
time of seasoned offering. In this sense, the firms with SEOs are assumed to be under-
priced more than those that do not have SEOs.  
 
The signaling concept could have another implication on the IPO under-pricing. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the insider information held by an entrepreneur 
about the quality of the firm can be transferred to suppliers of capital through owner’s 
willingness to invest in his or her own projects, because it is in the owner’s interest to 
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invest a bigger proportion of his or her wealth in the successful projects. Thus, the 
value of a firm increases with the percentage of the equity held by the entrepreneur 
relative to what he or she otherwise would have held given a lower-quality project. If 
their assumption is acceptable, then the insider ownership should be related to the first 
trading day under-pricing.  
 
3.2 Ex ante Uncertainty Theories/ Advising Agent Quality Theories 
This class of theories is basically variations of information asymmetry theories, but 
they have gained some popularity in the past.  
 
When firms issue new shares, one of the investors’ biggest concerns is the firm’s fair 
value. The investors’ concern may in turn affect the face value of the issuing firm, 
which is reflected by the share price offered. Beatty and Ritter (1986) consider the 
level of ex ante uncertainty surrounding the intrinsic value of an issue as a critical 
factor in explaining the under-pricing, and the greater the uncertainty the larger the 
under-pricing. In other words, the more uncertainty the investors have about the fair 
value of the firm the more likely they will pay less in terms of face value, which 
essentially causes new shared to be under-priced. The underlying argument is that 
higher uncertainty will proportionally lead to more benefit to the informed investors, 
which will deteriorate the winner’s curse problem. In result, greater under-pricing is 
needed to compensate the uninformed investors. Their theory suggests that smaller 
firms should have higher under-pricing due to the higher risk associated with the 
smaller firm size.  
 
Based on the relationship between ex ante uncertainty and under-pricing, many 
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researchers have elicited some other models. For example, Booth and Smith (1986), 
Titman and Trueman (1986), Balvers, McDonald and Miller (1988), Carter and 
Manaster (1990), and Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) suggest that the quality of 
advising agents (e.g. investment bankers, accountants and auditors) is negatively 
related to IPO under-pricing levels. It is argued that more prestigious underwriters or 
advising agents can reduce the information asymmetry and thereby cut the under-
pricing cost.  
 
3.3 Institutional Theories 
The institutional theories, as pointed out by Ljungqvist (2004), generally consist of 
the legal insurance or lawsuit avoidance theories, the price support theories and the 
tax inducement theories. The name of this block of theories comes from the argument 
that the IPO under-pricing is caused by various institutional settings and behaviors. 
 
The basic idea of legal insurance or lawsuit avoidance theories may go back at least to 
Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975). The assumption is that companies deliberately sell 
their stock at a discount to reduce the likelihood of future lawsuits from shareholders 
disappointed with the post-IPO performance of their shares. Tinic (1988) and Hughes 
and Thakor (1992), and Hensler (1995) stress that the under-pricing represents an 
insurance premium imposed by issuers and underwriters to avoid legal liabilities 
under federal securities laws for material misstatements in the offering prospectus or 
registration statement. Apparently this block of hypotheses is built upon the US 
market settings. 
 
The second institutional theory is the price support theories, also called price 
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stabilization theories. Usually when the new shares are issued, according to the pre-
signed contract the underwriter will have to prevent the new share price from 
plunging dramatically right after the issuing by means such as share buy back. 
According to her investigation of the distribution of initial returns following IPO's, 
Ruud (1993) claims that the positive mean initial returns may reflect the existence of a 
partially unobserved left (negative) tail. She finds that most IPOs with zero one-day 
returns subsequently fall in price, suggesting that underwriter price support may 
account for the skewed distribution and hence the phenomenon of positive average 
initial IPO returns, even if offering prices are set at expected market value. 
 
The IPO under-pricing may be advantageous from a tax point of view, which 
promoted the tax inducement theories. The tax inducement theories are very much 
country-biased. For example, Rydqvist (1997) explores the tax inducement possibility 
in the context of Swedish IPOs. His argument is based on a tax differential between 
the employment income tax and the capital gain tax imposed by the Swedish 
government before year 1990. The much heavier employment income tax created an 
incentive for the firms to pay the employees by allocating appreciating assets in lieu 
of salaries. One such appreciating asset is under-priced stock, allocated preferentially 
to the firm’s own employees at the IPO. Based on the observation of US IPOs, 
Taranto (2003) puts forward a similar argument. In the US, the capital gain tax rate is 
typically lower than the income tax rate. The holders of managerial or employee stock 
options pay both the income tax on the difference between the strike price and the 
“fair market value” when they exercise the option, and the capital gain tax on the 
difference between the sale price and the “fair market value” when they eventually 
sell the acquired shares.  The US tax law considers the “fair market value” for options 
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exercised in conjunction with an IPO to be the offer price rather than the price that 
will prevail in the market once the trading starts. As a result, the senior managers may 
have the tax incentive to under-price their company’s IPO. 
 
3.4 Ownership and Control Theories 
Before a firm goes public, usually the ownership and managerial control are in the 
same hands. IPO in many cases eventually separate the ownership and the control. 
When coming to the issue of making optimal operating and investment decisions, the 
ownership matters considerably to the management’s incentives. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) find that managers may maximize the expected private utility of their control 
benefits such as perquisite consumption at the expense of outside shareholders rather 
than maximizing expected shareholder value when the separation of ownership and 
control is incomplete. Within the agency cost context, two opposing theories have 
been put forward to rationalize the IPO under-pricing phenomenon. 
 
Brennan and Franks (1997) view under-pricing as a means to entrench managerial 
control and the attendant agency costs by avoiding monitoring by a large outside 
shareholder. They argue that the under-pricing gives managers the opportunity to 
protect their private benefits by allocating shares strategically when taking their 
company public. Managers seek to avoid allocating large stakes to investors for fear 
that their non-value-maximizing behavior would receive unwelcome scrutiny. Small 
outside stakes reduce external monitoring, owing to two free-rider problems. First, 
because it is a public good, shareholders will invest in a sub-optimally low level of 
monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Second, greater ownership dispersion 
implies that the incumbent managers benefit from a reduced threat of being ousted in 
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a hostile takeover (Grossman and Hart (1980)). In this view, the role of under-pricing 
is to generate excess demand, which enables managers to ration investors so that they 
end up holding smaller stakes in the business. Simply speaking, under-pricing in this 
theory is a means to retain control. 
 
On the contrary, in the second theory under-pricing is regarded as a means to reduce 
agency costs. Brennan and Franks (1997) implicitly assume that managers try to 
maximize their expected private utility by entrenching their control benefits. However, 
it could be argued oppositely that managers should actually seek to minimize their 
scope for extracting private benefits of control, because the agency costs are 
ultimately borne by the owners of a company and the managers as part-owners bear at 
least some of the costs of their own non-profit-maximizing behavior. When the 
managers’ stakes are large enough so that the agency costs they bear outweigh the 
private benefits they enjoy, it will be in their interest to reduce, not entrench, their 
discretion. Based on this intuition, Stoughton and Zechner (1998) observe that it may 
be value-enhancing to allocate shares to a large outside investors who is able to 
monitor managerial actions. When the allocation is sub-optimally large from the 
investor’s point of view, for instance because it is easily diversified, an added 
incentive may be offered in the form of under-pricing. 
 
3.5 Managers’ Strategic Under-pricing Theories 
Broadly speaking, this school of theories belongs to the ownership and control theory 
family. Although in the same context of agency cost, this group of theories has 
slightly different underlying assumptions. The difference somehow makes it justified 
to list this group of theories separately. 
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Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2002) developed a IPO under-pricing model that 
regards the under-pricing as an agency cost to issuers, in which the manager 
strategically under-prices the IPO in order to maximize his wealth from selling shares 
at lock up expiration. The first-day under-pricing creates information momentum i.e. 
incremental comments and recommendations by research analysts, especially by non-
lead underwriter analysts, which shifts the demand curve for the stock outwards. This 
generates higher prices at the lockup expiration, when managers have their first 
opportunity to sell shares. As a result, managers accept substantial under-pricing in 
order to maximize their personal wealth.  
 
3.6 Behavior Theories 
This school of theories is still in its infancy, as Ljungqvist (2004) points out. The 
behavior theories assume that either the presence of ‘irrational’ investors who bid up 
the price of IPO shares beyond true value, or that issuers are subject to behavior 
biases and therefore fail to put pressure on the underwriting banks to have under-
pricing reduced. 
 
Welch (1992) shows that ‘informational cascades’ can develop in some forms of IPO's 
if investors make their investment decisions sequentially i.e. later investors can 
condition their bids on the bids of earlier investors, rationally disregarding their own 
information. Successful initial sales are interpreted by subsequent investors as 
evidence that earlier investors held favorable information. As a result, later investors 
follow to invest irrespective of their own information, forming a snowball effect on 
the new share demand. Conversely, disappointing initial sales discourages subsequent 
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investors and the new share demand remains low over time. The possibility of this 
cascade or ‘bandwagon’ gives market power to early investors who can demand more 
under-pricing in return of committing to the IPO's and thus starting a positive cascade. 
Ritter (1998) suggest that the IPO market may be subject to the bandwagon effects. A 
positive cascade or bandwagon means that the IPO is under-priced. Amihud, Hauser, 
and Kirsh (2001) support this hypothesis by showing that IPOs tend to be either 
undersubscribed or hugely oversubscribed, with very few moderately oversubscribed 
in Israel. 
 
Assuming the existence of ‘irrational’ or ‘sentiment’ investors, Ljungqvist, Nanda, 
and Singh (2004) advance the investment sentiment theory. They suggest that because 
sentiment investors hold optimistic beliefs about the future prospects for the IPO firm, 
the issuer tries to capture as much of the surplus under the sentiment investors’ 
downward-sloping demand curve as possible. The optimal strategy to maximize the 
excess valuation over the fundamental value of the stock is to hold back stock in 
inventory to keep the price from falling. But due to regulatory constraints on price 
discrimination and inventory holding, the issuer’s optimal strategy is instead to 
allocate shares to ‘regular’ institutional investors for subsequent resale to sentiment 
investors at prices the regulars maintain by restricting supply. The under-pricing is to 
compensate for the regulars’ risk of holding IPO shares in case of prematurely ended 
hot market. This mechanism works even in the absence of asymmetry information. 
Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh’s (2004) theory suggests that the offer price still 
exceeds fundamental value, resulting in a negative IPO return in the long-run that is 
consistent with empirical findings from Ritter (1991) and others. 
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3.7 Privatization IPO and Political Motives 
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) argue that government may pursue political objectives 
other than maximizing firm’s value in the privatization process. For example, 
government may allocate under-priced shares to the employees who may otherwise 
have misgivings about privatization.  
 
Perotti (1995) suggests that a partial sale and (possibly) its under-pricing are signals 
of commitment, and gradual sales are the signs of government’s willingness to bear 
residual risk. Perotti’s (1995) conclusion has shed light on the empirical puzzle why 
the typically large, well-known privatized firms with a long track record are usually 
under-priced more than those mostly new or little-known private IPO’s, which is 
difficult to reconcile with the traditional explanation for partial sales and under-
pricing based on asymmetric information over asset values.  
 
Another political motive that could enter the IPO under-pricing rationale is related 
with government election strategy. Biais and Perotti (2002) point out that, to avoid 
being voted out in favor of a left-wing government that plans to expropriate the gains 
from privatization, an existing market-oriented government’s optimal privatization 
strategy is to allocate under-priced shares to median-class voters to align their 
interests with those of the market-oriented government. The greater this country’s 
income inequality, the larger under-pricing needed to persuade median-class voters to 
reject a left-wing government’s policies. As a matter of fact, although government as 
agent of taxpayers should ensure no unfair wealth transfer has taken place from 
taxpayers to small group of investors who bought the IPO, political implications of 
privatization IPO under-pricing may take over this priority and they may be different 
 57 
from one country to another, as suggested by Paudyal, Saadouni and Briston (1998).  
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Chapter 4 Literature Review – Empirical Studies 
The first question to be raised in any empirical study of IPO under-pricing is how to 
measure the under-pricing. Ritter (1984) adopts the IPO raw initial percentage return 
as a proxy to measure the IPO under-pricing degree and the market-adjusted initial 
return is also used by later researchers such as Chi and Padgett (2005) in Chinese IPO 
literature especially. Chapter 6 will discuss in detail the difference and the 
applicability of these two measurements to the Chinese IPO context. Being widely 
accepted in empirical studies, ordinary least square (OLS) multivariable regression is 
often adopted as benchmark test model by early researchers such as Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997) and Su and Fleisher (1999). Given proper IPO under-pricing 
measurement as the dependent variable and appropriate regression models, all 
applicable IPO under-pricing theories or hypotheses are in fact waiting for test against 
their testable implications based on suitable independent proxy variables to prove 
their validity.  
 
4.1 Empirical Studies of Existing Theories 
4.1.1 Information Asymmetry Theories 
Let’s roll back a little to the earlier discussion of Information Asymmetry theories. At 
the heart of the Winner’s Curse model is the idea that, if properly adjusted for 
rationing, uninformed investors’ abnormal returns are zero on average. That is to say, 
the uninformed investors only get just enough return to ensure their continuous 
participation in the market. This implication is extensively tested in countries that 
impose strict allocation rules. The earliest empirical study is by Koh and Walter (1989) 
in the analysis of Singapore’s IPO market. They show that the likelihood of receiving 
an allocation in a random ballot is negatively related to the degree of under-pricing. In 
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Chinese IPO literature, Liu (2003) and Chi and Padgett (2005) have tested the 
“Winner’s Curse” hypothesis using the lottery winning ratio which measures the 
likelihood of receiving an allocation in a random ballot. Rock’s (1986) “Winner’s 
Curse” argument also implies that the degree of information asymmetry is a 
decreasing function of profitability and firm age. Indeed, these two proxies are often 
tested by early researchers including Su and Fleisher (1999). Besides, they also 
suggest another test proxy of offer price. They believe a higher offer price means a 
lower profit to the informed investors, which has similar effect of lower profitability. 
 
The information-asymmetry-based information revelation theory prompts researchers 
to test the difference between fixed pricing and bookbuilding offering methods. In the 
Chinese literature, Liu (2003) found that China’s IPO's are under-priced more under 
the fixed pricing method than the bookbuilding method. 
 
The adverse selection motivated signaling theory is one of the most successful 
theories in IPO mis-pricing literature and it is widely supported by the empirical data 
from many markets. As mentioned earlier, less than 10%20 of the total Chinese IPO 
companies are previously owned by private sectors. Leland and Pyle’s (1977) insider 
signaling theory may not be applicable to Chinese IPOs because the private owner or 
entrepreneur is usually not the issuer who holds the insider information. But if we 
regard the government as insider seller too, then the signal of the issuing firm’s 
quality can be translated into the government equity retention rate in the new firm. 
Indeed, Mok and Hui (1998) demonstrate that the ‘Chinese characteristic’ of high 
equity retention by the state is one of the key determinants of market-adjusted IPO 
                                                 
20
 There are 83 previously private-owned IPOs in the thesis’ dataset of total 880 IPOs. 
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under-pricing. By contrast, using a much later dataset Chi and Padgett (2005) stress 
that the government retention rate has a negative impact on the under-pricing, which 
they claim shows that the privatization is welcomed by the investors. 
 
In fact, information asymmetry theory is the most frequently tested theory in Chinese 
IPO literature but the theory seems to have mixed implications. For example, Su and 
Fleisher (1999) examine the signaling model and find that the Chinese IPO under-
pricing is a strategy for issuing firms to signal their value to investors. Furthermore, 
they claim that the under-pricing is better explained by a signaling model that relates 
IPO under-pricing to subsequent equity offerings (SEOs) than by the one linking 
government or employee ownership to equilibrium IPO under-pricing. On the contrary, 
Yu and Tse (2003) argue that the signaling model cannot explain the Chinese IPO 
under-pricing. Yu and Tse’s (2003) point of view is agreed by Chi and Padgett (2005) 
and Liu (2003). 
 
Not only the signaling theory, but also the winner’s curse theory is causing skepticism 
among researchers in the Chinese context. For instance, Yu and Tse (2003) address 
that the winner’s curse problem caused by information asymmetry can well explain 
the Chinese IPO under-pricing and their finding is supported by Chi and Padgett 
(2005) and Liu and Li (2000), but Liu (2003) argues that his analysis only shows a 
very weak evidence for winner’s curse hypothesis. 
 
As a matter of fact, Yu and Tse (2003) point out that because the Chinese underwriters 
do not have much market power to seek the information rent due to the intense 
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competition in the Chinese underwriting industry21 , and also because it is not a 
problem for underwriters to place all available stocks with investors due to the 
extremely high demand, the principal-agent model cannot possibly explain the 
Chinese IPO under-pricing without rent seeking or moral hazard problems. 
 
4.1.2 Ex ante Uncertainty Theories/ Advising Agent Quality Theories  
McGuinness (1992) has tested Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) hypothesis. In Chinese IPO 
literature, Su and Fleisher (1999) and Chi and Padgett (2005) have used the issuing 
firm’s market capitalization and offer size as proxies of the firm size to test for ex ante 
uncertainty under-pricing. 
 
The auditing standards in China’s stock market are generally perceived to be low, as 
pointed out by Aharony et al (2000). The corporate disclosure is far less stringent than 
in the developed market. Private investors or so-called liquid or retail investors’ major 
source of information is the IPO prospectuses, which unfortunately are not reliable 
under the existing accounting and auditing standards because the A-share companies 
only need to follow the disclosure/listing requirements according to the less restrictive 
Chinese accounting rules (RPC GAAP) instead of the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), let alone the forged accounting report problem. Even Zhou 
Xiaochuan, the governor of China’s central bank, ever admitted, “Through the 
1990s … there existed large deficiencies in the standards of accounting, information 
                                                 
21
 There are 129 firms providing underwriting services in China as of year 2003. These firms range 
from security and investment companies to commercial bank subsidiaries, from state-owned facilities 
to private financial branches. All of them have very strong government background or relationships. 
Many of them have various levels of provincial or local governments as their biggest shareholders. 
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disclosure and financial reporting 22 .” Zhou’s opinion has been verified by large 
amount of accounting and auditing literatures in China including Shi and Weisert 
(2002). On one hand, as Aharony et al (2000) pointed out the state-owned enterprises’ 
managers lack the accounting sophistication to manage their financial statements. On 
the other hand, they are motivated to manipulate the financial statements to boost their 
firms’ chance of being selected for IPO. Furthermore, the state, which remains the 
majority shareholder of the IPO firm, may instruct the manager to manage earnings 
(through financial statements) to influence the offering price. International 
underwriters and auditors are seldom hired for the offering. The inadequate 
information disclosure and lack of information sources make it difficult for retail 
investors to evaluate the intrinsic value of an IPO before investing. The ex ante 
uncertainty could be exacerbated under such circumstances. For these reasons, a 
number of Chinese researchers have tested the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis using 
different proxies. For example, Mok and Hui (1998) test the inverse of new funds 
raised as a proxy of the ex ante uncertainty, and Yu and Tse (2003) test other 3 proxies 
including the standard deviation of the IPO share’s market returns, the offer size and 
the age of the firms. Their findings show that the ex ante uncertainty theory may be 
promising to explain Chinese IPO under-pricing.  
 
On the other hand, the advising agent quality theory is rarely tested in the Chinese 
IPO literature. Why? The reasons are actually discussed already. As said, because the 
A-share companies only need to follow the RPC GAAP accounting standards instead 
of the International Accounting Standards, A-share companies usually do not hire 
international auditing companies such as Big 4 for the auditing services. While most 
                                                 
22
 Extracted from the speech Instability and Evolution of the Financial System given by Zhou Xiaochun, 
Governor of the People’s Bank of China, in December 2007, full text can be found at The People’s 
Bank of China’s official website www.pbc.gov.cn. 
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of the local accounting and auditing companies are state-owned or previously state-
owned, the quality of their services is not easy to differentiate. Meanwhile, seldom 
does China’s IPO issuing firm hire international underwriters23. Because there are too 
many local underwriting companies and the underwriting services are very much 
segmented by regions due to local governments’ interference, the underwriter 
reputation may not be convincing in suggesting the agent’s quality. In fact, as pointed 
out by Yu and Tse (2003), because the Chinese A-share issues are underwritten by 
domestic state-owned security companies and there are no prestigious financial 
institutions with international reputations involved, the underwriter’s reputation is not 
a testable hypothesis in China’s context. 
 
4.1.3 Institutional Theories  
The earlier discussion about institutional theories shows that the theory only has local 
suitability for explaining the IPO under-pricing. The lawsuit concern is largely US-
centric and the tax hypothesis is applicable only to specific countries too. China’s 
IPOs have a different story. Yu and Tse (2003) once pointed out, because China did 
not have a complete securities law in force until July 1999, the risk of being sued is 
not economically significant. Ironically, even after the securities law came into force 
there are still many stock market scandals due to material misstatements in China’s 
stock market and the lawsuit issue has hardly ever been in the firms’ concern24 . 
“China’s stock market has long suffered from corruption and accounting scandals, but 
few successful prosecutions have been launched for insider trading”, a comment in 
                                                 
23
 Only very recently, UBS joined Goldman Sachs to become one of the very few international 
companies earning underwriting fees from Chinese IPO firms for their mainland stock market’s listing. 
24
 According to the listing rules formulated by the two stock exchanges, they do not have the legal 
power to punish any fraudulent behaviour. The most serious action they can take is to publish a report 
to “publicly reprimand” the offender and until the middle of 1999 they had not even issued such report. 
Even the CSRC has very restrained power to punish any fraud. So far the highest economic penalty 
enforced by the CSRC is 300,000 Yuan, approximately 20,000 pounds, let alone the lawsuit. 
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Financial Times that well illustrates such failures25. At the same time, academics such 
as Su (2004) have dismissed the bankruptcy cost as a reasonable concern in the 
Chinese IPO pricing process. He emphasizes that ‘in the absence of rigorous 
enforcement, the Chinese bankruptcy law is merely an embryonic regulatory regime 
and may not affect leverage decisions.’ Thereby, the legal cost is trivial in general and 
the lawsuit hypothesis may not apply to the Chinese IPO context.  
 
As for the price support hypothesis, a big difference between China’s and western 
countries’ listing rules is that the price support is prohibited in the Chinese stock 
market. The price support hypothesis is not suitable for Chinese IPO context. 
 
Likewise, the tax inducement hypothesis is not applicable to Chinese IPO under-
pricing either. In China, there is no capital gain tax on securities. Hence, the 
hypothesis’ fundamental assumption of personal income and capital gain tax rate 
differential does not exist. 
 
4.1.4 Ownership and Control Theories  
In respect of the ownership and control theory, the earlier introduction of Chinese 
primary market proves to be necessary. It has been mentioned that the Chinese IPOs 
are mostly partial privatization and the government retains dominant control power in 
the post IPO firm. The agency cost influences on IPO pricing diminish in this instance. 
Su (2004) gives subtle explanations on the agency cost problem when trying to find 
the insider ownership influences on Chinese IPO under-pricing. He says, ‘the degree 
of separation of ownership and management is quite low in newly privatized Chinese 
                                                 
25
 “Angola deal sparks China shares probe”, Financial Times, Monday, April 9 2007. 
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firms. The average fraction of the number of A-shares sold to the public in our sample 
is merely 30% of a firm's total equity and the average fraction of shares retained by 
the government is 45%26. A firm going public has much less free cash flow and less 
managerial entrenchment problem. Typically being the largest stakeholder, the 
Chinese government has tremendous amount of influence over the selection and 
dismissal of managers, and serves to check managerial performance. Agency 
problems have little effect on pre-IPO leverage decisions.’ His point of view is 
strongly agreed by Yu and Tse (2003). They confirm that the ownership and control 
explanation will not apply to the Chinese IPO under-pricing because the two 
ownership and control models need rationing discrimination as means to realize the 
control ends but the major offering mechanism in China does not have any pricing or 
rationing bias. 
 
4.1.5 Managers’ Strategic Under-pricing Theories  
As said, the agency cost based ownership and control theories are not applicable to 
the Chinese IPO literature, neither are the managers’ strategic under-pricing theories 
that are too based on agency cost assumptions. Previous chapters have said that only 
30 to 130 out of more than 1300 issuing firms in China are previously private-owned. 
In the majority state-owned issuing companies, managers are government officials 
and usually they have neither shareholdings nor stock options in the issuing firms like 
their western country peers. Sometimes, they do not even buy the new shares because 
of local government requirement for management not buying shares of their own 
companies. In fact, Yu and Tse (2003) found that the manager’s strategic under-
                                                 
26
 This thesis found that in the post-IPO firms average tradable shares sold public is 28.5%, average 
government shareholding is 46.8%, average employee shareholding is 4.1% and average other legal 
entity (other than the state) shareholding is 19.2%. The attribution of the post-IPO shareholding is very 
similar to what Su (2004) found. 
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pricing model does not stand. However, they admit that their test is preliminary and 
their topic needs further research due to the lack of data for media coverage. Their 
statement again shows the common problem of data accessibility in Chinese IPO 
research. 
 
4.1.6 Behaviour Theories  
This block of theories remains the least explored in general IPO under-pricing 
literature as well as in Chinese IPO literature. Liu (2003) suggests that the share 
allocation method and investors’ demand for shares can be used as proxies for the 
bandwagon effect on China’s IPOs. One of the testable proxy variables is the lottery 
winning ratio again. Meanwhile, he also uses the lottery mechanisms including money 
based lottery and lottery based on the market value of tradable shares held as testing 
proxy. His result is mixed and no decisive conclusion has been drawn.  
 
4.1.7 Privatization IPO and Political Motives  
Speaking of IPOs in the privatization process, Jenkinson and Mayer (1988) and 
Menyah and Paudyal (1996) show that under-pricing in UK privatization sales is 
greater than in the average public offerings. Choi and Nam (1998) have empirically 
collected supportive evidence from 30 countries, showing that there is a general 
tendency for privatizations to be under-priced to a greater degree than the initial 
public offerings of privately-owned enterprises. In Chinese literature, Tian (2003) has 
directly tested the privatization IPO hypothesis and he finds no pricing differential 
between state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) and privately owned enterprises.  
 
Datar and Mao (1998) attribute the Chinese IPO under-pricing to the political motive 
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for the dispersed distribution of shares to create a viable capital market. According to 
Perotti’s (1995) partial sale and government signaling model, a bigger government 
shareholding would mean bigger risk to the investors and therefore need a stronger 
signal of government commitment. In other words, the government needs to under-
price the IPO with greater magnitude to compensate for the investors’ risk. To find 
implications of Perotte’s (1995) theory in Chinese IPO market, researchers have 
looked at the relationship between government retention rate – a rate measuring 
government shareholding in percentage in the issuing firm after the IPO – and the IPO 
initial return. Their results are contradictory and not decisive at all. As already 
mentioned, Mok and Hui (1998) demonstrate that the ‘Chinese characteristic’ of high 
equity retention by the state is one of the key determinants of market-adjusted IPO 
under-pricing. Their finding may have reflected Leland and Pyle’s (1977) hypothesis 
if we regard the state-owned parental company of the carved out IPO units as another 
type of insider issuer. And Perotti’s (1995) hypothesis seems to be supported by their 
findings as well. However, Chi and Padgett (2005) stress that the government 
ownership has a negative impact on the under-pricing, which by their claim shows 
that privatization is welcomed by investors. Mok and Hui’s (1998) test is based on the 
early period of China’s stock market while Chi and Padgett (2005) focus on much 
later period. The contradiction may be caused by different time horizon and further 
test is needed. 
 
Apart from government ownership, in terms of the government behavior in the IPO 
process, Chi and Padgett (2005) believe that the Chinese government does not send 
signals to the market on the quality of the issuers by under-pricing. But at the same 
time, they suggest that the Chinese government does capture the market opportunities 
 68 
to time IPO’s to get the best market feedback on offerings.  
 
4.1.8 Miscellaneous China-Specific Explanations 
Now that the Chinese stock market is not yet fully developed and is still experiencing 
many regulation changes, many studies are attracted by some China-unique factors 
but it is hard to fit these studies into any specific existing theories. These 
miscellaneous China-specific explanations provide promising perspectives to look at 
the high under-pricing of China’s IPO's. 
 
Su and Fleisher (1999) found evidence that the difference in IPO under-pricing among 
A and B shares can be explained by the differences in domestic and foreign investors’ 
investment opportunities and investment sentiments. While Liu (2003) argues that the 
Chinese IPO under-pricing is the result of the interactive process between the offer 
price and the trading price on the secondary market. In other words, the overpriced 
secondary market shares under the condition of de facto segmented primary and 
secondary markets, i.e. in general money from one does not flow to the other, causing 
the under-priced IPO shares in the primary market. Chan et al (2004) resort to the 
institutional features of Chinese stock market to interpret their findings. For example, 
they find that the under-pricing is positively related to the number of investors in the 
province from which the IPO comes, but negatively related to the number of shares 
being issued.  
 
Mok and Hui (1998) suggest that the long time lag imposed by the government 
between the offering and listing dates is another key determinant of China’s market-
adjusted IPO under-pricing. Chi and Padgett (2005), Tian (2003) and Liu (2003) all 
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support the hypothesis that the administrative listing quota system has caused the 
Chinese IPO under-pricing. Furthermore, Tian (2003) suggests that the Chinese 
government uses this listing time lag as a policy tool to adjust the market cycle. In 
other words, a firm with a relatively shorter listing time lag is given the priority for 
floatation in an overheated market and a firm with longer listing time lag is let go 
public with priority in a sluggish market. Tian (2003) finds that one day delay of the 
floatation increases the initial return by 0.4 % in China, which captures the general 
characteristic of lockup risk stressed by Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), and he 
believes this delay accounts for the Chinese IPO under-pricing.  
 
In addition, Tian (2003) proposes another government imposed limitation – IPO 
pricing cap i.e. the ceiling of P/E ratio – as a driving force of Chinese severe IPO 
under-pricing. But these hypotheses have not yet been fully accepted by other 
researchers. 
 
4.2 Critical Review of Both Existing Theories and Empirical Studies 
Researchers have been working on IPO under-pricing theories for four decades. Many 
of the theories have been put to empirical tests as we have just discussed. However, 
there are still gaps waiting to be filled in the literature, especially regarding China’s 
IPO under-pricing. 
 
A distinct feature about China’s IPO under-pricing is its magnitude. As mentioned 
earlier, the Chinese IPO's are particularly priced at significant discount. The 
magnitude is much higher than in the developed markets and other emerging markets 
as well. Last section has showed that researchers have tried to use classical theories to 
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explain the Chinese IPO under-pricing but those theories have not been able to fully 
explain the high under-pricing degree. Therefore, alternative angles to look at the 
issue are necessary. As we can see, researchers also come up with miscellaneous 
China-specific explanations. However, these explanations lack consistency and their 
validity is yet to be proved.  
 
Talking about consistency, the classical theories lack consistent empirical supports too 
in the Chinese IPO literature. For example, based on the same theoretical framework 
of signaling hypothesis Mok and Hui (1998) and Chi and Padgett (2005) found 
completely different implications of high government retention rate on the IPO under-
pricing. Su and Fleisher (1999) believe the issuing firm uses IPO under-pricing to 
signal its quality to the investors in order to achieve a better seasoned offering (SEO) 
later on. But on the contrary, Yu and Tse’s (2003) and Chi and Padgett (2005) do not 
think the signaling theory has any explanatory power. Neither the Winner’s Curse 
hypothesis is a consensus among researchers. In light of all these inconsistent 
empirical results, further empirical tests of existing classical hypotheses are necessary. 
 
A third concern regarding previous literatures is some debate among the researchers. 
More specifically, Tian (2003) believes that the Chinese government uses the listing 
time lag as a policy tool to adjust the market cycle. Tian’s (2003) statement together 
with Chi and Padgett’s (2005) suggestion of government timing seem to ring the bell 
to the classical debate of whether the dog is chasing its wagging tail or the tail is 
actually following the dog. The question is whether the Chinese government uses the 
IPOs with different under-pricing magnitudes (as a function of offer prices) to adjust 
the market cycle or it times the IPOs according to the market status to get best offer 
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prices.  
 
According to Tian’s (2003) paper, since the offer price is fixed beforehand the 
government floats the firms with long time lags during the bear market period and the 
firms with short time lags during the bull market period. But as he and some other 
researchers have showed, the listing time lag is positively related with the IPO initial 
return, which means if the listing time lag is longer then the IPO might be under-
priced more and vice versa. Yu and Tse (2003) showed that the Chinese IPOs are 
under-priced more in hot market, which they believe is consistent with conclusions of 
other researchers such as Davis and Yeomans (1976), Reilly (1977), and McGuiness 
(1992). 
 
As a matter of fact, after CSRC has approved an IPO application then the time lag 
between the IPO offering date and the listing date basically depends on the length of 
the administrative procedure before listing and the numbers of other IPOs in the 
queue for listing. Normally first in first out rule applies. Exceptions are rare and only 
happened in two cases. At the very beginning when there was no standardized IPO 
procedure and even there was no established stock market, first in first out rule did not 
apply. Later after the stock market was established, when there was an IPO procedural 
change a few IPOs went to floatation with priority due to special government 
requirement. One such exception is “Jiu Zhi Tang” (a pharmaceutical company). But 
generally speaking, these are very rare exceptions because the government does not 
want to leave an impression that it puts certain issuers at priority over others. Suppose 
that during certain market cycle period the government has chosen to let one IPO go 
public, then as long as the IPO is approved it is not the government intention to hold 
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or speed up the IPO’s listing process. Since the price has been fixed beforehand, no 
government intentional delay or acceleration between the approval and listing means 
no deliberately caused under-pricing. However, the government does have choices on 
whether or not to let the IPO go public before it actually approves the application. 
Logically, Tian’s (2003) hypothesis sounds unrealistic, but it provides an enlightening 
suggestion of taking listing time lag as an explanatory variable to more 
comprehensively understand the IPO under-pricing. 
 
Finally, there are some untested statements in China about the IPO under-pricing. 
Like Tian’s (2003) statement of floatation game and other miscellaneous explanations, 
these untested statements could provide alternative but maybe promising perspective 
angles to interpret China’s severe under-pricing. The following section will review 
these statements and related literatures in the area. 
 
4.3 Untested Statements – Literatures and Articles 
In China, there are some untested arguments and statements trying to expand 
explanations of the under-pricing. Chapter 1 has briefly touched some topics relating 
to these statements. It is said that the Chinese IPO under-pricing could be caused by 
speculation in the Chinese stock market, by the intention to implement its Western 
Region development policy and by the government protection over certain firms. 
Compared to well-knitted classical theories these statements have not yet been tested. 
However, a summary of related literatures from both academic researches and 
practical field would help to understand how these arguments are formulated. 
 
4.3.1 Speculation Effect 
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To discuss the speculation effect properly, it is necessary to go through some unique 
features of China’s stock market and IPO process. As said, the Chinese government 
set up the Chinese stock market to meet the huge capital demand of SOEs. However, 
at the very beginning of China’s stock market the local government or even the 
management level of the listing companies did not want their companies to go public 
because they were afraid of losing absolute control of the companies. Therefore, the 
central government introduced the quota system in order to: 1, relatively fairly 
allocate capital among different regions and industries according to the government 
agenda; and 2, force the unwilling local governments and managers to let the 
company go public. But in effect, the quota system eventually serves the 
government’s goal of controlling the supply of new issues as Chi and Padgett (2005) 
point out. The examining and approving system, the channel system and the 
recommending person system all in fact have evolved from the quota system. 
Essentially, they are all kinds of quota systems but in different forms and names. Let 
us focus on the original quota system for the moment since the implication is 
applicable to other systems too. In reality, after the first lot of listing companies had 
financially benefited (and more importantly had not lost any control) from the 
offering all the other companies rushed into the IPO application queue. The quota 
system may have achieved its objectives in this sense but at the cost of some 
unexpected problems. 
 
The story starts with the outdated organizational structure of the old big SOEs before 
they went public. Besides insufficient capital, a serious problem facing the SOEs is 
their huge unprofitable burdens formed in the former Soviet-style administratively 
planned economy, from company-subordinate hospitals to nursery schools, from 
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kindergartens to high schools and from sports centers to food and retailing chain 
shops. A famous Chinese saying before at that time is that “you born as a socialist 
man you die as a socialist ghost”, which means the SOE takes care of everything for 
your whole life. A big SOE is like a small society and it is very difficult for the 
management level to cope with significantly and usually unnecessarily diversified 
business lines. Indeed, one major objective of China’s economic reform is to release 
the SOEs from the unnecessary burdens. Then what is the implication of this problem 
to the IPO system?  
 
As described in chapter 2, the CSRC used to set a certain amount of new shares to be 
floated at the stock exchanges and to ration the quotas to each of the central 
government ministries that oversee various industries, and the provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions. To get as many companies as possible to go 
public within the quota limit, the local government or individual ministries resorted to 
a unique IPO method: separate to go public. The company might separate the major 
operating parts from other unprofitable parts and let only the profitable parts go public. 
Sometimes the company might even cut into pieces the whole business chain or the 
operation cycle to go public. For example, an iron and steel company might only let 
its sales department go public and a TV manufacturing company might only let its 
production department go public. The separation is somehow different from the 
common units carving out seen in other markets and it led to other problems. Before 
the company was separated, it was running as a whole unit and the profits and lose 
were calculated all together. But to fulfill the CSRC requirement of at least three years 
traceable profit in accounting record, the carved out units have to figure out some 
bypass to get around this requirement. Because the newly separated part did not have 
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such records when applying for issuing, it would have to forge the accounting report, 
called “simulated accounting report” by some professionals and officials. Naturally, 
the issuing firm would take advantage of this game and decorate its performance as 
brilliant as it could. This process was completely legal till the central government later 
published a number of official documents requiring the IPO applying companies to go 
public in whole units27. Furthermore, the CSRC has published new regulations since 
2004 to cut the source of the “simulated accounting report” problem28.  
 
Usually, because only the profitable parts of the company go public in the IPO, it is 
generally believed among investors that these units would have better performance in 
future than the whole unit otherwise not separated. The investors would buy the IPO 
in hope of higher future return. The IPO share would experience short-term increase 
of share price in the secondary market when the IPO shares in primary market are 
short of supply and the IPO offering price would be relatively underestimated. 
Secondly, as the applying company (sometimes even the local government) wants to 
make its IPO offering price as high as possible, it would naturally describe in its 
forged accounting disclosure the ‘simulated’ performance as brilliant as possible. 
Although the central government has strict rules against such behavior and requiring 
honest estimation of performance, it was nearly impossible to get rid of this deliberate 
fraud.29 Believing in these forged accounting reports, the investors would be eager to 
buy the IPO shares, pushing up the share price in the secondary market and hence 
                                                 
27
 For example, on August 23rd, 2005 the CSRC, the State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC), the Ministry of Finance, the People’s Bank of China and the Ministry of 
Commerce jointly published a government document supporting whole unit issuing. In November 2005, 
the CSRC published another document again emphasising the government support of whole unit 
issuing. 
28
 See The Notice Regarding Further Standardizing the Listing Process, September 21st, 2003, CSRC. 
29
 Such scandals have been explored in numbers by media. Because most of the auditors are state-
owned or tightly controlled by local government, and the Chinese accounting standard (GAAP) instead 
of International Accounting Standard (IAS) is used in the IPO process, the auditing has lost its real 
value in this instance. 
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causing the IPO under-pricing in the primary market.  
 
Soon these investors would recognize that they have made very bad decision and the 
only way to make money or even get some money back is to get out as quickly as they 
can, which in turn provides a good motive of short term speculation. Why they are 
wrong? The following paragraphs will follow up with the answer. But for the moment, 
we can see that the listing quota system suppresses the supply and lifts the demand. 
Although the government control method has evolved to different systems, the control 
itself over new share supply is never released.  
 
The inaccurate accounting report is not the only problem. As said in last chapter, the 
Chinese IPOs are mainly partial privatization IPOs, which means the parental 
company/companies is still the major shareholder in the new firm after the IPO. 
Although the profitable part or operating part of the company has been separated to go 
public, after the IPO unit has cashed out its shares the parental company still has the 
dominant power to withdraw capital or IPO proceeds from the IPO unit and re-
allocate the money for other uses such as paying the bank debt or buying other SOE 
shares. A Chinese financial newspaper China Management (January 31st 2004) ever 
joked about this phenomenon by saying that “the listed firm is the parental firm’s 
ATM and investors’ money is poured into a deep dark bottomless hole.” It pointed out 
that “the purpose for a lot of parental companies to carve out profitable units and 
separate to go public is sole and pure – to make the listed son company their ATM. 
This process starts from the very beginning when the first lot of money gets into the 
listed son company.” The newspaper gave an example of “Hei Hua Gu Fen” 
(SSE600179) being robbed of by its parental firm about 59% of its net assets in just 
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one year. Financial Times (March 28th 2005) ever said that “the corporate [issuers] 
that stole the money with IPOs put something back by buying shares in other state-
owned companies, it is one way to offset those ill-gotten gains.” The second way in 
which the parental company exploits the carved-out units is the so-called “associated 
transaction”. This is also caused by the “separate to go public” methodology. As 
described previously, the carved-out units are effectively part of the parental firm 
before the IPO. In order to satisfy the quota system, the unit is carved out as if it is an 
independent firm. But in reality, the carved-out units normally cannot survival without 
the parental firm because of their incomplete production or organization structures. 
Therefore, the carved-out units have to rely heavily on the transactions done with the 
parental firm. The parental firm could take this advantage and exploit the transactions 
that are vital to the carved-out units, for instance, by charging unreasonable price for 
upstream products or materials. All these problems keep happening in great numbers 
from the beginning of Chinese IPO market till now because IPO is regarded as a 
cheap way to replace bank debt.  
 
On the other hand, because the capital is withdrawn by parental companies and 
because the issuing companies do not feel responsible for returning profit to the 
shareholders, very few IPO companies pay cash dividend to the investors. This is a 
common phenomenon such that even the profitable IPO firms rarely pay dividend, let 
alone the fact that many SOEs performs badly after IPO. The fact that IPO SOEs 
performs badly after IPO actually has two-folded meanings. Firstly, as Aharony, Lee 
and Wong (2000) pointed out, the SOE managers may manage their firms’ earnings to 
boost their chance of being selected for IPO or they are instructed by the majority 
shareholder – the state – to do so. Aharony, Lee and Wong (2000) found that in China 
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IPO firms’ performance peak in the IPO year and decline in the post IPO years. 
Secondly, as a matter of fact, even if some listing firms intend to pay dividend they 
are actually not be able to do so because their performances are much worse than they 
have declared in the prospectus. “The cities and provinces deliberately pushed lousy 
state-owned companies on to the stock market to reduce the pressure on their own 
finances,” quoting Mr. Joe Zhang of UBS Financial Times (March 28th 2005) said so. 
In result, Zhang and Wang (2003) found that the “IPO effect” – the new shares’ 
performance decline after listing – is evident for China’s IPOs especially in the 
middle-sized IPO group. As Yang (2003) pointed out, the deteriorating profitability of 
these firms further strengthens arguments that Chinese listed companies are “over-
dressed” when initially listed. In light of above factors, the investment opportunities 
for the retail investors in China have been diluted, i.e. the money has gone beyond the 
range where the investors originally want to invest but the long-term capital gain is 
not correspondingly promising due to the bad long-term performance of the parental 
company. Even worse, there is no dividend.  
 
If the investors try to make profit by holding the IPO shares instead of selling them in 
short-term, they are wrong. Eun and Huang (2002) have tested a hypothesis pertaining 
to asset pricing in China that investors will pay a premium for dividend-paying stocks 
as dividends signal the management’s willingness to return cash flows to outside 
shareholders rather than expropriating them. On the other hand, based on this 
hypothesis the IPO has to be under-priced to attract investors if the IPO firm does not 
pay cash dividends. This hypothesis hits right at the heart of the question posed above. 
As said, Chinese issuing firms regard IPO as a cheap way to raise money but assume 
no responsibility of returning dividend to shareholders or more precisely the minority 
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shareholders, because the biggest shareholder is still the parental company. It is not 
uncommon for the parental company to withdrawn IPO proceeds and re-allocate to 
something else in its own interest. The investors’ investment has been diluted and 
misused. Also given the situation that the IPO is used by the government to finance 
lousy SOEs as said, the long-term investment opportunity vanishes. 
 
On the other hand, the short-term speculation opportunities still exist, i.e. the short-
term capital gain from IPO under-pricing. “To facilitate such a process - and lure retail 
investors to companies of dubious quality - Beijing set rules that ensured initial public 
offerings were under-priced, thus guaranteeing investors handsome gains in the first 
few days of trading.” (Financial Times March 28th 2005) Bailey (1994) and Ma (1996) 
point out that Chinese markets are highly speculative, and domestic investors may be 
highly risk tolerant and are to earn money in the short run. A formal report on China’s 
stock markets compiled by OECD (2001) states: “The market, which is dominated by 
small retail investors who are concerned primarily with short-term trading profits, has 
frequently been marred by speculation and market manipulation.”  
 
During decades of double digits economic growth since the economic reform started, 
household disposable wealth has increased significantly. A long time Chinese family 
tradition is to save for the future. With a gross domestic annual savings rate of about 
40 percent, China has the highest proportions of income savings in the world30 . 
However, the relatively high inflation and low deposit rate often push the real interest 
rates of bank savings into negative territory. On the other hand, alternative investment 
opportunities are scarce. Prior to the inception of stock market, bank savings and 
                                                 
30
 The savings rate was reported to be 41.5 percent in 2000 according to Asian Development Bank’s 
Country Economic Review – the People’s Republic of China, November 2001. 
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treasure bonds were the only investment instruments available for Chinese residents31. 
The introduction of stock market provides a brand new investment channel to 
investors. With constantly high savings and quite limited investment alternatives, 
investors’ potential demand for new shares is lofty. But soon the investors find their 
IPO investments are trapped in a pool of problems described above. The only way to 
get money back is to target at the short-term IPO initial return given as bait by the 
government. As a matter of fact, not only in the primary market but also in the 
secondary market, investors are betting on the short-term stock price rise (short sell is 
not allowed in China) to make profit. Eun and Wei (2002) observe that investors’ 
desire for quick gains from holding stocks, coupled with lax market regulations, has 
fostered a speculative atmosphere in the stock market.  
 
The distinct feature that China’s stock market is driven by an army of highly 
speculative investors has been noticed by many people. The Wall Street Journal 
(August 22, 2001) once vividly depicted the Chinese stock market by likening it to a 
casino: “China’s stock markets have operated like casinos, driven by fast money flows 
in and out of stocks with little regard for their underlying value.” Based on interviews 
with individual investors, Financial Times (July 11, 1997) reports that interviewees 
never held shares for more than one month. Similarly, the International Herald 
Tribune (July 2, 1999) reports that typical small investors held only a couple of stocks 
for less than a month before selling them. The Economist (June 30, 2001) concurs: 
“Trading, not ownership, is the approach of China’s investors…” The lack of 
investment opportunities, the government control of new share supply and China’s 
                                                 
31
 Mutual funds were not available to Chinese investors until the late 1990s. Even after the government 
passed the Provisional Measures of the Administration of Securities Investment Funds – the guideline 
for institutional stock trading - in November 1997, institutional investors are still playing a rather 
limited role in the often-volatile market where long-term investors are scare. 
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problematic IPO process should be blamed for causing the problem. 
 
At most of the times, the government has a tolerant attitude towards investors’ 
speculation as long as the stock market runs relatively stably. But sometimes, the 
speculation is so high that the government is forced to take actions to cool the market.  
In the middle of 1990’s, after several years of bear market there was a surge of 
investments in China’s stock market due to a long-time suppressed capital supply and 
a bright market expectation. The pouring of the hot money into the market leads to 
great amount of speculative trading and in turn the market disturbance. To cool the 
investment and stabilize the market, the central government issued an official 
document announcing its willingness to curb the speculation. Besides, the government 
loaded its traditional fiscal weapon – tax. The development of this event is described 
in China Security (www.ctaxnews.com.cn October 10th 2004): “In 1996, huge 
amount of irrational speculation get into the market after the ending of a 3-year period 
of bear market. To stabilise the market, the transaction stamp duty tax rate was raised 
to 0.5% (by the CSRC) to encourage mid and long-term investment.” The real 
situation is that in 1997 the security regulation authority raised the transaction stamp 
duty tax rate from 0.3% to 0.5% of the total trading value. The logic behind this 
policy is that the increase of the transaction stamp duty tax would increase the 
transaction cost and supposedly damper the speculation magnitude. From the very 
beginning of Chinese stock market until May 200732, this is the first and the only time 
that the government increases the transaction stamp duty tax rate in almost two 
decades, let alone the big increase that the tax rate was almost doubled. The raise of 
the transaction tax rate can be seen as a very strong and serious signal from the 
                                                 
32
 When this thesis is being written, the Chinese government raised the transaction stamp duty tax rate 
for the second time in May 2007 to slow down the overheated market after a 7 years high economic 
growth and 3 consecutive years of bull market.  
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government in line with its statement of tackling the speculation problem. This 
government policy change provides a valuable opportunity to examine the speculation 
effect. Chapter 4 will discuss in more detail how this event forms a testable 
implication of the speculation effect hypothesis. 
 
It is broadly believed among Chinese stock market practitioners that the high 
speculation effect in the primary market has caused severe IPO under-pricing. But 
surprisingly, few academic papers have done research directly based on this 
assumption. The most authoritative and direct statement about speculation effect 
comes from Zhang (2006) in his consultation report to the Shanghai Security 
Exchange Research Institute. He is quoted by Security Daily (August 15th, 2006) as 
saying that one of the sources of China’s severe IPO under-pricing is the heavy 
speculative atmosphere in the primary market. Chen and Zeng (2003) suggest that 
over-speculation is one of the reasons for Chinese IPO under-pricing. Li and Zhou 
(2005) put forward that China’s IPO under-pricing can be explained by a so called 
speculative-bubble hypothesis. Although their whole analysis on this hypothesis 
including literature review, hypothesis setting and conclusion only has less than 10 
lines, they do have proposed a testable proxy – the turnover rate in the first trading 
day after IPO – to test their hypothesis without giving any explanations.  
 
As a matter of fact, Li and Zhou (2005) are not the first researchers to look at the 
relationship between speculation and turnover rate although others have not tried to 
relate the speculation to the IPO under-pricing.  As will be defined formally in chapter 
6, the turnover rate measures the intensity of the short-term (or more specifically in 
the IPO’s first trading day) trading activities. The bigger the turnover rate the greater 
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the speculation magnitude, if we regard the short-term trading activities as speculative 
trading. A same term of turnover rate has emerged from US IPO literature and referred 
by Krigman, Shaw and Womack (1999) and Aggarwal (2001) as flipping rate. 
However, their turnover rate is to measure the block trades done by institutional 
investors while in Chinese IPO literature the turnover rate is to measure retail 
investors’ behavior because retail rather than institutional investors are the majority in 
China’s stock market. Being a highly speculative market, Chinese stock market has 
the highest turnover rate in the world by Chinese definition33. From 1991 to 2000, the 
average annual turnover ratio is 587% in China, far exceeding its counterparts 
observed in other markets, and it is reported that at least 90% of turnover is from 
trades by retail investors with limited funds34. Eun and Huang (2002) suggest that this 
high turnover ratio is likely to reflect the speculative trading behavior. 
 
On the other hand, indirect literature can be found in line with the investment 
opportunity assumptions. In fact, Su and Fleisher (1999) suggest that the under-
pricing of A-share IPO’s is partly due to relative small aggregate supply of shares. 
And Tian (2003) has demonstrated that the listing quota has restricted the amount of 
issuing shares, so the supply is less than sufficient. Chau et al (1996) and Gu (2000) 
suggested that “the lack of investment opportunities causes…the high initial returns of 
IPO's” without testing the hypothesis. More explicitly, Zhang (2006) points out that 
because there are large amount of idle capital in the market investors try to “hit the 
new share and make speculation”. The incentive for this speculative behavior is the 
inappropriately matched risk and return of IPOs. All these arguments indicate that the 
                                                 
33
 Detailed comparison results of turnover rates between the Chinese stock markets and the world’s 
other stock markets between year 1992 to 2000 can be found in Shirai’s (2002) paper. In general, the 
numbers show that the turnover rate in the two Chinese stock markets are 4 to 20 times higher than in 
other stock markets in countries and regions such as US, Japan, Hong Kong and South Korea. 
34
 The details of this percentage and statement can be found in Eun and Huang’s (2002) paper. 
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imbalance between the new share supply and demand may be a testable implication of 
the speculation effect hypothesis. In existing Chinese IPO literatures, researchers such 
as Chi and Padgett (2005) have used the lottery winning ratio to measure the over-
subscription degree. Since the imbalance between the new share supply and demand 
is largely reflected in the over-subscription level, it is appropriate to employ the 
lottery winning ratio as a testable proxy variable for the test of the speculation effect 
as well. 
 
4.3.2 Western Region Development Policy Effect 
The “Western Region Development” policy started from year 200035. According to 
the policy the government’s emphasis of economic development is moved from 
eastern regions to western regions, where most China’s poor and less developed 
provinces are located36 . Through this policy the government plans to reduce the 
development imbalance between eastern region and western region as well as to 
decrease the gap between the rich and the poor, because the western region has much 
greater portion of poor population than the eastern region. It is believed that the 
western regions gained less boosting power for economic development due to the lack 
of capital. Some academics and government officials have ascribed the lack of 
financial facilities37 and financial services to the cause of the lack of capital in western 
regions and they suggest to build up new ‘capital pools’ for western regions and to 
encourage western region companies to go public. Statistic report shows that in SSE 
50% of the publicly listed companies are local companies and in SZSE this rate is 
                                                 
35
 According to the then Chinese president Jiang Zemin’s instruction, China’s State Council Western 
Region Development Leading Group Office was set up in January 2000, which can be seen as the 
official start of the policy.  
36
 The official definition of “Western Region” includes 12 provinces and cities, they are: Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang, Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Guangxi and Nei 
Menggu. 
37
 China’s both stock exchanges are located in the so-called eastern sea-shore region. 
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36%, but in western regions there is no such kind of financial facilities. In the year 
2003, the eastern region companies accounted for 59.29% of the total amount of all 
the publicly listed companies nationwide but the western region companies only 
accounted for 17.48% (the rest are middle region companies 38 ), said Shanghai 
Security (May 26th, 2003). To solve the problem, the government has determined to 
encourage western region companies to go public at the existing two stock exchanges. 
In its official document of “State Council’s several suggestions on further promoting 
the development of the western regions” (March 11th, 2004), the Chinese government 
has clearly stated that it would “actively support the eligible western region 
companies to issue shares (go public)” to “widen the investment channel in order to 
provide the capital guarantee for the western region development”, quoted by People’s 
Daily (March 23rd, 2004), the country’s most significant newspaper. 
 
Although the government has decided to encourage western region companies to go 
public, the reality is different. Because the western region areas started the economic 
reform later than the eastern region areas and because the inland western region areas 
have far less convenient transportation channels, western region companies are 
normally perceived as less efficient and less profitable compared to their eastern 
counterparts. To deal with this lack of confidence in western region companies, the 
investors are supposed to get more incentives and motives to invest in the western 
region companies under this policy. In practice, investors have realized the existence 
                                                 
38
 Even though the Shanghai Security separately listed the proportion of middle region companies, the 
middle region company is not used as a geographic discrimination criterion in this thesis for two 
reasons. According to the Chinese custom people usually differentiate between eastern and western 
regions in a very general sense, although sometimes narrower regional definition may come out of 
different context. Depending on the context, sometimes western region may stand for the poorer area 
rather than always necessarily the geographic definition. Secondly, the Chinese government’s “Western 
Region Development” policy only give rise to the term western region, therefore, in this thesis all the 
regions belong to eastern region if they are not from the 12 provinces and cities included in the 
government policy.  
 86 
of such incentives and tried to profit on them implicitly. For example, there are many 
so called ‘concept shares’ in China’s stock market. These concept shares’ IPOs are 
popular because the hot concepts make the investors believe the shares are going to be 
attractive to more investors than the normal shares and hence have bigger growth 
potential in the secondary market. “Western Region Development” is one of such hot 
“concepts” that make the regions’ shares more popular. A more vivid example is that 
when people are analyzing the IPO price of Sichuan Road and Bridge Company 
(Sichuan is a western inland province), they believe that the price should be adjusted 
in line with its “Western Region Development” concept (www.nugoo.com, March 24th, 
2003). The analysts expect that the policy must have positive impact on the future 
development of this company and thus on the IPO price, because the government 
policy is supposed to encourage the investment into the western region 
communication and transportation facilities. The example shows that practitioners 
believe that the western region concept could provide a more prosperous profile for 
the IPO share. 
 
Since the economic reform, China has seen its economy in the process of being 
transformed from tightly government planned and controlled into a more market-
oriented one. However, the government maintains powerful influence in the economy. 
As the “Western Region Development” policy brought about a vital policy change, 
some researchers claim that the Chinese government may adjust its IPO policy, using 
under-pricing to support the implementation of this policy because the under-priced 
western region IPOs are supposed to provide less confident investors more incentives 
to invest into western region companies. “Between reducing the risks and increasing 
capital-raising efficiency…the CSRC has chosen to sacrifice the efficiency by under-
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pricing the IPO’s……” said Financial and Economic Times (V572, July 2004). 
 
Although it is claimed that the government may seek implementation of the “Western 
Region Development” policy through IPO pricing, interestingly, there is no particular 
policy or regulation in the CSRC-issued documents requesting favor towards western 
region IPOs even if the government claims to do so. In fact, the government tends to 
give fiscal support such as tax reduction and remission to the western region 
companies. Additionally, cheap business loan and government appropriation are often 
used too39. The reason why the concept of “Western Region share” makes the IPO 
more attractive is only because investors believe the government policy may help 
improve the company’s performance in above ways. In result the Western Region 
IPOs are relatively under-priced due to its short-term price increase in the secondary 
market. If the result is positive, it is promising to think the IPO under-pricing also as a 
government signal for commitment in the “Western Region Development” policy as 
what Perotti (1995) and Tian (2003) have pointed out - the motivation of this forced 
under-pricing is in the political interests of the reformist government in developing a 
capitalist stock market and transforming the society. 
 
The literature on the Western Region Development policy effect on Chinese IPO 
under-pricing is even less than the speculation effect. But there is one particularly 
interesting research paper trying to explain the Chinese IPO under-pricing from more 
or less the geographic point of views. This is the only paper found so far dealing with 
the regional factors from the government influence perspective, and more 
                                                 
39
 Supportive fiscal policies can be found in government archives such as State Council’s Notice on 
Several Policy Measures Regarding to the Implementation of Western Region Development Policy 
[State- promulgated (2000) No. 33] and Notice on Favourable Tax Policy Measures Towards Western 
Region Development Policy [Finance & Taxation- promulgated (2001) No. 202]. 
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interestingly the purpose of the regional differentiation in this paper is to indirectly 
find out the impact of the government listing quota system. Chan et al (2004) find that 
the Chinese IPO under-pricing is positively related to the number of investors in the 
province or municipality where the IPO firm comes from. They argue that since the 
listing criteria is not solely based on the quality of the companies, but is also 
determined by the central government that tries to balance the development of 
different provinces, not all IPOs are of similar quality. They conjecture that the IPOs 
from the more developed provinces are of higher quality than those from the less 
developed ones. The number of stock investors in the province is used as a proxy for 
the stage of development (wealth) of the area. Because the eastern regions in general 
are much more developed in economic sense than the western regions and because the 
Western Region Development policy indicates government’s intention of keeping 
balance between the developed and undeveloped regions, their research could imply 
that the government may have managed to use the under-pricing to implement its 
balancing strategy. But all in all, the test of Western Region Development Policy 
statement is a direct and explicit test to see whether or nor the government has been 
involved in Chinese IPO under-pricing. 
 
4.3.3 Government Protection Effect 
Perotti’s (1995) paper shows that a partial sale and (possibly) its under-pricing are 
signals of commitment of the government due to investors’ concern about future 
interference from the government. Perotti’s (1995) theory may have realistic 
implications to Chinese IPO under-pricing. Although the privatization wave has 
stormed China for decades, there are still many huge monopoly companies tightly 
controlled by the government. In contrast to other SOEs, these industry giants usually 
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are of strategic importance to the nation, such as energy and petrochemical companies. 
It is generally believed that the government carefully protects these companies. Also 
as described previously, one major purpose of Chinese stock market is “to reform the 
unprofitable, inefficient state-owned enterprises.” When these government-protected 
firms go public investors often have more concern about the government interference 
in the future. Thus, according to Perotti’s (1995) theory it is likely to presume that the 
under-pricing is a signal of credible privatization in the sense that the government 
needs to under-price those protected firms more than it does with the non-protected 
firms to ease investors’ concerns.  
 
The government protection possibly has been reflected in the under-pricing of the IPO 
share, but few researches have explicitly tested the statement. An (2003) comments on 
the statement by saying that, because “the Chinese government traditionally always 
takes the stock market as a tool to help those state-owned firms with bad 
performance”, “some industries like energy will benefit from the policy.” The most 
direct remark on this issue is from Sayuri (2002) that in China “stock prices of 
protected firms were lower than the prices of unprotected even though the former 
performed better than the latter.” 
 
Although research on the government protection effect on IPO under-pricing still 
needs further development, a few studies do have noticed the government protection 
and its possible impacts in the IPO area even if they not directly relate the protection 
to the under-pricing. For example, when studying the relationship between the pre-
IPO financial packaging process (essentially the carving out process as we discussed) 
and the long-term performance of Chinese IPO firms, Aharony et al (2000) observe 
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that the government protection seems to have played active role in causing 
discriminative difference of long-term performances among the IPO firms. They 
identify that firms within petrochemical, energy and raw material industries have 
enjoyed government protection and firms within all other sectors have not. Their 
classification of government-protected and non-protected IPO firms is enlightening to 
the test of the government protection effect on IPO under-pricing too. A possible 
testable implication of government protection effect is to look at the discriminative 
difference in IPO initial returns between the government protected firms and the non-
protected firms according to Aharony et al (2000)’s classification. The test will 
directly show whether or not there is a government involved in the under-pricing of 
IPOs of government protected firms. 
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Chapter 5 Hypothesis 
Last chapter has exhibited the IPO under-pricing theories. Especially, several 
statements about Chinese IPO under-pricing have been discussed. This chapter will 
follow the discussion of these theories and statements by looking at the corresponding 
testable implications. Eventually, testing hypotheses will be formulated based on these 
testable implications.  
 
But before going through all the hypotheses, one thing ought to be mentioned 
beforehand although detailed discussion is left to chapter 6. In the hypothesis setting, 
IPO under-pricing magnitude is measured in the form of average IPO initial return. 
Accordingly, hypotheses are set up to test the relationship between individual factors 
and the IPO initial return rather than the term IPO under-pricing. 
 
5.1 Speculation Effect 
By two means, it is possible to demonstrate the speculation effect on the IPO under-
pricing. The first approach is to take a look at an allegedly powerful policy weapon in 
the government’s ammunition depot to fight the speculation – the transaction stamp 
duty tax. It is mentioned earlier that the Chinese government increased the transaction 
stamp duty tax rate on May 12th 1997 to curb market speculation. The tax rate was 
almost doubled and it was the first time and the only time (before May 2007) in 
Chinese stock market history that the government raised the transaction tax rate. It is a 
very strong and serious signal of the government intention to tackle the speculation 
problem. If the government’s intention has been fully realized and its goal achieved, 
the speculation effect would have been subdued by this policy change. Furthermore, if 
the assumption that the speculation is a driving force of Chinese IPO under-pricing is 
 92 
correct, the under-pricing magnitude would have become smaller in the post-event 
period than in the pre-event period. The hypothesis is thus set as: 
  
Hypothesis 1: The average IPO initial return is higher before the transaction stamp 
duty tax ratio is increased on May 12th 1997 than after. 
 
Since the tax raise is a government policy change, the test of hypothesis 1 may help 
indirectly test the government influences on IPO pricing. 
 
The above hypothesis is focused on the effect of the tax rate change event, while a 
second view of the transaction stamp duty tax rate is based more universally on the 
whole time series of the transaction tax rate development. As said, the Chinese 
government only increased the transaction stamp duty tax rate once and for all the rest 
of times it always tried to reduce the tax rate (before May 2007). If the logic and 
reasoning about transaction tax rate, transaction cost and speculation magnitude in 
chapter 4 are reasonable, and more importantly if our assumption about the 
relationship between the speculation effect and the IPO under-pricing is robust, it is 
natural to imagine that the transaction tax rate fluctuation has a direct impact on the 
IPO under-pricing.  
 
The Chinese government believes, and so does this research, that the stamp duty tax is 
a manageable force to control the speculation magnitude. If it makes sense that a 
higher transaction stamp duty tax rate could reduce the speculation because of the 
increased transaction cost, then a reasonable inference is that a lower transaction 
stamp duty tax rate could lead to a higher speculation due to the decreased transaction 
 93 
cost. Given the assumption that that speculation magnitude has positive contribution 
to the IPO under-pricing, a higher transaction stamp duty tax rate in turn would lead 
to a lower IPO initial return and vice versa.  
 
Thus, it is possible to set up a hypothesis with both directions of IPO initial return 
movement associated with the transaction stamp duty tax rate movement. The purpose 
of running this hypothesis test is still to find out the real impact of the speculation 
effect because the transaction tax only kicks in at the time when a stock transaction 
happens in the secondary market. In the primary market, neither the new issuer’s 
offering price is possibly affected by any transaction tax taking place later nor is the 
under-pricing magnitude. Therefore, by looking at the relationship between the IPO 
initial return and the transaction stamp duty tax rate that is exogenous to the IPO 
pricing and only directly affects the speculative trading, a bridge connecting the IPO 
under-pricing and the speculation effect can be built up. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The IPO initial return is negatively related with the stamp duty tax rate 
on the transaction value. 
 
The second approach to find out the speculation effect is to look at the direct link 
between the magnitudes of speculation and IPO initial return. If the assumption that 
the IPO under-pricing is caused by speculation is correct, then a positive relationship 
would be found between the two magnitudes. A good proxy to measure the 
speculation magnitude is the turnover rate in the first trading day, as suggested in last 
chapter. As a result, the positive relationship between the magnitudes of speculation 
and under-pricing would translate into the positive relationship between the turnover 
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rate and the IPO initial return. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The IPO initial return is positively related with the first trading day 
turnover rate. 
 
Chapter 4 has suggested that the supply and demand of IPO shares somehow play 
roles in introducing the speculation effect which agrees with the introduction of 
China’s highly speculative stock market and sparse investment opportunities. As a 
result of the serious imbalance between supply and demand, the A-shares are 
distributed through a lottery system, in which there is a fixed price offer with 
investors bidding for quantities40. The odds of winning the lottery depend on how 
much money has been put into the lottery. Winners are selected via a random number 
generating scheme and are entitled to purchase shares (usually one thousand shares) at 
the issue price (Gu, 2000). Since the demand for the new shares far exceeds the 
supply, only a small percentage of the subscriptions win the lottery. As a result, a 
proxy usually used by previous researchers such as Liu and Li (2000) and Chi and 
Padgett’s (2005) to measure the oversubscription of IPO shares is the lottery winning 
ratio. As they suggest, the odds of winning the lottery can be used to quantify the 
demand for IPOs since it shows how much money has been invested to buy the newly 
issued shares and what the chance is to stand out from loads of other applications. 
Lower odds signify a higher imbalance between supply and demand of new shares. 
According to the assumption that the speculation is caused by the lack of supply, a 
higher imbalance between supply and demand of new shares means a higher 
                                                 
40
 Details about the online fixed pricing can be found in chapter 2, the introduction of China’s stock 
mark background. 
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speculation and hence a higher IPO under-pricing. Obviously, a testable hypothesis 
would be: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The IPO initial return is negatively related to the IPO share’s lottery 
winning ratio. 
 
In early studies, the lottery winning ratio is usually put to test of information 
asymmetry and information cascade hypotheses. But since all these hypotheses 
assume the same relationship between the lottery winning ratio and IPO initial return, 
the test result of hypothesis 4 can be used for the other two hypotheses that will be 
shown later in this chapter. 
 
5.2 Western Region Development Policy 
Previous chapters have discussed that under the Western Region Development Policy, 
the government could seek to under-price the IPO shares of western regions in order 
to encourage investments into the area. To test whether the new “Western Region 
Development” policy has really affected the IPO pricing, a comparison between ex 
ante and ex post event is necessary. As mentioned in literature review, Chan et al 
(2004)’s study indicates that eastern region IPOs are possibly under-priced more than 
western region IPOs. This study will compare the difference of IPO mean initial 
returns between western region and eastern region companies before and after year 
2000 when the policy started. The geographic definition of western region will follow 
the official definition by the government. The classification of western and eastern 
companies is according to where the company has registered. This company 
classification criterion is adopted by all the financial databases used in this study and 
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also by most of the financial databases in China. As the Western Region Development 
policy is supposed to cause more under-pricing to the western region IPO's after the 
policy came into effect. The hypothesis is set as: 
 
Hypothesis 5: The Western Region IPOs will be under-priced more after year 2000 
when the Western Region Development policy has come into effect.  
 
5.3 Government Protection Effect 
The last chapter of literature review has discussed that the government could under-
price government-protected IPOs in order to compensate for investors’ concern of 
future government interference. But before setting up testable hypothesis, it is 
necessary to notice another side of the government protection assumption. As 
mentioned before, the government-protected firms are usually at the same time huge 
monopoly companies. These companies often have gigantic market capitalization and 
large market shares. Meanwhile, some of the government protected firms may have 
comparatively good performance among the listed firms, of which the majority shares 
are held by the state, due to their dominant market position and possibly government 
support. A good example is China’s petrochemical companies. Later sections of this 
chapter will show that such firm characteristics as size and profitability are usually 
believed to be factors that could affect the IPO under-pricing. It is presumed that 
larger and more profitable issuing firms will suffer less under-pricing in the IPO due 
to reduced information asymmetry between the issuer and investors.  
 
Tangled with impacts of other factors, the real effect of government protection on the 
IPO under-pricing is hard to predict. It is possible that the attractive profile of those 
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government protected firms overweighs investors concern of government future 
intervention, thus making the government protection effect more difficult to 
distinguish. In reality whether the investors’ concern of government protection or the 
firm’s specific attractive characteristics will prevail, only the empirical data can prove. 
But from the angle of government interference, the hypothesis is set as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 6: The IPO mean initial return in government-protected firms is higher 
than in non-protected firms. 
 
5.4 Information Asymmetry Hypotheses 
As discussed in literature review, some classical theories have been put forward to 
explain the IPO under-pricing and these theories could also be adopted into the 
context of China’s IPOs. Information asymmetry hypotheses are the most frequently 
tested hypotheses in Chinese IPO literature. 
 
Rock’s (1986) “Winner’s Curse” argument implies that the degree of information 
asymmetry is a decreasing function of profitability and firm age. The information 
asymmetry between informed investors and uninformed investors causes the 
“Winner’s Curse” problem as the uninformed investors are more likely to receive the 
allocation of shares of bad quality firms. The under-pricing is a compensation to lure 
the uninformed investors to play along. In other words, better quality firms measured 
by higher profitability need less incentive to lure uninformed investors as opposed to 
the “lemon” firms in the market. Also, the longer the issuing firm has stayed in the 
market, the more information about the firm is available to the outside investors. In 
this sense, a higher profitability and a longer firm’s history would lead to less IPO 
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initial return. Because if the information asymmetry really is the cause of IPO under-
pricing, then the less information asymmetry would mean a less IPO under-pricing 
reflected in a less IPO initial return. 
 
Hypothesis 7: The IPO initial return is negatively related with the issuing firm’s 
profitability. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The IPO initial return is negatively related with the issuing firm’s age. 
 
Generally speaking, Chinese IPOs are oversubscribed. A lottery offering mechanism 
is hence used in the process, as introduced previously. China’s IPO market setting 
indicates that Koh and Walter’s (1989) ballot allocation test for Winner’s Curse 
hypothesis may be applicable in Chinese IPO context too. Indeed, Chi and Padgett 
(2005) use the lottery winning ratio as an explanatory variable in test for information 
asymmetry, which coincides with our early discussion of Hypothesis 4. 
 
Hypothesis 9 (also Hypothesis 4): The IPO initial return is negatively related to the 
IPO share’s lottery winning ratio. 
 
Based on the information revelation theory, Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990), Spatt 
and Srivastava (1991) and Benvensite and Busaba (1997) address that the under-
pricing is a reward to those investors who reveal their demand and true valuation for 
the new shares. They argue that the fixed pricing should cause more under-pricing to 
the IPO than the bookbuilding offering method. 
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Hypothesis 10: The IPO initial return is higher under the fixed pricing method than 
the bookbuilding method.  
 
Within the information asymmetry theory category, signaling hypotheses are the 
mostly tested. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch 
(1989) have pointed out that the under-pricing is used as a costly signaling tool by the 
high quality firm to reveal its value to the investors so that it will be rewarded in the 
seasoned offering later on.  
 
Hypothesis 11: The IPO initial return is higher for the firms that have seasoned 
offerings than the firms that have no seasoned offerings. 
 
Another very often-used variable to explain the cross-sectional differences in IPO 
initial return is the IPO price itself. Su and Fleisher (1999) have suggested that the 
under-pricing of A-share IPO’s is partly due to relative small aggregate supply of 
shares and they found that the smaller the IPO price, the higher the IPO initial return. 
They believe a higher offer price means a lower profit to the informed investors. 
Shleifer (1986) once argued that the supply of shares is negatively related to share 
prices, reflecting the downward-sloping demand curve. If Su and Fleisher’s (1999) 
argument is right, then a small aggregate supply of shares means higher price and in 
turn a smaller IPO initial return should be expected. However, their result is opposite. 
In this sense, to look at the relationship between the IPO price and its initial return is 
necessary.  
 
Hypothesis 12: The IPO initial return is positively related to the offer price. 
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5.5 Ex ante Uncertainty Hypotheses 
If Beatty and Ritter (1986)’s ex ante uncertainty theory is correct then the smaller the 
issuing firm is the bigger ex ante uncertainty about its IPO’s intrinsic value and 
therefore the greater under-pricing of its IPO, i.e. the greater the IPO initial return. In 
line with this logic, the equity size, an often employed proxy for firm size by previous 
researchers such as Su and Fleisher (1999), should be negatively related with the 
initial return. Thus, the hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 13: The IPO initial return is negatively related with the firm’s market 
capitalization. 
 
In Chi and Padgett’s (2005) study, the market capitalization is regarded the same as 
the offer size, which equals the shares issued and fully paid multiplied by the offering 
prices. In China, the vast majority of IPOs are partial sale, which means the issuing 
firm still holds some non-tradable shares post listing. Chi and Padgett’s (2005) 
calculation of offer size does not include the non-tradable shares. However, when 
calculate the market capitalization that equals to all outstanding shares multiplied by 
the market price (in this case the offer price as the new shares’ market price), the non-
tradable shares do need to be taken into account because someday if the issuing firm 
wants it could still in theory sell the non-tradable shares at the prevailing market price. 
This paper therefore regards market capitalization as a different variable from offer 
size and employs both.  
 
The offer size essentially in its own meaning i.e. the total shares offered to public 
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multiplied by the offer price is often used by researchers such as Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) and McGuinness (1992) as a proxy for measuring the ex ante uncertainty of 
the IPO’s. In this sense a smaller offer size amounts to higher ex ante uncertainty and 
will lead to a higher under-pricing of the IPO. 
 
Hypothesis 14: The IPO initial return is negatively related with the IPO offer size. 
 
Other proxies reflecting the ex ante uncertainty have appeared in the IPO literature. 
According to Davis and Yeomans (1976) et al’s theory that the under-pricing is higher 
in buoyant markets, hypotheses are set as follow together with a standard deviation of 
daily market return as the proxy of market turbulence to test for the assumption that 
the ex ante uncertainty is higher in more volatile market.  
 
Hypothesis 15: The IPO initial return is positively related with the average market 
return during the time interval from the offer price is fixed to the IPO share really 
goes to floatation. 
 
Hypothesis 16: The IPO initial return is positively related with the coefficient of 
variation of daily return of the market index levels during the time interval from the 
offer price is fixed to the IPO share really goes to floatation. 
 
In Chinese IPO context, Yu and Tse (2003) use percentage change of the market index 
three months prior to the issuing as an explanatory variable to control for the ex ante 
uncertainty. Their measurement somehow is problematic according to the findings of 
this thesis which will be demonstrated in more details in the later chapter. This study 
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finds that the time interval from the offer price is fixed to the IPO share goes to 
floatation varies severely ranging from 12 days to 380 days (see table 2), and the 
mean of the time interval is about one month (33 days) with a median of 25 days. 
Therefore, the fixed three months interval chosen by Yu and Tse (2003) is 
inappropriate for measuring the market fluctuation. This thesis will measure market 
returns within the time interval consistent with the listing time lag of every individual 
IPOs rather than within the fixed three months for all IPOs.  
 
5.6 Behaviour Theories 
According to information cascade or bandwagon hypothesis, a positive bandwagon or 
cascade means that the IPO is under-priced, and vice versa. Based on the hypothesis, 
Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2001) find that IPOs tend to be either undersubscribed or 
hugely oversubscribed, with very few moderately oversubscribed. In Chinese IPO 
literature, Liu (2003) suggests that investors’ demand for new shares can be used for 
testing the bandwagon effect. He further suggests that the odds of winning the lottery 
could reflect investors’ demand for the new share and the odds should be negatively 
related to the degree of IPO under-pricing. This hypothesis again is set the same as 
hypothesis 4 and 9. 
 
Hypothesis 17 (also Hypothesis 4 and 9): The IPO initial return is negatively 
related to the IPO share’s lottery winning ratio. 
 
5.7 Privatization IPO and Political Motives/Existing China-specific Hypotheses 
According to Perotti’s (1995) partial sale and government signaling model, a bigger 
government shareholding would indicate a higher IPO under-pricing because the less 
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percent of shares the government sells to the public the higher under-pricing is needed 
for signaling. In Chinese literature Mok and Hui (1998) demonstrate that the ‘Chinese 
characteristic’ of high equity retention by the state is one of the key determinants of 
market-adjusted IPO under-pricing. However, Mok and Hui’s (1998) result is not 
consistent with a later finding of Chi and Padgett (2005). In this sense, a re-test of the 
hypothesis is required. The hypothesis is set as: 
 
Hypothesis 18: The IPO initial return is positively related with the government 
retention rate. 
 
Tian (2003) has advanced that the listing time lag between the IPO announcement 
date and the IPO listing date causes the Chinese IPO under-pricing. In the literature 
review, a debate among Tian (2003), Chi and Padgett (2005) and Yu and Tse (2003) 
has been discussed as well. If the government really uses the listing time lag to adjust 
the IPO under-pricing as Tian (2003) suggests, then a positive relationship between 
the IPO initial return and the length of the listing time lag would be found. 
 
Hypothesis 19: The IPO initial return is positively related with the time lag between 
the IPO announcement day and the first trading day. 
 
The test of hypothesis 19 would not only help clarify above debate, but more 
importantly would prove whether or not the government has really played such 
floatation time game because testing for government involvement in IPO under-
pricing is one of the major tasks of this thesis. 
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If Dewenter and Malatesta (1997)’s theory that government may use under-pricing to 
reduce the employees’ misgivings about privatisation is right, then the more employee 
shares the government has offered the more under-priced the IPO is. Consequently, 
the employee shareholding would be expected to be positively related with the IPO 
initial return.  
 
Hypothesis 20: The IPO initial return is positively related with the size of employee 
shareholding. 
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Chapter 6 Data Analysis – General Description 
 
6.1 Data Collection 
 
In China, the financial information distribution industry is pretty much segmented and 
the competing firms in the area are much smaller compared to Bloomberg, Reuters 
and Thomson Financial in the western countries. Even though several information 
firms do have nationwide operations, there are few dominant information vendors. 
Many of the financial news agencies in China are effectively state-owned or 
controlled by the government. Although some database such as DataStream provides 
information of Chinese stock market, their data is neither complete nor 
comprehensive. Some other internationally known news and information agencies 
only start financial information operation recently.  
 
Therefore, this research mainly relies on private information vendors for the data. The 
main sample set is obtained from Shanghai Wind Information Co. Ltd., a commercial 
database company serving institutional investors. The raw dataset of the original 
sample given by the company includes 1,464 IPO shares from October 12th 1990 to 
September 9th 2004, which covers the whole Chinese stock market history till the 
time when the sample was obtained. The original sample includes almost all the IPO 
shares at both SSE and SZSE. Every entry in the sample includes 38 items such as 
offering price, first-trading-day closing price, listing date, company status and IPO 
P/E ratio, etc. To compare and to eliminate possible human errors, another sample of 
1,320 IPO shares at both SSE and SZSE during approximately the same time period 
was collected one by one from Asia Securities Co. Ltd., an investment company in 
China. Whenever disparity occurs between the two raw samples and whenever item is 
missing, other commercial databases such as Stock Star (www.stockstar.com), 
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Panorama (www.p5w.net) and Financial Analyst (www.fxj.com.cn) are resorted for 
complementary information and adjustment is made in accordance with the data that 
is quoted by the most resources. Any market index to be used in this study is SSE A-
Share Index and SZSE A-Share Composite Index, the two major weighted-average 
indexes at the Shanghai Security Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE). 
 
Due to data analysis requirement, some data items that are missing from the main 
dataset such as first-day trading volume and value, companies’ founding date and 
companies’ industrial classification are collected company by company from public 
information sources such as Internet, IPO prospectus, newspapers and government 
archives. For example, the companies’ founding dates are collected from Stock Star 
(www.stockstar.com) and yahoo finance China website (cn.fiance.yahoo.com), and 
the companies’ industrial classifications are according to the CSRC Listing 
Companies’ Industrial Classification Guidebook (2001). As for documentary data 
such as government policy and regulation, newspaper, government archive and the 
official issuing handbooks are main sources. For example, the geographical 
classification of provinces and regions of the “Western Region Development” policy 
is found within a government’s official document shown later in the analysis section.  
 
After the original sample is collected, sub-sample datasets are re-collected out of the 
raw sample dataset for the following reasons. Firstly, for every individual testing 
hypotheses and models the sub-sample sizes may be different due to missing data 
items. For example, when the industry dummy variables are formulated some 
companies may be left out of the sub-sample dataset because they lack industry 
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classifications. Also “died” companies are not included in some sub-sample datasets41. 
The concern of survival bias is not significant for this research for the reasons given 
in the footnote. In the meantime, even if there is no missing item and the issuing firm 
is still alive at the time when the data is collected, there is still another consideration 
of choosing an appropriate window period for testing.  
 
Basically, the window period of testing is chosen as from January 1996 to December 
2003. This window period can be different for different hypotheses. For example, the 
information asymmetry hypotheses tests are based on the whole window period, while 
the test for the effect of transaction stamp duty rate tax increase is based on the 
window period of one year around the event date when the tax rate was increased. As 
a matter of fact, there are far less IPOs in the time period before year 1996 than in the 
period after 1996. Among the IPOs before 1996 many are not even market tradable 
when they were issued. In the original sample, there are 364 firms that were listed 
prior to 1996 and almost half of them went public even before the Chinese stock 
exchanges are established. It is therefore difficult to measure their under-pricing 
magnitude and compare them with other market tradable IPOs. During the early 
1990’s, there were many changes in the regulations and laws in the primary market. 
Only until the middle 1990s, the market was relatively established and the 
infrastructure became reasonably stable. When the market is experiencing frequent 
regime changes it is difficult to distinguish one particular effect from others. Another 
reason to choose such testing window period is that there are less studies focusing on 
the more recent time period. Eventually, 880 IPO shares are included in the new sub-
                                                 
41
 Because the commercial database company pays less attention to the non-existing companies, the 
information for “died” companies is likely to be incorrect or incomplete. In the given period in the 
example, these companies are in very small numbers (<10), and thus the survival bias will not be a 
problem. 
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sample dataset. Among the 880 shares, 83 IPOs are previously private-owned before 
going public. The private-IPOs account for 9.4% of total IPOs in the sub-sample. 
 
Even after the sample set is selected, some raw data still need to be transformed for 
data analysis purpose. These data transformations will be illustrated when descriptive 
statistics of data are under discussion. The data is analyzed mainly in statistic software 
EViews, and SPSS is also used.  
 
6.2 Basic Benchmark Measurement 
A first step to build up a testable model is to choose a proper measurement benchmark. 
To measure the IPO under-pricing level, two approaches are adopted in previous 
literatures. Therefore, it is necessary to make a comparison between the two. The 
most widely accepted and used approach is to use the IPO raw initial return that is 
defined by the formula: 
1ir  = 
0
101
i
iii
P
DPP +−
   (1) 
where 1ir  is the i
th
 IPO share’s daily return on the first trading day; 
1iP  is the closing price of the i
th
 IPO share on the first trading day; 
0iP  is the offer price of the i
th
 IPO share; 
1iD  is the dividend issued on the first trading day for the i
th IPO share.  
As a matter of fact, dividend in the first trading day is equal to zero. Therefore, the 
raw initial return (IPORETN) is defined by: 
IPORETN = 
0
01
P
PP −
   (2) 
This raw initial percentage return is also adopted by many previous researchers such 
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as Ritter (1984). 
 
On the other hand, some researchers such as Chi and Padgett (2005) also used market-
adjusted abnormal initial return (MAAR) to measure the IPO under-pricing degree. 
The MAAR definition is: 
1iMAAR  = 100 ×  (
1
1
1
1
m
i
r
r
+
+
 - 1)  (3) 
where 1ir  is the raw initial return; and 1mr  is the same time market index return with 
the definition: 
1mr  = 
0
01
m
mm
P
PP −
    (4) 
In the formula 1mP  is the closing market index on the first trading day and 0mP is the 
closing market index on the offer day.  
 
Chi and Padgett (2005) claimed that the market-adjusted initial return will give a 
more accurate picture. When 1iMAAR  is interpreted as an abnormal return, the 
assumption is that the systematic risk of the IPO’s under consideration is the same as 
that of the index, i.e. the betas of the IPO's average to unity. Ibbotson (1975) and some 
other researchers have demonstrated that the average beta of newly listed firms is 
higher than one. Thus, the abnormal return 1iMAAR  calculated in above equation 
provides a somewhat upwardly-biased estimate of the initial performance of the IPO 
relative to the market. On the other hand, the market-adjusted initial return provides a 
good measure of relative return. Since the under-pricing is measured against the 
average returns in the market, the market-adjusted return is more sensible measure 
according to the under-pricing definition. As a matter of fact, this thesis finds no 
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statistically significant difference between the two under-pricing measures of IPO raw 
initial return and the market-adjusted initial return. But for logic consistency, the 
thesis will present the statistics and regression results in terms of market-adjusted 
initial return. 
 
A third measure of IPO under-pricing is the so-called odds (new share lottery winning 
ratio)-adjusted IPO initial return. As mentioned earlier, the IPO's in China are all 
oversubscribed and the oversubscription rates are normally very high which is 
reflected by a very low lottery winning ratio of new shares. It is suggested by some 
researchers to make adjustment of the possibility of being allocated the new shares to 
the IPO initial return. The logic is that if a high degree of under-pricing is achieved 
through a high degree of oversubscription which means a much higher demand than 
the supply then the initial return should be reduced accordingly to reflect the low 
probability of winning the new share. Such lottery winning odds-adjusted and market-
adjusted IPO initial return has been used by researchers such as Liu (2003) in 
empirical studies. It is defined as follows: 
1iOAMAR  = 1iMAAR ×  1iEWINNINGRAT    (5) 
where 1iMAAR  is the IPO market-adjusted initial return and WINNINGRATE is the 
IPO new share lottery winning ratio. WINNIGRATE is defined by the following 
formula: 
WINNINGRATE = 
investors by thefor  applied shares Total
firm issuing by the offered shares Total
  (6) 
All quantities in formula 5 and 6 are calculated based on the data on the IPO listing 
date. 
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After appropriate proxy measure of the under-pricing magnitude has been chosen, the 
next step is to find the proper statistic model and identify other independent variables.  
As Stigler (1981) points out, the method of least square is the automobile of modern 
statistical analysis. This study is going to carry out the hypothesis test based on the so-
called ordinary least square (OLS) regression model, particularly because the OLS 
regression is asymptotically efficient and is a best linear unbiased estimation (BLUE) 
model. The principle is to choose the estimated regression coefficients to fit in the 
regression model so that the sum of squares of prediction errors is minimized, given 
certain independent variables. In this sense, those independent variables that give the 
best fitting result will be the factors that have the biggest power in explaining the 
dependent variable. As decided, the IPO initial return will enter the left-hand side of 
the regression equation as the dependent variable while all other factors that may 
explain this initial return will enter the right-hand side of the regression equation as 
independent variables. The question then boils down to which factors ought to be 
included as the independent variables, because these independent variables are exactly 
the factors we are looking for. The hypothesis test will replace the independent 
variables in the regression with the proxy variables set up according to the hypotheses 
listed in the last chapter. If the proxy variable stands the statistical test, so does the 
hypothesis. 
 
As a matter of fact, the original benchmark OLS regression model is usually adopted 
by previous researchers such as Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) and Su and Fleisher 
(1999). An illustrative example is given as follows: 
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iMAAR  = 0α  + 1α × iPRICE  + 2α × iIPOSZ  + 3α × iAGE + 4α × iMKECAP  + 
5α × iPROFSHA  + 6α × iGOVNT  + 7α × iTIMEIPO  + iε     (7) 
 
The meanings of every variable in above equation will be explained in more details 
later in the following sections, but the regression formulas for every individual sub-
samples will be in a similar format as above. The MAARi on the left-hand side of the 
regression equation stands for the dependent variable which in this instance is the ith 
IPO’s market-adjusted initial return, and all other independent variables are listed on 
the right-hand side of the equation with α’s standing for the regression coefficients of 
these independent variables. The above independent variables are just for 
demonstration purpose because they may not all be included in the same model for a 
specific hypothesis test. On the other hand, some other factors may be missing from 
above model, depending on which hypothesis is to be tested. For example, the 
turnover rate for speculation effect hypothesis test is not included in the model. The 
independent variables serving particular hypothesis will be set up according to the 
hypothesis later on. The definition of additional independent variables will be 
explained accordingly in the following sections. 
 
After the model is chosen, the next issue under concern is the scaling of the 
measurement. There is a particular reason to scale the independent variables’ values 
so that the resulting numbers are not too large or too small and are similar in 
magnitudes to other variables. This is because large numbers cause overflow errors 
and small numbers cause round-off errors, especially when sums of squares are 
computed, which adversely affect the accuracy of results. If the scale of measurement 
of an independent variable is changed in a linear regression model, its regression 
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coefficient and the corresponding standard errors are affected by the same scale, but 
all other statistics are unchanged. Therefore the impact of changing the scale of 
measurement on the regression results is well justified. As can be seen later the units 
of measurement of the independent variables in this study range widely from tens to 
billions, it is necessary to scale the measurement units of these variables to a similar 
level. Scaling of every individual variable will be discussed in details in the following 
section when these independent variables are defined. 
 
6.3 General Description of the Raw Data 
Now that the benchmark model has been chosen and the measurement has been 
selected, it is very helpful to take a close look at the general descriptive characteristics 
of the sample so that we could get an overview of the whole dataset and we could find 
and deal with any problem in the data at an early stage before we really embark on the 
analysis. The meanings of the variables in this section are listed in the following table. 
Table 1: Meanings of Individual Variables in the Raw Dataset 
Variables Names Meanings of Variables 
AGE Issuing firm’s age. 
GOVNT Government shareholding (retention rate) in the post-IPO firm (%). 
IPORETN IPO initial return. 
MAAR Market-adjusted IPO initial return. 
OAMAR Lottery winning odds-adjusted and market-adjusted IPO initial return. 
IPOSZ IPO offer size. 
MKECAP Issuing firm’s market capitalisation. 
PRICE IPO offer price (RMB ¥). 
PROFSHA Issuing firm’s profitability. 
TIMEIPO Listing time lag between IPO announcement and listing dates. 
EMPLYEERATE Employee shareholding in the post-IPO firm (%). 
WINNGINGRATE IPO lottery winning ratio (%). 
 
Some of above variables are directly read off the dataset and the above table is self-
explanatory for the meanings of these variables. Other variables are calculated based 
on the readings from the dataset. Although more detailed discussions about the 
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variables will be left to every individual chapters that deal with particular hypotheses, 
brief explanations and calculation formulas of these variables are listed below so that 
readers can better understand how the variables are calculated. 
AGE The issuing firm’s age at the time of IPO. It is the total calendar 
days from the firm’s founding date to the first trading date 
divided by 100.42 
GOVNT The size of government shareholding in percentage of the total 
share volume in the post-issuing IPO firm. It is defined by the 
following formula: 
GOVNT = 
IPO after the firm issuing  theof in volume ngshareholdi Total
IPO after the firm issuing in the in volume ngshareholdi Government
 (8) 
IPORETN, MAAR and OAMAR are calculated by formula 2, 3 and 5 respectively 
as discussed. 
IPOSZ  The IPO offer size measured in billion Chinese RMB Yuan. It is 
calculated by the following formula: 
IPOSZ = Total shares issued to public×Offer price  (9) 
MKECAP  The issuing firm’s market capitalization measured in 100 
million Chinese RMB Yuan on the first trading day:  
MKECAP = Total outstanding shares incl. tradable and non-tradable × fully paid 
market price of the shares  (10) 
As said earlier, the IPO size and issuing firm’s market capitalization are regarded 
different variables, which is easy to tell from their formula definitions. In fact, 
researchers such as Su and Fleisher (1999) and Liu (2003) have used both measures in 
their regressions. 
                                                 
42
 Days instead of years are used is because 1, the Chinese companies are usually very young and 2, it 
is to make the scale match with other variables’ measurements. It is also for the purpose of scaling 
discussed in chapter 5 that the days are divided by 100. 
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PROFSHA The issuing firm’s profitability at the time of IPO. It is the ratio 
of the issuing firm’s net profit in the former year before the 
issuing divided by the volume of the firm’s outstanding shares 
at the time of IPO. It is also called earnings per share (EPS) and 
it is calculated by the following formula: 
PROFSHA = 
IPO of  timeat the in volume shares goutstandin Total
IPO  thebeforeyear  oneYuan in profit net  sfirm' Issuing
 (11) 
Researchers such and Chi and Padgett (2005) have used the EPS as a measure of the 
issuing firm’s profitability. 
 
TIMEIPO The listing time lag. It denotes the number of days between the 
announcement date of an IPO and the first market trading date 
divided by 100: 
TIMEIPO = 
100
datent announceme sIPO' The - date ingfirst trad sIPO' The
 (12) 
EMPLYEERATE The employee shareholding ratio. It is the total employee share 
volume divided by the total outstanding share volume: 
EMPLYEERATE =
IPO after the firm issuing  theof in volume ngshareholdi Total
IPO after the firm issuing in the in volume ngshareholdi Employee
 
           (13) 
WINNINGRATE is calculated by formula 6 as discussed earlier. 
 
The abbreviations of the variables will be used throughout this thesis with the same 
meanings. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Individual Variables 
(Note: The lottery winning ratio is measured in percentage.)  
 
 
Variables/Statistics  Observations  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Skewness  Kurtosis
AGE 880 9.9046 8.5200 62.5800 0.0100 9.2383 1.2118 5.1150
GOVNT 880 0.4684 0.5455 0.8500 0.0000 0.2507 -0.7281 2.2860
IPORETN 880 1.2950 1.1529 8.3021 -0.0617 0.8370 1.6594 9.6322
MAAR 880 1.2945 1.1565 8.2543 -0.0424 0.8335 1.6530 9.6034
OAMAR 879 1.2397 0.5203 27.4605 -1.0466 2.5848 5.0528 34.0529
WINNINGRATE 879 1.4079 0.4545 90.5777 0.0107 5.0543 12.1107 179.0010
IPOSZ 880 0.4745 0.3030 11.8160 0.0431 0.8808 9.2410 105.5860
MKECAP 880 22.8308 9.5950 3658.8400 1.9400 128.8883 25.7841 722.1003
PRICE 880 6.8885 6.2250 36.6800 2.2000 3.0736 3.0724 20.9251
PROFSHA 880 0.1766 0.1496 1.9029 -0.3768 0.1338 4.1146 41.8046
EMPLYEERATE 880 0.0411 0.0183 0.4847 0.0000 0.0646 2.4692 10.8365
TIMEIPO 880 0.3324 0.2500 3.8000 0.1200 0.2703 4.9231 46.6143
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The descriptive statistics of individual variables are given in table 2 above. A very 
prominent finding in the table is that the average IPO raw initial return across the 
sample is approximately 129% with a maximum level of more than 830%, which is 
almost the same magnitude as Chi and Padgett’s (2005) presented in their paper even 
the sample of this research includes data from a later period of time. The supposedly 
more sensible measure of average market-adjusted IPO initial return MAAR is only 
marginally lower than the average raw initial return with very similar descriptive 
statistics.  
 
Meanwhile, the lottery winning ratio seems to be very low with a mean of 1.4079%, 
which is already higher than the normally perceived 0.3% winning rate43 in China. 
The lowest rate is 0.0107%, which means every IPO new share is demanded by 
almost 10,000 investors or accounts 44 . The finding is consistent with previous 
descriptions of the high oversubscription rate of Chinese IPOs. Based on this very low 
lottery winning ratio, people could argue that the very high IPO initial return is 
inflated by the low probability of winning the new shares. Therefore, the lottery 
winning odds-adjusted and market-adjusted IPO initial return OAMAR will provide 
the most accurate description of the under-pricing magnitude. OAMAR does show a 
6% lower IPO initial return than the other two under-pricing measures. However, this 
minor change will not dampen the huge 123% initial return. The IPO high initial 
return again proves that a severe under-pricing does exist in the Chinese IPO market 
and this pattern of high magnitude of IPO under-pricing has not been changed so far 
as of the time when data was collected for this study.  
                                                 
43
 0.3% is an unofficial estimate of average IPO lottery winning ratio among investors which is not 
proved or tested by any official publications.  
44
 The subscription is through investors’ accounts opened with security companies and one investor 
may have multiple accounts. 
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A distinct common feature of all the variables in table 2 is that they all have large 
magnitude of skewness and kurtosis. Only the government retention rate has relatively 
small skewness (-0.7281).  According to statistic theory, when a distribution is normal 
the variable’s skewness and kurtosis values are zero. Non-normal kurtosis produces 
an underestimate of the variance of a variable. Apparently, most variables in table 1 
are far from normally distributed. Many variables are highly skewed in terms of their 
skewness and have too peaky spikes in terms of their kurtosis. Such non-normality 
can also be clearly seen from figure 1, which is the normal P-P plot of the 
standardized residual of OLS regression with original variables listed above. 
Figure 1: Normal P-P Plot of the OLS Regression with Non-transformed 
Variables from SPSS 
(The P-P plot demonstrates whether the residual from the regression of IPORETN are 
normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45-degree line.) 
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The x-axis of the plot is the observed cumulative probability of the sample and y-axis 
is the expected cumulative probability if the sample is normally distributed. If the 
normality assumption is strictly followed the bold curve should coincide with the 
diagonal straight line. But in figure 1, it is clear that the original data set is far from 
normal so that the bold cure does not coincide with the straight line.  
 
The non-normal dataset is a common problem seen in many empirical studies and it 
could lead to some concerns of the regression. One of the underlying assumptions of 
OLS regression analysis is that the regression variables ought to be normally 
distributed. The violation of this assumption may undermine the regression quality for 
instance by the decentralized mean (skewness) or underestimated variance (kurtosis). 
In literature, there are normally two different points of views to cope with the non-
normal dataset. 
 
The first approach is based on large sample statistics. Some researchers believe that in 
a large sample, a variable with statistically significant skewness often does not deviate 
enough from normality to make a substantive difference in the analysis. In other 
words, with large samples the significance level of skewness is not as important as its 
actual size (worse the farther from zero) and the visual appearance of the distribution. 
In a large sample, the impact of departure from zero kurtosis also diminishes. For 
example, the underestimates of variance associated with negative kurtosis (flat 
distributions) disappear with samples of 100 or more cases; with positive kurtosis the 
underestimation of variance disappear with samples of 200 or more (Waternaux, 
1976). In other words, as long as the sample is big enough it is possible to ignore the 
non-normality problem and the raw data analysis may still produce sufficiently 
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precise estimations. Since this study uses a dataset of more than 800 observations, this 
approach is promising because it provides a quicker but relatively accurate analysis 
procedure.  
 
Another more aggressive approach is to use the data transformation. Its basic idea is 
to adopt some traceable mathematical transformations on the raw dataset to make the 
variables’ distribution more like normal. As soon will be seen, the regression 
variables can be transformed by taking their square root, cubic root, logarithm or 
inverse. Accordingly, transformed variables are denoted in prefixed forms. For 
example, LNPRICE stands for logarithm of PRICE and CUBEPROFSHA for cubic 
root of PROFSHA etc. The selection criterion for which transformation should be 
used or whether the variable should be transformed is based on the variable’s 
deviation from the normal distribution in terms of Skewness and Kurtosis. Less 
deviation is preferred. In fact, as all the transformations are the monotone one-to-one 
mapping functions of the original variables, the real effects of the original variables 
can be easily traced back by taking inverse image of the transformed function.  
 
Although all the sub-sample sets have large number of observations, by taking the 
one-to-one mapping transformation it is easy to trace back the original variable. In 
this sense, the transformation may further help to prevent the occurrence of the 
regression problem caused by the non-normally distributed data. Therefore, it may be 
better to transform the raw data into the data that is closer to the normally distributed 
one. The effect of taking the transformations of the raw data will be illustrated 
through the distribution histogram of the variables. Details of the data transformations 
and the distribution histograms will be discussed in the analysis chapters. 
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However, there is a drawback in the data transformation method. Because the 
regression analysis is concerned about the relationship between different set of 
regression variables, the regression variables are supposed to capture certain model 
characters and they should have meaningful economic or financial presentations. The 
data transformation may cause difficulty in understanding these economic 
explanations. To avoid too much complexity, the study will only adopt simple one-
step data transformations such as natural logarithm, square root, cubic root and 
inverse etc. Transformations that involve two or more steps such as reflect and square 
root method will not be used.  
 
As a matter of fact, this study finds that transformed dataset and non-transformed 
dataset actually produce quite similar statistic results and no big difference in terms of 
significance level or regression coefficient sign has been found. For this reason, only 
results based on transformed dataset will be demonstrated. Besides the two 
approaches of dealing with the dataset, it is also possible to make further 
improvement on the regression method itself. One such improvement is through the 
use of the White Heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS regression.  
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix for the Variables 
(The numbers stand for the correlation coefficients between the two variables on top of the same column and on the left of the same row. E.g. the 
correlation coefficient between AGE and itself is 1.00000 and the correlation coefficient between EMPLYEERATE and AGE is 0.3046. All 
significant at 90% significance level or above.) 
 
 
MAAR AGE EMPLYEERATE GOVNT IPOSZ MKECAP PRICE PROFSHA TIMEIPO WINNINGRATE 
MAAR 
 1.000000          
AGE 
 0.051599  1.000000         
EMPLYEERATE 
 0.022871  0.304614  1.000000        
GOVNT -0.056460 -0.389223 -0.254813  1.000000       
IPOSZ -0.227984  0.033273 -0.137449  0.143458  1.000000      
MKECAP -0.112753  0.006510 -0.060247  0.087132  0.657024  1.000000     
PRICE -0.152296  0.073027 -0.076625 -0.177558  0.093742 -0.004341  1.000000    
PROFSHA -0.438565 -0.065671  0.103795 -0.052880  0.080928  0.019815  0.497537  1.000000   
TIMEIPO 
 0.128729 -0.063853  0.001351  0.066559 -0.025597 -0.020113 -0.093074 -0.058612  1.000000  
WINNINGRATE -0.138586 -0.052694  0.079918  0.028788 -0.006822 -0.000874 -0.043020  0.213653 -0.002364  1.000000 
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Before starting the analysis of every each and single factors it is interesting to see 
roughly the relationship between these variables and especially their relationship with 
the IPO initial return. Therefore, table 3 above demonstrates the correlation matrix of 
all the variables. It can be seen from the table that the issuing firms’ market 
capitalisation may have a slightly high correlation with the firms’ offer size, which 
indicates that a further parsimonious test of the regression model may be needed in 
the later regression analysis if one of the variables are not significant in the regression. 
In fact, in the later part of this study the statistic test shows that the issuing firm’s IPO 
offer size may be a more powerful explanatory variable in the regression. 
 
Also a quick look at the table will lead to the impression that the IPO initial return 
may be closely related to the issuing firm’s profitability, because the correlation 
between these two variables are relatively high (-0.4386). And the negative 
correlation seems to support the information asymmetry hypothesis that the 
information asymmetry is a decreasing function of the issuing firm’s profitability. In 
the meantime, several variables including issuing firm’s age, government retention 
rate and offer price seem to be correlated with the IPO initial return in an opposite 
direction as opposed to what have been expected according to the hypotheses. 
Attention should be brought to these variables in the later analysis. 
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Chapter 7 Data Analysis - Speculation Effect 
 
Chapter 4 has thrashed out the logic behind the statement that China’s highly 
speculative market may have contributed to the Chinese IPO under-pricing. On this 
ground the speculation effect hypothesis has been derived. It has also been discussed 
that the government’s control of new share supply and problematic IPO process are 
behind the speculation. Therefore, the test of speculation effect hypothesis overall 
may help to indirectly find out whether the government has been involved in the IPO 
under-pricing.  
 
In particular, the hypothesis test engages in an investigation of a government policy 
change of transaction stamp duty tax rate. No matter what purpose the government 
policy change is for, the test will reveal whether the impact of the policy change has 
been reflected in the IPO pricing. To this end, the government’s involvement in IPO 
pricing will be indirectly revealed through its direct tackle of speculation. 
 
 
7.1 Model and Variables 
Chapter 4 has introduced the background of the raise of transaction stamp duty tax 
rate on May 12th 1997. Through the tax raise Chinese government seeks to curb 
speculation, as claimed by China Security, a newspaper with government background. 
On the other hand, speculation is blamed for causing Chinese IPO under-pricing by 
people in the area. If the tax raise has achieved the government’s objective of 
suppressing speculation, the event of the tax rate change would have negatively 
affected the under-pricing. Hence, an event study on the impact of the tax rate change 
on IPO initial return will deliver the answer whether the speculation hypothesis is 
robust since speculation is the sole target of this policy change.  
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Hypothesis 1 in chapter 5 suggests that the under-pricing magnitude measured in IPO 
initial return is smaller after May 12th 1997 than before because the speculation is 
supposed to be subdued by the tax raise and so is the IPO under-pricing. As 
mentioned before, the window period of testing is chosen from six months before 
May 12th 1997 to six months after May 12th 1997.  
 
Six months is a common length of window period for event study. In this case, the six 
months window period would provide enough observations in a sufficiently long 
period for the event impact to appear statistically. Meanwhile, it would avoid 
including possible overlapping impacts from other events, for instance, the transaction 
stamp duty tax rate was cut one year later in June 1998. If a longer test period is used, 
the pre-event effect in many financial studies, such as leveraged stock returns before 
merger and acquisition, would possibly pollute the sample due to the later event of the 
tax cut. In other words, unknown pre-event effect from the later tax cut could make it 
more difficult to differentiate the real impact of the tax raise on IPO initial return if 
the test window period gets closer to the later event of tax cut. On the other hand, if 
the test period is shorter there may not be enough IPOs in the period. 
 
To measure the change in IPO initial return from the pre-event to the post-event 
period, a dummy variable is defined as follows: 
POST970512 The period dummy variable, which has value 1 if the IPO is 
issued after the May 12th 1997 and 0 if otherwise.  
Since no other factors are considered except for the event itself within the window 
period, the testing model for hypothesis 1 simply will be: 
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Model 1: 
iMAAR  = 0α  + 1α × iPOST970512  + 2α × iMKTCAP + 3α × iPROFSHA + iε   (14) 
where iε  is the error term. As MAAR is already market return adjusted, the issuing 
firms’ market capitalisation and profitability are used as control variables. 
 
According to hypothesis 1 that the average IPO initial return is higher before the 
transaction stamp duty tax ratio is increased than after, the regression coefficient 1α  
of the dummy variable in above model should have a negative sign to make the 
hypothesis stand.  
 
Setting up proxy variables to measure or reflect the speculation magnitude is a more 
direct way for testing the hypothesis, which compares to the indirect event study 
above. If the change of transaction stamp duty tax rate has impact on the IPO pricing, 
then it is possible to use the tax rate itself as a proxy to gauge the impact of the change, 
i.e. the magnitude of the tax rate could be related to the IPO initial return too. 
According to this assumption, the transaction stamp duty tax rate can be used as an 
explanatory variable in the regression. It is shown in chapter 5 that the turnover rate 
can be used as a proxy to directly measure the speculation magnitude, and the IPO 
lottery winning ratio can be used to measure the imbalance between supply and 
demand of new shares which according to chapter 2 and 3 is essentially a driving 
force of China’s speculation. Based on hypothesis 2, 3 and 4, the three independent 
variables are defined as follows: 
 
TRNSCTNTAX The transaction stamp duty tax rate. 
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TRNOVER The turnover rate of the IPO share in the first trading day 
measured in percentage. It is defined by the following formula: 
TRNOVER = 
shares IPO  tradablegoutstandin Total
day ingfirst trad on the  tradedshares IPO Total
 (15) 
In simple words, the turnover rate measures how actively the new share is traded on 
its first trading day. The speculative trading of new shares in China, as said, is 
conducted mainly by retail investors. If the IPO initial return is targeted by 
speculative trading, then the short-term intensity of the speculation will be reflected in 
a high turnover rate. In fact, the term ‘turnover rate’ has been referred by Krigman, 
Shaw and Womack (1999) as flipping rate of sell-motivated block trades as a percent 
of total dollar volume on the first-day, to predict future returns. But in this study the 
turnover rate mainly measures the trading behaviour of retail investors because the 
majority of investors in the Chinese stock market are retail investors. Share volume 
rather than dollar volume is used in this study. In previous Chinese IPO literatures, the 
turnover rate is usually measured as the rate of the new shares traded on the first 
trading day against the total outstanding shares. However, since vast majority of 
Chinese IPOs are partial sales and the proportion of non-tradable shares in the post-
IPO firms varies significantly, the traditional measurement of turnover rate may lack 
accuracy. In order to more accurately measure the speculation magnitude, the turnover 
rate is measured against only to total tradable shares in this thesis because there is no 
way for investors to speculate on short-term return of non-tradable shares. 
 
WINNINGRATE The IPO lottery winning ratio. It is calculated according to 
formula 6. 
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The lottery winning ratio is defined in the way such that the more shares are in 
demand by investors or the fewer shares are in supply by the issuing firm the lower 
the winning ratio. By this means, the lottery winning ratio gauges the oversubscription 
level of the new shares, or equivalently how eagerly investors are demanding the new 
shares. Intuitively speaking, an IPO that has potentially higher initial return would 
trigger a higher demand from retail investors who would like to realize the quick 
profit through instant selling. 
 
The second model for testing hypothesis 2, 3 and 4 will be: 
Model 2: 
iMAAR  = 0α  + 1α × iTRNSCTNTAX  + 2α × iTRNOVER  + 3α × iEWINNINGRAT  
+ 4α × iMKTCAP + iε     (16) 
where the issuing firm’s market capitalisation is used as a control variable. 
 
Recalling the underlying assumption of hypothesis 2 would lead to the expectation of 
a negative regression coefficient 1α , because a higher transaction stamp duty tax is 
supposed to curb the speculation and in turn cut the IPO under-pricing. Similarly, if 
speculation directly causes IPO under-pricing, then the turnover rate that measures the 
speculation magnitudes would have a positive regression coefficient 2α . Finally, if the 
short-term speculation is driven by the imbalance of the demand and supply of new 
shares, the lottery winning ratio should have a negative regression coefficient 3α , 
because a higher likelihood of winning the lottery means less imbalance between the 
demand and supply of new shares and vice versa.  
 
7.2 Analysis and Results 
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To test the event impact of transaction stamp duty tax raise is an implicit and indirect 
approach to find out the speculation effect. Let us firstly take a look at the sub-sample 
of IPOs in the 12 months window period in which the event study of the stamp duty 
tax raise will be carried out. 
Table 4: Comparison of Market-adjusted IPO Initial Return in the 6 Months 
pre- and post-Stamp Duty Tax Raise 
 MAAR pre 12/05/97 MAAR post 12/05/97 
 Mean 1.8270 1.3693 
 Median 1.5943 1.1989 
 Maximum 4.6849 3.8872 
 Minimum 0.6321 0.0420 
 Std. Dev. 0.7982 0.7106 
 Observations 94 114 
 
The above table shows that there are 208 IPOs in the window period. Among them 94 
IPOs went public before the tax raise and 114 afterwards. The partition looks pretty 
even between and pre and post event periods in terms of IPO observations. The 
comparison shows that the average market-adjusted IPO initial return experienced a 
significant drop from 183% to 137% and this pattern is consistent across all other 
statistics such as median, maximum and minimum. Given that the standard deviation 
is pretty close, the numbers give a quite good indication that the event of tax raise has 
caused the market-adjusted IPO initial return to drop.  
 
But we jump to any conclusion, let us further look at how the regression model shows. 
The regression results of model 1 (formula 14) are presented in the following table 5. 
As discussed in chapter 6, the White heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS regression is 
used. 
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Table 5: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression with the Post 
Event Period Dummy Variable 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; *** stands for 1% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: MAAR; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 208. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: Table 5 demonstrates the ordinary least square (OLS) regression 
results of model 1. The period dummy variable POST970512 has a negative 
regression coefficient (-0.4577), which is in line with our expectation under 
hypothesis 1, and the regression coefficient is statistically significant at a 99% 
confidence level (or equivalently 1% significance level). The test results support our 
assumption that the event of the transaction stamp duty tax rate increase on May 12th 
1997 has a negative impact on the IPO initial return. 
 
That is to say, the government action of increasing the transaction stamp duty tax rate 
has eased the IPO under-pricing at least within the window period of testing. Since 
one underlying assumption for hypothesis 1 is that the IPO under-pricing is caused by 
retail investors’ speculation and the government claims that the increase of the 
Variable Coefficient 
C 1.8270 ( 22.4337***) 
POST970512 -0.4577 ( -4.3237***) 
MKTCAP -0.3267 ( -2.8737***) 
PROFSHA -4.1139 ( -7.8737***) 
R-squared 0.3849 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.3805 
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transaction stamp duty tax rate is to curb the speculation, the satisfactory test results 
have indirectly proved the underlying assumption.  
 
In addition to proving that the speculation effect is a source for Chinese IPO under-
pricing, above test also displays that the change of government’s transaction tax 
policy has clear impact on IPO under-pricing despite the government intention of 
fighting speculation through the policy. 
 
Let us look at the second, more explicit and direct approach to explore the speculation 
effect. But at first, let us examine some fundamental statistic characteristics of the raw 
data in model 2. The transaction stamp duty tax rate is the same for all the IPOs in the 
same period, so there is no point to show the descriptive statistics of it across different 
IPOs. The following table 6 demonstrates how the transaction stamp duty tax rate has 
evolved with the development of China’s stock market. 
Table 6: History of China’s Transaction Stamp Duty Tax Rate Changes 
(Note: The table only shows the transaction stamp duty tax rate changes before December 2004 when 
the data for this research was collected. Also the table only shows the transaction stamp duty tax rate 
changes for A-shares.) 
 
Time of Changes Changes 
June 12th, 1992 Transaction stamp duty tax starts (for both buy and sell sides). 
The rate is originally set at 0.3%. 
May 12th, 1997 Transaction stamp duty tax rate is increased from 0.3% to 
0.5%. 
June 12th, 1998 Transaction stamp duty tax rate is decreased from 0.5% to 
0.4%. 
November 11th, 
2001 
Transaction stamp duty tax rate is decreased from 0.4% to 
0.2%. 
 
The first change in table 6 took place at the beginning of China’s stock market. The 
second change on May 12th 1997 has been repeatedly mentioned in previous parts of 
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the thesis and it forms the foundation of hypothesis 1. Table 6 shows that except for 
the second change, the Chinese government has been trying to cut the transaction 
stamp duty tax rate consistently. According to table 6, the whole window period of 
testing for model 2 will be divided into four periods and the independent variable of   
TRNSCTNTAX will take constant value within each period. For instance, 
TRNSCTNTAX is 0.5% from May 12th 1997 to June 12th 1998. 
 
As said earlier, the lottery winning ratio showed in table 2 is very low with a mean of 
1.4079% with the lowest lottery winning rate of 0.0107%, which means every IPO 
new share is demanded by almost 10,000 investors or accounts paying application 
deposit upfront. Table 2 shows that the highest lottery winning ratio in the sample is 
90.58%, which means not a single IPO in the sample is undersubscribed. As there is 
no undersubscribed IPO, it may be difficult to see how the IPO behaviours when there 
is not enough demand. But anyway, the following table shows how the market-
adjusted IPO initial return behaviours under different categories according to whether 
the IPO is slightly oversubscribed, moderately oversubscribed or heavily 
oversubscribed. 
Table 7: Distribution of IPO Initial Return by Oversubscription Level 
(Note: N stands for the number of observations in the category.) 
 
Category Slightly Oversubscribed 
Moderately 
Oversubscribed 
Heavily 
Oversubscribed 
Lottery 
Winning Ratio 
30% to 100% 
(N=5) 
1% to 30% 
(N=237) 
0.01% to 1% 
(N=637) 
Statistics Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
MAAR 0.0899 0.0418 1.0749 0.9890 1.3862 1.2308 
 
A distinct feature of the sample is that the vast majority of the IPOs are heavily 
oversubscribed (N=637) and only 5 IPOs have lottery winning ratio bigger than 30%. 
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Another apparent pattern is that the average market-adjusted IPO initial return is the 
highest when the probability of winning the new share is the lowest. The moderately 
oversubscribed IPOs seem to have moderate market-adjusted IPO initial return too. 
The group of IPOs that have relatively higher lottery winning ratio tend to have the 
lowest average market-adjusted IPO initial return of 9%, which is dramatically lower 
than the average market-adjusted IPO initial return for the whole sample (129%). A 
distribution histogram may help us better understand the statistics of the winning ratio.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution Histogram of the Lottery Winning Ratio - 
WINNINGRATE 
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Std. Dev.   5.054307
Skewness   12.11066
Kurtosis   179.0010
Jarque-Bera  1155996.
Probability  0.000000
  
In figure 2, the lottery winning ratio of vast majority IPOs is less than 2.5%. The data 
shows that even judged by average lottery winning ratio, Chinese IPOs are hugely 
short of supply. The data again confirms the earlier statement that Chinese IPOs are 
mostly oversubscribed. Meanwhile, the data is far from normally distributed with 
extremely high kurtosis (179.0010) and skewness (12.1107). The existence of non-
normality in the distribution of independent variables could lead to some problems 
and it could be dealt with in two ways, as discussed in chapter 6. The natural 
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logarithm-transformed lottery winning ratio has a better-shaped distribution that is 
illustrated in figure 3.   
 
Figure 3: Distribution Histogram of the Natural Logarithm of the Lottery 
Winning Ratio - LNWINNINGRATE 
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Sk ew nes s    0.377465
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A new variable LNWINNINGRATE is used to represent the natural logarithm of the 
lottery winning ratio. Now the chart looks more like a normal distribution with a bell-
shape curve. The excess skewness is now only 0.3775 and the kurtosis is significantly 
reduced. Taking natural logarithm is not the only data transformation method. As a 
matter of fact, taking the inverse, square root and cubic root of the original variable 
are all practical transformation methods, depending on the fundamental characteristics 
of the data. Chapter 6 has stressed that only the best transformation will be used for a 
specific independent variable. Examples of different types of data transformations will 
be demonstrated in later chapters when transformations are adopted.  
 
Let us now take a look at another independent variable – the turnover rate - in model 2. 
The descriptive statistics of the turnover rate is listed in the following table. 
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Table 8: Descriptive Statistics of Turnover Rate 
 
 TRNOVER 
 Mean  0.586034 
 Median  0.600000 
 Maximum  0.940000 
 Minimum  0.030000 
 Std. Dev.  0.161715 
 Skewness -0.999921 
 Kurtosis  4.506118 
 Jarque-Bera  228.5121 
 Observations 875 
 
As discussed before, the turnover rate is an approximate measure of the intensity of 
short-term trading activities. Table 8 shows average 58.6% turnover rate in the first 
trading day, which means on average an IPO has more than half of the total 
outstanding tradable shares changed hands in the first trading day alone. The highest 
turnover rate is even 94% for the IPO in a single day. Chapter 4 has mentioned an 
annual IPO turnover rate of 587% in China. Consistent with that number, the high 
level of first trading day turnover rate again confirms that the Chinese primary market 
is “driven by fast money flow in and out of the market”.  
 
Table 8 also shows that the distribution of the turnover rate is not normal either. But 
after comparing different transformation methods, the thesis finds that data 
transformation in this instance will not help improve the distribution too much. 
Therefore, the original variable TRNOVER will be used in the regression. The 
correlations between the turnover rate, lottery winning ratio and market-adjusted IPO 
initial return are presented as below. 
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix for Lottery Winning Ratio, Turnover Rate and IPO 
Initial Return 
(The numbers stand for the correlation coefficients between the two variables on top of the same 
column and on the left of the same row. E.g. the correlation coefficient between TRNOVER and 
MAAR is 0.3541.) 
 
 
WINNINGRATE TRNOVER MAAR 
WINNINGRATE 
 1.0000   
TRNOVER -0.0436  1.0000  
MAAR -0.1386  0.3541  1.0000 
 
Both the turnover rate and the lottery winning ratio have the right correlation sign as 
expected, i.e. the lottery winning ratio is negatively correlated with the IPO initial 
return and the turnover rate is positively correlated with IPO initial return. 
Furthermore, the turnover rate seems to have a relatively high correlation coefficient 
with the market-adjusted IPO initial return (0.3541).  
 
A further investigation of turnover rate statistics shows more compromising results. 
Aggarwal’s (2001) study uses an IPO-flipping ranking classification method to 
analyze the relationship between the IPO initial return and the flipping rate. Following 
his method, this study uses the turnover ranking classification method to identify the 
connection between the IPO initial return and the speculation.  
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Table 10: Turnover Rate Distribution by Initial Returns  
(Note: The table follows Reena Aggarwal’s (2003) classification of IPO shares. The definitions of very cold, cold, hot and very hot IPO shares follow his definitions too. N is 
the number of observations of IPO shares in that category. ) 
 
 Very cold 
Day 1 return <= 0% 
(N = 2) 
Cold 
0 < Day 1 return <= 10% 
(N=15) 
Hot 
10 < Day 1 return <= 60% 
(N=146) 
Very hot 
Day 1 return > 60% 
(N=717) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Initial Return -0.030833 -0.030833 0.046795 0.053009 0.383186 0.400495 1.510444 1.312187 
Turnover Rate 0.427300 0.427300 0.336577 0.362706 0.486854 0.486432 0.611752 0.630039 
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First thing to be noticed in table 10 is the big proportion of “very hot” IPOs (first 
trading day return greater than 60%) in China’s stock market. There are about 81.5% 
(717/880) IPOs falling into this category, while in Aggarwal’s (2001) paper this rate 
is about 7.3% for the US IPOs. Although this may look trivial because the Chinese 
IPOs are obviously under-priced much more than the US IPOs in a bigger proportion, 
a more interesting finding in table 8 is the apparent simultaneous increases of the 
turnover rate and the IPO mean initial return. For the first three categories, the mean 
of the turnover rate does not change much, i.e. 0.4273 for the very cold IPOs, 0.3366 
for the cold IPOs and 0.4869 for the hot IPOs. But for the 81.5% majority block – the 
very hot IPOs – the turnover rate mean jumps to 0.6118. Accompanying this, the 
group mean of the IPO first day return has a significant jump to the highest 1.5104. 
The difference between the hot and very hot IPO initial returns is statistically 
significant at 5% confidence level. But for the first two groups, as the sample sizes are 
too small it is not sensible to talk about statistic significance. The finding 
demonstrates that the turnover rate and IPO initial return are closely connected. Given 
that the turnover rate measures the speculation effect, the table also reveals that the 
short-term speculative trading is really targeting at the IPO initial return. 
 
Finally, let us examine the regression results. As said earlier, WINNINGRATE is 
replaced by the transformed new variable LNWINNINGRATE in the regression to 
sooth the non-normal distribution problem. 
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Table 11: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression with Turnover 
Rate, Lottery Winning Ratio and Transaction Stamp Duty Tax Rate 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; * stands for 10% significance level and *** stands for 
1% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: MAAR; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 874. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient 
C -0.2918 (-1.8931*) 
TRNSCTNTAX 1.3851 (4.9372***) 
TRNOVER 1.6884 (9.1741***) 
LNWINNINGRATE -0.3031 (-5.6541***) 
MKTCAP -1.9872 (-2.0531*) 
R-squared 0.2673 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.2644 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: The t-statistic of the independent variable TRNSCTNTAX, the 
transaction stamp duty tax rate, is significant at 99% confidence level. But the 
regression coefficient has a positive sign (1.3851), which is opposite to what the 
hypothesis assumed. The result is surprising but it may be interpreted possibly in two 
ways.  
 
Firstly, because the transaction stamp duty tax rate is relatively stable and it remains 
constant within every time period as shown in table 6, the tax rate may be too 
stubborn to capture the characteristics of the fluctuation in the speculation magnitude 
and hence the lump-sum IPO initial return. In a specific period, in which the 
transaction stamp duty tax rate remains constant, the investors’ decision to pursue the 
lump-sum IPO initial return is less likely to be affected by the constant transaction tax 
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rate. Because the investors cannot foresee any transaction tax rate change in a very 
short-term, they will buy and sell news shares to realize the short-term initial return 
anyway. By contrast, the change of the transaction stamp duty tax rate will have an 
instant impact on the IPO initial return but only in a short-term. The test of hypothesis 
1 shows that the initial return right after the tax rate raise is decreased significantly 
compared to that before the policy change. It is possible that the long-term effect of 
the tax rate change is rather than straightforwardly seen as suggested by hypothesis 2. 
In other words, only in short-term and only the change of transaction stamp duty tax 
rate instead of the rate itself affects the speculation while in long-term China’s 
investors’ speculative trading behaviour is not affected.  
 
 Certainly, the underlying assumption of above interpretation is still that the 
speculation effect positively causes the IPO under-pricing. If above interpretation is 
reasonable, the relationship between the speculation proxy – turnover rate – and the 
transaction stamp duty tax rate should be either insignificant or positive. A regression 
of turnover rate against transaction stamp duty tax rate may support above conclusion. 
Indeed, an OLS regression shows that the hypothesis that the turnover rate is 
negatively related with the transaction stamp duty tax rate cannot be accepted, instead 
the regression coefficient is positive at a confidence level of about 95% (see table 12). 
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Table 12: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression of Turnover 
Rate against Transaction Stamp Duty Tax Rate 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; ** stands for 5% significance level and *** stands for 
1% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: TRNOVER; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 875. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
 
Variable Coefficient 
C 0.5384 (25.4338***) 
TRNSCTNTAX 0.1313 (2.3934**) 
MKTCAP -0.9381 (-1.3805**) 
R-squared 0.1563 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.1551 
 
 
The second possible explanation is that the varying transaction cost introduced by the 
transaction stamp duty tax has been reflected in the IPO under-pricing. That is to say, 
if the issuing company needs to under-price its IPO for whatever purposes it may have 
to under-price the IPO more to compensate for investors’ transaction costs due to 
increased transaction stamp duty tax. While less under-pricing is needed when the 
transaction stamp duty tax rate is low. In this instance, the hypothesis should be 
modified to assume that the IPO initial return is positively related with the transaction 
stamp duty tax, which is exactly what the regression result tells.  
 
The transaction tax rate is a brand new testing proxy proposed by this study. It is very 
interesting to find the positive relationship between the transaction tax rate and the 
IPO initial return. Although this thesis has put forward above two explanations for the 
result, the real reason may be still waiting to be discovered. On the other hand, a 
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significant regression coefficient at least shows that the government tax policy plays 
important role in IPO pricing no matter what the real government motivation of the 
policy is. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The test of hypothesis 3 proves to be successful. In table 11, the 
explanatory variable TRNOVER has a positive regression coefficient (1.6884) as the 
hypothesis expected. T-statistic shows a 99% confidence level. We cannot reject the 
null hypothesis of hypothesis 3 at 1% significance level. The first impression from the 
test is that the speculation effect may have introduced the IPO under-pricing as the 
thesis has pointed out earlier. 
 
A potential argument that could possibly undermine the validity of above test results 
is that the normal OLS regression model does not rule out the possibility of the 
existence of the so-called simultaneous equation problem. In contrast to hypothesis 3, 
people could argue that it is the high IPO initial return that drives investors to pursue 
speculative profits in short-term rather than the other way around. Although previous 
researchers such as Chi and Padgett (2005) and Tian (2003) ignore this problem and 
only use the normal OLS, it is worthwhile to handle this problem explicitly. The 
heteroskedasticity-consistency adjusted two-stage least square (TSLS) regression 
result is shown in the following table 13. 
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Table 13: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Two-stage OLS Regression of 
IPO Initial Return against Turnover Rate 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; *** stands for 1% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: MAAR; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 874. 
Instrument list: C TRNSCTNTAX LNWINNINGRATE 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient 
C -4.0601 (-2.6534***) 
TRNOVER 9.1820 (3.4977***) 
R-squared -1.8680 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
-1.8714 
 
 
As the transaction stamp duty tax rate and the lottery winning ratio are all decided 
exogenously, they are used in the two-stage least square regression as instrument 
variables. The regression coefficient of the turnover rate is still positive (9.1820) as 
expected. The hypothesis that the IPO initial return is positively related to the IPO 
initial return cannot be rejected at a 99% confidence level. It is not uncommon to see 
negative R-squared and adjusted R-squared in a TSLS regression. But they really have 
no statistical meanings in the context of TSLS because the model’s residuals are 
computed over a set of independent variables different from those used to fit the 
model. However, to show how well the model fits the data, it is helpful to gauge the 
correlation between the fitted model and real data. 
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Table 14: Correlation Matrix of Fitted Model and Real Data for TSLS 
Regression in Table 13 
 
FITTEDMAAR MAAR 
FITTEDMAAR 
 1.0000   
MAAR 
 0.3647  1.0000 
 
The table 14 illustrates that the regression model in table 11 is fitted relatively well to 
the real data with a correlation coefficient of 0.3647, which is high enough in the 
normal sense of regression quality. Given the results in table 11, 13 and 14, it is safe 
to say that the hypothesis 3 stands the statistical tests successfully.  
 
Now that both the normal OLS and TSLS generate the same regression result when 
the turnover rate is used as an explanatory variable, no doubt should be cast about the 
quality of the regression especially with respect to the simultaneous equation problem. 
The message is clear from the test, Chinese IPO under-pricing is driven by the short-
term speculation, which in the test is measured by the turnover rate on the first trading 
day. 
 
Hypothesis 4: In table 11, the explanatory variable LNWINNINGRATE does have a 
negative regression coefficient (-0.3031) as expected by the hypothesis, and it is 
significant at 99% confidence level (-5.6541). The result contradicts Chi and Padgett’s 
(2005) research, in which they claim that the IPO lottery winning rate does not have 
sufficient power in explaining the IPO initial return. Nevertheless, Chi and Padgett’s 
(2005) hypothesis is set the same as hypothesis 4 in this thesis. In this sense, table 11 
 145 
shows that their hypothesis as well as hypothesis 4 in this study has passed the 
statistical test. 
 
Earlier chapters have depicted that China’s speculative market is partly due to the 
imbalance between the new share supply and demand. The test simply proves that this 
imbalance has found its way into the IPO under-pricing through speculation. 
 
7.3 Summary 
In summary, the thesis finds that the claim that Chinese IPO under-pricing is driven 
by retail investors’ short-term speculation in the primary market is largely supported 
by the empirical data. More specifically, the thesis finds that hypothesis 1, 3 and 4 
stand statistical tests.  
 
As the underlying assumption of the speculation effect hypothesis is that the under-
pricing is positively related to speculation level, a significantly positive relationship 
between the speculation measure – turnover rate – and the under-pricing measure - 
IPO initial return – would prove the assumption to be sound. In this sense, the thesis 
has directly tested the speculation effect statement for the first time in Chinese IPO 
literature through testing of hypothesis 3.  
 
In addition to the direct test of the statement, the successful testing of hypothesis 1 on 
the other hand shows the mitigating impact of an event which is supposed to reduce 
the speculation magnitude is significant to the under-pricing. Well following what the 
Chinese government has planned, the increase of transaction stamp duty tax has 
increased the speculation costs and hence compromised investors’ speculative 
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opportunities in the IPOs. The testing of this tax rate raise event not only proves that 
the speculation is behind China’s high IPO initial return but also it demonstrates 
vividly how regulatory influences have found way into IPO under-pricing mechanism.  
 
As repeatedly discussed earlier, the imbalance between supply and demand of new 
shares has played important role in introducing the speculation to China’s primary 
market as the higher speculative margin would trigger higher demand and supply 
imbalance and vice versa the more likely the demand is bigger than the supply the 
more possible the retail investors would target the short-term speculation. The 
successful testing of hypothesis 4 again indirectly proves that the speculation is 
driving the IPO under-pricing. 
 
Although the test of hypothesis 2 produces opposite sign of regression coefficient to 
the hypothesis, it is possible that the proxy of long-term transaction stamp duty tax 
rate is not suitable for reflecting the short-term speculation fluctuations. Alternative 
explanations may come along based on this surprising result, but they demand future 
study. A particularly interesting assumption among them is that the compensation for 
the transaction cost caused by the transaction stamp duty tax is required from the 
investors’ point of view, reflecting a leveraged IPO initial return.  
 
All in all, the statement that the short-term speculation in China’s stock market has 
driven up the IPO under-pricing is supported by the empirical data used in this study. 
In the test process, traces of government influence have been found in the example of 
transaction stamp duty tax rate change. In terms of contributions to existing literatures, 
this chapter has several highlights. Firstly, the thesis has for the first time tested a 
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statement about IPO under-pricing in China. It does inspire a new angle to look at 
China’s high level of under-pricing i.e. from irrational investors’ behaviours such as 
speculation. Secondly, the thesis again proves that the imbalance between supply and 
demand of new shares in China has played roles in the under-pricing, no matter this 
imbalance is intentionally imposed by the government or not. The result is consistent 
with findings from earlier studies such as Chi and Padgett (2005) and Su and Fleisher 
(1999)’s papers. Thirdly, the test of the hypothesis raises interesting question about 
the impact of the transaction costs to the IPO under-pricing.  
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Chapter 8 Data Analysis – Western Region Development Policy 
Implications of government policy influence somehow have emerged in last chapter 
during the test of speculation effect. This chapter, by contrast, will directly reveal the 
impact of a major government policy – the Western Region Development Policy – on 
the IPO under-pricing. The successful hypothesis test in this chapter will not only 
prove the statement regarding to the Western Region Development Policy discussed 
earlier but also discover the government involvement in IPO under-pricing directly 
from policy perspective. The underlying assumption throughout this chapter is that the 
government uses under-pricing as a policy tool to lure investors to invest in western 
region IPOs.  
 
8.1 Model and Variables 
Hypothesis 5 has implicitly assumed that there is a difference of the mean initial 
returns between the western region and eastern region IPOs. According to the 
hypothesis, this difference is affected by the Western Region Development policy on 
the back of the assumption that the policy introduces higher under-pricing to the 
western region IPOs. In order to measure the mean initial return difference between 
the two regions’ IPOs and measure the change of the difference before and after year 
2000 when the policy started, it is necessary to formulate at least two sets of dummy 
variables for the regression as follows: 
WEST The region dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the IPO 
comes from the western region area and 0 if otherwise. 
AFTER2000 The period dummy variable, which takes value 1 if the IPO is 
issued after January 2000 and 0 if otherwise. 
In addition, another interactive dummy variable is used to measure the event impact 
as a whole. 
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INTERDUMMY The interactive dummy variable that measures the event effect 
as a whole. It is defined as the cross-product of the above two 
dummy variables WEST and AFTER2000.  
The following table shows how the value of the interactive dummy variable 
INTERDUMMY is determined. 
 
Table 15: Definition Matrix of Interactive Dummy Variable INTERDUMMY 
 
Western Region IPO Eastern Region IPO 
IPO Before Year 2000 0   0 
IPO After Year 2000 
 1  0 
 
The regression model is modified accordingly as follows: 
Model 3: 
iMAAR  = 0α  + 1α × iWEST  + 2α × iAFTER2000  + 3α × iINTERDUMMY  
+ 4α × iMKTCAP + 5α × iPROFSHA +  iε    (17) 
 
The regression means that an IPO’s initial return is affected by the issuing firm’s 
region and when it went public (before or after the WRD policy came into effect). If 
the IPO is a western region IPO that went to public after the WRD policy started, then 
supposedly the INTERDUMMY which represents such IPO’s group will have a 
positive relationship with the IPO’s initial return. 
 
If the mean initial return of western region IPOs is bigger than that of eastern region 
IPOs, a positive regression coefficient 1α will be found in the regression. Otherwise, if 
the mean initial return of western region IPOs is smaller than that of eastern region 
 150 
IPOs, a negative regression coefficient  1α  will be found. If there is no significant 
difference between the mean initial returns of the two regions’ IPOs, 1α  should have a 
small absolute value with insignificant t-statistic. Meanwhile, as hypothesis 5 has laid 
out, the Western Region Development policy presumably causes the western region 
IPOs to be under-priced more. As a result, a positive regression coefficient of 3α  
should be expected. It is not obvious to tell the sign of 2α  because no assumption has 
been made about the policy’s impact on the eastern region IPOs.  
 
8.2 Analysis and Results 
Let us firstly take a look at the general descriptive statistics of the dataset with respect 
to the Western Region Development Policy.  
Table 16: Distributions of IPO Initial Returns with respect to Western Region 
Development Policy 
(Note: Total Observations 880.) 
 
IPO 
NO. 
Mean 
MAAR 
Median 
MAAR 
Max 
MAAR 
Min 
MAAR 
Std. 
Deviation 
Western 
Region IPOs 
183 1.3883 1.1893 4.6849 -0.0113 0.8558 
Eastern 
Region IPOs 
697 1.2699 1.1307 8.2543 -0.0424 0.8264 
IPOs before 
January 2000 
530 1.2952 1.1517 8.2543 -0.0264 0.8300 
IPOs after 
January 2000 
350 1.2935 1.1589 4.7639 -0.0424 0.8400 
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Table 16 divides the IPOs into several categories. There are much more IPOs from the 
eastern region area than from the western region area in the sample. Only 
approximately 20.8% (183/880) IPOs are from western region area, which agrees with 
the early introduction of China’s stock market that the majority of listed companies in 
China are from more developed eastern area. It appears that the western region IPOs 
have a larger average initial return than their eastern counterparts (1.3939 against 
1.2688). The statistics do not fully agree with Chan et al (2004)’s findings. 
Meanwhile, the IPO mean initial return of the whole sample seems to have 
experienced a drop of 0.17% (from 1.2952 to 1.2935) after the policy came into place. 
Since it is assumed that the policy introduces more under-pricing to the western 
region IPOs, the drop of the IPO mean initial return of the whole sample must be 
primarily due to the drop of IPO mean initial return of eastern regions. Let us take a 
closer look at the sub-group of the western region IPOs only. 
Table 17: General Descriptive Statistics of Western Region IPOs 
(Note: Total Observations 183.) 
 
IPO 
NO. 
Mean 
MAAR 
Median 
MAAR 
Max 
MAAR 
Min 
MAAR 
Std. 
Deviation 
IPOs before 
January 2000 
112 1.3766 1.1903 4.6849 -0.0113 0.8504 
IPOs after January 
2000 
71 1.4069 1.1647 4.1329 0.1734 0.8700 
 
Table 17 evidently confirms above judgment. The sub-group of western region IPOs 
has a relatively even distribution between the groups of IPOs that went public before 
and after January 2000 (112 observations before versus 71 observations after). It is 
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crystal clear that there is a hike in the mean initial return after the policy came into 
place. The jump of 3% is fairly significant, compared to the change of mean initial 
returns of 0.17% of the whole sample in table 16. Obviously, the drop of IPO mean 
initial return of the whole sample is due to the mean initial return drop from eastern 
region IPO because the policy, as expected, has incurred an increase in the mean 
initial return of western region IPOs. At the first sight, table 17 illustrates that the 
policy indeed has caused more under-pricing to western region IPOs, which could 
indicate that the government has tried to use the under-pricing to attract investment 
into western region companies. But will the regression tell the same story as the 
descriptive statistics? Let us look at the regression result. 
 
Table 18: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression with Dummy 
Variables of WEST, AFTER2000 and INTERDUMMY 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; *** stands for 1% significance level, ** 10% 
significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: MAAR; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 874. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient 
C 1.8292 (16.9256***) 
WEST 0.1423 (1.2133) 
AFTER2000 -0.1023 (-1.5706) 
INTERDUMMY 0.03912 (0.2694) 
MKECAP -0.0006 (-2.3168**) 
PROFSHA -2.7567 (-5.5894***) 
R-squared 0.2064 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.2018 
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Hypothesis 5: In general the statistic results tell a similar story, but the test fails to 
show sufficient significance. First thing to notice in table 16 is that the regional 
dummy variable WEST has a positive regression coefficient sign, which means that 
the western region IPOs are on average under-priced more compared to eastern region 
IPOs. But the difference is only marginal (0.1423) and it is only at weak confidence 
level. The period dummy AFTER2000 shows a negative regression coefficient (-
0.1023), which is consistent with the early judgment that around the event date there 
is a drop in the IPO mean initial return. But again, this drop is only significant. Finally, 
the interactive dummy variable INTERDUMMY has a positive sign as expected, 
which agrees with the underlying assumption of hypothesis 5 that the Western Region 
Development policy contributes positively to the IPO under-pricing. However, the test 
does not show enough statistic explanatory power in terms of significance level.  
 
8.3 Summary 
Although both the descriptive statistics and regression results indicate that the 
government’s Western Region Development Policy has impact on the IPO under-
pricing in the exact direction as the statement indicated, the data does not lend 
sufficient explanatory power to the independent variables in the statistic sense. It is 
possible that the government may have relied more on fiscal measures such as 
favourable tax and government capital allocation that are suggested in earlier chapters, 
instead of direct economic incentive of IPO under-pricing to encourage investment 
into western region companies. Even if the practitioners have claimed that the policy 
will introduce more under-pricing to western region IPOs, the data shows that the 
government may have not heavily relied on under-pricing to fulfil its objective. 
Alternatively, the government might have planned to use the under-pricing as 
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suggested, but in reality it found that the investors are already encouraged by the high 
expectation of thriving western firms under the western policy and there is no further 
need to under-price the new shares. Or, the government simply fails to fulfil its 
intention. If any of these scenarios is the case, the insignificant regression coefficients 
are no longer surprising. 
 
In summary, the statement that the Western Region Development policy has caused 
western region IPOs to be under-priced is only weakly supported by the empirical 
data. The regression shows satisfactory regression coefficient signs but the t-statistics 
are not significant enough. Based on the test of Western Region Development Policy 
hypothesis, there is not enough evidence to support the statement that the government 
has been involved in the western region IPO pricing process. 
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Chapter 9 Data Analysis – Government Protection Effect 
While last chapter is focusing on specific government policy influences on IPO under-
pricing, this chapter examines the influences of general government protection of the 
IPO firms on the under-pricing. The government protection is regarded a source of 
IPO under-pricing because it is assumed that the government could under-price 
government-protected IPOs in order to compensate for investors’ concern of future 
government interference. Chapter 4 has listed several related statements from the area 
regarding the Chinese government’s protection. This chapter will test the statement 
and check whether the Chinese IPO under-pricing can be explained by government 
involvement in terms of discriminative protection. 
 
9.1 Model and Variables 
The government protection effect hypothesis is based on the assumption that the IPO 
under-pricing is a cost for the state-owned company going public to compensate 
investors for their concern of government future intervention in the company’s 
business. This is a brand new hypothesis although the idea about government 
protection effect on IPO under-pricing is not fresh. However, the government 
protection has rarely entered the Chinese IPO under-pricing literature. One reason 
may be because it is not easy to tell which firms are more blessed by the government 
than others because the vast majority IPO firms in China are state-owned. The 
difficulty is like to statistically prove that the parents like some of their children more 
than the others.  
 
As mentioned in literature review, Aharony et al (2000) have found discriminative 
difference in the long-term IPO share performances between government protected 
 156 
and non-protected government firms. To do that, they have managed to identify 
groups of companies under the category of government protection. Their paper may 
not deal with the IPO under-pricing but their grouping method is enlightening to this 
thesis. Their grouping method does not tell how much government protection has 
been given to the issuing firms but at least it provides a feasible way to test the 
protection effect from statistic perspective. 
 
In their paper, Aharony et al (2000) identify the petrochemical, energy and raw 
material firms as government-protected and all other firms as non-protected firms. 
According to their method, the sample of this thesis is divided as follows: 
Table 19: Issuing Firm Classification According to Government Protection 
 Numbers of the companies 
Protected Sectors 161 
Petrochemicals 110 
Energy 36 
Raw Materials 15 
Non-protected Sectors 719 
Agriculture 26 
Consumer Products 74 
Commerce and Retail 39 
Conglomerate 34 
Construction, Properties and Real Estate 37 
Electronics 29 
Finance 5 
Information Technology and Telecommunication 56 
Machinery, Equipment and Instruments  137 
Manufacturing 107 
Media and Culture 4 
Medicine 56 
Public Service 12 
Textiles, Clothes 41 
Tourism and Hotel 16 
Transportation 45 
Warehouse 1 
 
The industrial classification of every IPO firm follows the official guidance from 
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CSRC, which has been mentioned in chapter 6. In the table, there are far less 
government-protected firms (161) than non-protected firms (719). At the first glance, 
the categorization criterion given by Aharony et al (2000) appears to be a good way to 
group the sample. Because almost all these companies are previously state-owned 
enterprises (SOE’s), it is difficult to distinguish the government-protected firms from 
the rest. The industries they select include those of national strategic importance and 
coincide with industries described by An (2003) as have benefited from the 
government protection. 
 
To discern the government protection effect from the regression, a dummy variable is 
set up to label the government-protected firms.  
 
PROTED The dummy variable to indicate whether the issuing firm has 
the government protection property or not. It is given value 1 if 
the firms is government-protected and value 0 if otherwise. 
 
The regression model is as follows: 
Model 4: 
iMAAR  = 0α  + 1α × iPROTED   + + 2α × iMKTCAP + 3α × iPROFSHA + iε  (18) 
 
where the issuing firm’s market capitalisation and profitability are controlled 
variables.  
 
Hypothesis 6 suggests that the government protection ought to bring more under-
pricing to the IPO. Accordingly, the dummy variable of PROTED is expected to have 
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a positive regression coefficient 1α . 
  
9.2 Analysis and Results 
The general descriptive statistics of the sample with respect to the government 
protection is firstly put into table 20.  
Table 20: General Descriptive Statistics of IPOs with respect to Government 
Protection 
(Note: Observations 880.) 
 
IPO 
NO. 
Mean 
MAAR 
Median 
MAAR 
Max 
MAAR 
Min 
MAAR 
Std. 
Deviation 
Government-
protected 
Firms 
161 1.0921 1.0878 3.2414 -0.0424 0.5672 
Non-
protected 
Firms 
719 1.3398 1.1853 8.2543 
-
0.02639 
0.8761 
 
Table 20 shows that the market-adjusted IPO mean initial return of government-
protected firms is significantly lower than that of non-protected firms by 24% (1.0921 
vs. 1.3398). But under hypothesis 6, the assumption is the government protection 
would lead to more under-pricing due to investors’ concern of government 
interference. The data seems to contradict this assumption. Let us look at the 
regression results in the following table 21 for a clearer answer. 
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Table 21: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression with the 
Government Protection Dummy Variable 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; *** stands for 1% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: MAAR; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 880. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis 6: Once again, table 21 shows that the regression coefficient of the 
dummy variable PROTED is negative (-0.2477) as opposed to a positive sign 
expected by the hypothesis with a high significance level. It simply means that the 
government protection contributes negatively to the IPO initial return, i.e. IPO under-
pricing is reduced by the government protection.  
 
However, the result is not a total surprise. Chapter 4 has argued that since the 
government-protected firms are usually large monopoly firms that have huge market 
share and large market capitalization and possibly some of them have comparatively 
better performance, information asymmetry and ex ante uncertainty effects may 
overweigh the concern of government protection and cause the IPO initial return to 
move in opposite direction. A separate inspection of the relationship between the 
government protection group and other proxies will help to draw a more 
Variable Coefficient 
C 1.3398 ( 40.9884***) 
PROTED -0.2477 ( -4.4791 ***) 
MKTCAP -0.0006 ( -3.1927 ***) 
PROFSHA -2.7293 ( -14.5879 ***) 
R-squared 0.2185 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.2122 
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comprehensive picture. 
Table 22: OLS Regression Results of Various Proxies against Government 
Protection Dummy Variable 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; ***stands for 5% significance level.) 
Other Proxies as Dependent Variable Regression Coefficient against PROTED 
Market Capitalisation 24.9702 (2.2270***) 
Cubic Root of Profitability 0.0056 (0.5383) 
In table 22, regressions show that the government-protected IPO firms statistically 
have larger market capitalization at a 95% confidence level and better profitability but 
at a relatively low confidence level. The reason to transform the profitability variable 
is described in chapter 6. Although thorough investigation of information asymmetry 
and ex ante uncertainty hypotheses is left to the next chapter, at least table 22 shows 
that there exists possibility that other factors have overweighed the government 
protection effect proposed by hypothesis 6 and these factors have not been reflected in 
model 4. Indeed, the next chapter will explore in depth the relationship between these 
proxies such as market capitalization and profitability with the IPO initial return. 
 
9.3 Summary 
The opposite sign of regression coefficient in the test of hypothesis 6 does not support 
the original hypothesis of government protection effect. Although further 
investigation is still needed to find out the real causes of such phenomenon, the test 
does show that the statement that the government protection may lead to Chinese IPO 
under-pricing has not been supported by empirical data. Under the circumstance that 
the empirical evidence for Western Region Development Policy effect is not 
significant, the failure of test of hypothesis 6 may further render the impression that 
the government influences is not the real reason of Chinese IPO under-pricing as 
 161 
some academics and practitioners have suggested. 
 
In summary, the statement that the government protection may cause IPO under-
pricing is not supported by the empirical data. Instead, this thesis finds that the 
government-protected firms tend to have lower IPO under-pricing as table 20 and 21 
suggest. However, the real reason why the government-protected firms have a lower 
IPO initial return on average is worth future study. 
 
So far, all three brand new hypotheses have been tested and the results are basically 
mixed. With respect to the speculation effect, empirical data strongly supports the 
statement that the speculative trading is behind Chinese IPO under-pricing. Especially 
during the test, government influences have been found through the change of 
transaction stamp duty tax rate. The second hypothesis test regarding to the Western 
Region Development Policy only shows weak support to the statement that the 
government uses IPO under-pricing to encourage investments into western region 
companies. The direct test of government protection effect on IPO under-pricing 
proves to be not satisfactory but it does raise an interesting question why the 
government protection instead appears to have reduced the IPO under-pricing. 
 
From next chapter, hypotheses test will focus on classical factors and some China-
specific factors that have been used already in testing by previous researchers. 
Hopefully, more explanations of Chinese IPO under-pricing will appear in the test. In 
the meantime, some factors with government political implications will come out of 
the test and then the overall conclusion about government influences on Chinese IPO 
under-pricing can be drawn from the results. 
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Chapter 10 Data Analysis – Existing Classical Hypotheses 
This chapter will test the existing classical IPO under-pricing hypotheses. Although in 
previous studies many of the hypotheses have been put to test with China’s data of 
different periods, chapter 4 has pointed out that inconsistent test results have appeared 
in the literature. To clarify the inconsistency is therefore a key objective of this 
chapter. In addition, tests of classical hypotheses are indispensable parts of any 
research seeking to comprehensively reveal IPO under-pricing rationale.  
 
10.1 Information Asymmetry Hypotheses 
10.1.1 Model and Variables 
Information asymmetry hypotheses include hypothesis 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12. 
Especially, hypothesis 9 is the same as hypothesis 4. Since the test of hypothesis 4 is 
successful, the result will be reserved and no further test regarding to hypothesis 9 is 
conducted in this chapter. Explanatory variables with respect to hypothesis 7, 8, 10, 11 
and 12 are set below. 
 
PROFSHA The issuing firm’s profitability at the time of IPO. It is 
calculated by formula 11.  
AGE The issuing firm’s age at the time of IPO, as discussed in 
chapter 6. 
PRICE The IPO share offer price measured in Chinese RMB Yuan. 
SEO The dummy variable for seasoned offering. If the IPO has 
issued seasoned offering later on, SEO is set equal to 1; 
otherwise SEO equals 0. 
FIX The dummy variable for fixed pricing method. If the IPO is 
 163 
offered through fixed pricing, FIX is set equal to 1; otherwise 
FIX equals 0. 
 
The regression model is thus: 
Model 5: 
iMAAR  = 0α  + 1α × iPROFSHA  + 2α × iAGE  + 3α × iPRICE  + 4α × iSEO  + 
5α × iFIX + iε    (19) 
 
Rock’s (1986) “Winner’s Curse” argument implies that the IPO initial return is a 
decreasing function of profitability and firm age. In result, the regression coefficient 
1α
 of the issuing firm’s profitability, according to hypothesis 7, should have a 
negative sign. Likewise, the regression coefficient 2α  of the issuing firm’s age should 
also have a negative sign according to hypothesis 8. As fixed pricing requires the 
investors to reveal their demand, in return IPO under-pricing should be higher to 
compensate for the investors’ willingness of doing so. Therefore, fixed pricing should 
have higher under-pricing then bookbuilding method according to Benveniste and 
Wilhelm (1990), Spatt and Srivastava (1991) and Benvensite and Busaba (1997)’s 
theory. Hypothesis 10 implies a positive regression coefficient 5α . Hypothesis 11 
assumes that under-pricing is a costly signal tool in order for high quality issuing firm 
to achieve better seasoned offering later on. Hence, under-pricing is supposed to be 
higher for the issuing firms that have seasoned offering. Allen and Faulhaber (1989), 
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989)’s theory indicates a positive regression 
coefficient 4α . Su and Fleisher (1999) have argued that a higher offer price means a 
lower profit to the informed investors. Consequently, an increased offer price has the 
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similar impact as a decreased profitability on IPO. Hypothesis 12, therefore, suggests 
that the regression coefficient 3α  of offer price should have a positive sign. 
 
10.1.2 Analysis and Results 
Table 2 in chapter 6 has demonstrated some descriptive statistics of above variables. 
The following table shows how the IPO initial return differs in different offering 
methods’ groups and seasoned offering group.  
Table 23: Descriptive Statistics of IPO Initial Return in Fixed Pricing vs. 
Bookbuilding and Seasoned Offering vs. Non-seasoned Offering 
(Note: The number of IPOs in the sample is 656.) 
 
IPO 
NO. 
Mean 
MAAR 
Median 
MAAR 
Max 
MAAR 
Min 
MAAR 
Std. 
Deviation 
Fixed Pricing 617 1.3225 1.2037 8.2543 -0.0264 1.1819 
Bookbuilding 39 1.1805 0.8786 3.1235 0.0184 0.8538 
SEO 89 1.2911 1.1784 4.3196 0.0145 0.8134 
Non-SEO 567 1.3176 1.1875 8.2543 -0.0264 0.8507 
 
The sample size has been reduced because the sample has only included IPO's that are 
either offered through bookbuilding or fixed pricing. There are some ad hoc offering 
methods in the Chinese IPO history as mentioned in early chapters. Since these 
offering methods are not in the main-stream offering process, these IPO's are excluded 
from the sample so that the thesis can focus on the information asymmetry hypothesis 
tests. 
 
The above table shows that under fixed pricing method, the average IPO under-
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pricing seems to be higher than under bookbuilding by about 14% in market-adjusted 
return terms. This finding is consistent with the assumption of hypothesis 10. 
However, the IPO’s that have seasoned offerings later under-perform the IPO's that do 
not issue seasoned offering. Although the difference is marginal, this could still put a 
question mark on the assumption of hypothesis 11. Let us see what happens to the 
regression. 
 
Notably, table 2 shows that the above first three variables are not normally distributed.  
Chapter 6 has stressed how data transformation can help soothe the non-normality 
problem and an example of natural logarithm transformation is given in chapter 6. 
Likewise, PROFSHA and PRICE are transformed by taking cubic root and natural 
logarithm of the original variables respectively. According to the transformation 
criterion proposed in chapter 6, because the original variable of AGE has a 
distribution closer to normal than its transformed counterparts, the original variable 
AGE is used for the regression. The distribution histograms of the original and 
transformed variable of PROFSHA are shown in the following two figures. 
Figure 4: Distribution Histogram of the Issuing Firm’s Profitability – PROFSHA 
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Figure 5: Distribution Histogram of the Cubic Root of the Issuing Firm’s 
Profitability - CUBEPROFSHA 
 
Figure 4 and 5 illustrate that the cubic root transformation has apparently improved 
the normality of the data’s distribution in terms of both skewness and kurtosis. Now, 
the transformed variables can be used in the regression. 
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Table 24: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression with Issuing 
Firm’s Profitability, Age, Price, Offering Methods and Seasoned Offering 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; *** stands for 1% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: MAAR; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 655. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient 
C 2.7514 (12.7007***) 
CUBEPROFSHA -4.8508 (-14.3678***) 
AGE -0.0005 (-0.1684) 
LNPRICE 0.4565 (5.4245***) 
FIX 0.3194 (2.9474***) 
SEO -0.0562 (-0.7894) 
R-squared 0.3500 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.3449 
 
 
Hypothesis 7: Table 24 shows that the regression coefficient of the profitability 
CUBEPROFSHA is negative (-4.8508) exactly as we expected. Chapter 6 has 
addressed that, since the cubic root is the increasing function of the original variable it 
will have the same sign as the original variable in a linear regression. That is to say, 
the issuing firm’s profitability is negatively related to the IPO initial return. 
Furthermore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis at 99% confidence level according 
to the t-statistics (-14.3678).  The result agrees with Su and Fleisher’s (1999) finding. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The age of the issuing firm at the time of IPO, AGE, is again 
negatively (-.0.0005) related to the IPO initial return. However, the factor seems to 
have only marginal impact on the IPO initial return. Meanwhile, the t-statistic (-
0.1684) is not high. Similar result about the firm age is commonly found by almost all 
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Chinese IPO researchers.  
 
Hypothesis 9: The test of hypothesis 4 already shows that the lottery winning ratio is 
negatively related to IPO initial return at a 99% confidence level (see table 11). Koh 
and Walter’s (1989) method of ballot allocation test for Winner’s Curse hypothesis is 
fully applicable to Chinese IPOs in this case. The result agrees with Chi and Padgett’s 
(2005) finding about information asymmetry hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 10: The regression again shows a positive coefficient (0.3194) for the 
fixed pricing method, which is consistent with the findings in table 23. With the high 
significance level of 95%, our hypothesis is fully supported by empirical data. To this 
extent, Chinese IPO under-pricing can be partly explained by the information 
revelation theory.  
 
Hypothesis 11: Like the findings in table 23, not only the regression coefficient of 
seasoned offering dummy variable does not show a positive sign but also its 
significance level is very low. Hypothesis 11 is not supported by the empirical data, 
which means the issuing firms that make seasoned offering later seem to be less 
motivated to use under-pricing to signal their quality to investors. 
 
Hypothesis 12: Table 24 shows that the IPO offer price is positively (0.4565) related 
to the IPO initial return. We cannot reject the null hypothesis at a 99% confidence 
level with a high t-statistic (5.4245). For the same reason explained in hypothesis 7, 
the logarithm transformation should generate the same regression coefficient sign as 
the original variable. The result agrees with Su and Fleisher’s (1999) finding. 
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10.1.3 Summary 
Putting the regression results of hypothesis 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 together, we can 
draw conclusion that some hypotheses based on Rock’s (1989) “Winner’s Curse” 
model are basically supported by China’s data. Test of hypothesis 7 proves that in 
China, the better performance of the issuing firm can help reduce the information 
asymmetry between the issuer and investors and hence reduce the cost of issuing in 
form of IPO under-pricing. Compared to hypothesis 7, hypothesis 8 is relatively 
weakly supported by the empirical data. But as said earlier, most of Chinese IPO firms 
are very young with the oldest firm having been founded for less than 3 years (see 
table 2). All 880 IPO firms are populated within a three-year band. Given such narrow 
range of firm age, it is not totally surprising to see a relatively weak t-statistic of firm. 
The test to some degree shows that older firms have better chance to reduce the 
information asymmetry and hence the IPO under-pricing than younger ones. The test 
of hypothesis 9 shows that in China, the likelihood of winning a random lottery is 
negatively related to the IPO under-pricing degree which is consistent with Koh and 
Walter’s (1989) finding in Singapore. The Winner’s Curse problem is reduced by the 
random lottery. Successful test of hypothesis 10 shows that the information revelation 
hypothesis is strongly supported by the data. It shows that the information asymmetry 
between underwriter and the investors may have caused the IPO under-pricing. On the 
other hand, the signaling theory regarding seasoned offering expectation is not 
supported by the empirical data as hypothesis 11 fails the test. The test of hypothesis 
12 is based on Su and Fleisher’s (1999) assumption that a higher offer price means a 
lower profit to the informed investors. From the informed investors’ perspective, a 
high price IPO is equivalently a bad performance IPO. Thus, a higher under-pricing 
will be needed for uninformed investors. In this sense, the test shows that in China a 
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higher offer price exacerbates the Winner’s Curse problem and hence the IPO under-
pricing. In summary, this study finds that the information asymmetry theories 
especially Winner’s Curse hypotheses and information revelation hypotheses are 
suitable for explaining Chinese IPO under-pricing. 
 
10.2 Ex ante Uncertainty Hypotheses 
10.2.1 Model and Variables 
Beatty and Ritter (1986)’s ex ante uncertainty theory suggests that the ex ante 
uncertainty of the IPO firm’s intrinsic value is a decreasing function of the firm size. 
Early chapters have discussed that it is necessary to regard issuing firm’s market 
capitalization and IPO offer size as two different variables in Chinese IPO context. 
According to hypothesis 13 and 14, the two proxies to measure the ex ante uncertainty 
are defined as follows: 
 
MKECAP  The issuing firm’s market capitalization measured in 100 
million Chinese RMB Yuan on the first trading day. It is 
calculated by formula 10. 
IPOSZ  The IPO offer size measured in billion Chinese RMB Yuan. It is 
calculated by formula 9. 
 
Chapter 5 has discussed that market condition can also cause ex ante uncertainty at 
the time of IPO. Davis and Yeomans (1976) et al’s theory suggests that the under-
pricing is higher in buoyant markets. Proxies of market condition include the average 
market return and the variation coefficient of market index daily return. According to 
hypothesis 15 and 16, the two proxies are defined as follows: 
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MKTRTN The average market return during the time interval from the 
offer price is fixed to the IPO share really goes to floatation. It 
is defined by the following formula: 
MKTRTN = ∑ ′
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where iP′  is the closing market index on the i
th
 day after the offer price is fixed, and 
1−′iP  is the closing market index on the (i-1)th day after the offer price is fixed. 0P′  is 
market closing index on the day when offer price is fixed. n is the number of days 
elapsed between the offer price is fixed and the first trading day.  
 
MKTSTDEV The standard deviation of the market daily returns during the 
period between the day when offer price is fixed and the first 
trading day. It is used as the proxy of market status and is given 
by the formula: 
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where iR′  is i
th
 day market return and n is the number of days elapsed between the 
offer price is fixed and the first trading day. 
 
Both the average market return and the coefficient of variation of market index daily 
return are measured in the same time interval for the same IPO, i.e. from the specific 
IPO’s offer price is fixed to the first trading day. From the definitions of the two 
market status proxies, it is clear that MKTRTN and MKTSTDEV together measure 
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how the market behaves when the IPO goes public in terms of the average market 
return and market volatility during the specific IPO period. 
 
The regression model is modified as follows: 
Model 6: 
iMAAR  = 0α  + 1α × iMKECAP  + 2α × iIPOSZ  + 3α × iMKTRTN  
+ 4α × iMKTSTDEV  + iε    (22) 
 
The ex ante uncertainty hypothesis indicates that the two proxies of the issuing firm’s 
market capitalisation and offer size, contribute negatively to the ex ante uncertainty 
about the intrinsic value of the new share. Consequently the under-pricing, the 
premium to compensate for the ex ante uncertainty, ought to be negatively related to 
the issuing firm’s market capitalisation and offer size. In turn, both regression 
coefficients 1α  and  2α  should be negative. Under the assumption that the under-
pricing is higher in buoyant market due to investors’ expectation of higher return and 
ex ante uncertainty is higher in more volatile market, the two market condition 
proxies should be positively related to the IPO initial return, which is reflected by 
positive 3α  and 4α . 
 
10.2.2 Analysis and Results 
The descriptive statistics of issuing firm’s market capitalisation MKECAP and offer 
size IPOSZ have been demonstrated in table 2 in chapter 6. The two variables again 
are not normally distributed. Natural logarithm transformation is applied to both 
variables. The table also shows that the two variables apparently have different 
distributions, which justifies the earlier statements that the issuing firm’s market 
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capitalisation and offer size should be treated as two separate proxies as opposed to 
Chi and Padgett’s (2005) method. The descriptive statistics of the average market 
daily return and variation coefficient of market return are displayed in the following 
table. 
 
Table 25: Descriptive Statistics of Average Market Return and Market Variation 
Stats/Variables MKTRTN MKTSTDEV 
 Mean  0.086659  1.798341 
 Median  0.015000  1.495000 
 Maximum  2.390000  5.710000 
 Minimum -2.810000  0.330000 
 Std. Dev.  0.515775  1.022527 
 Skewness  0.400988  0.941378 
 Kurtosis  5.794757  3.361389 
 Observations 880 880 
 
Table 25 shows that in general, Chinese IPOs normally go public in a relatively 
buoyant market with an average market daily return (8.6%) during the IPO periods, 
and in a relatively volatile market with the mean variation of the market daily return is 
also high (179.8%). But compared to other explanatory variables in table 2, the two 
market condition proxies have much less severe non-normality problem in terms of 
much smaller skewness and excess kurtosis. In fact, the original variables of the two 
proxies are used in the regression. The results of the regression are presented in the 
following table. 
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Table 26: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression with Ex Ante 
Uncertainty Proxy Variables 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; * stands for 10% significance level and *** stands for 
1% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: MAAR; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 880. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient 
C 1.3828 (5.5491***) 
LNMKECAP -0.2863 (-1.8608*) 
LNIPOSZ -0.6661 (-3.3837***) 
MKTRTN 0.0804 (1.6378*) 
MKTSTDEV -0.0764 (-2.9398***) 
R-squared 0.1616 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1578 
 
Hypothesis 13: When the issuing firm’s market capitalisation is used as a proxy of 
firm size, the regression in table 26 shows that it is negatively (-0.2863) related to the 
IPO initial return. The t-statistic is significant at 90% confidence level. The null 
hypothesis of hypothesis 13 cannot be rejected at 10% significance level based on the 
data. 
 
Hypothesis 14: At the same time, the table shows that when IPO offer size is used it 
is negatively (-0.6661) related to the IPO initial return. The null hypothesis of 
hypothesis 14 cannot be rejected at 99% confidence level. The result agrees with Yu 
and Tse’s (2003) finding.  
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The satisfactory test results of hypothesis 13 and 14 firmly prove that the IPO initial 
return is reduced with larger firm size. Because the firm size is a proxy of ex ante 
uncertainty, China’s data reveals that larger issuing firms are likely to suffer less from 
the IPO under-pricing due to reduced ex ante uncertainty about the issuing firm’s 
quality. 
 
Hypothesis 15: The regression result shows that the average market return since the 
offer price is fixed is positively related (0.0804) to the IPO initial return. The null 
hypothesis of hypothesis 15 cannot be rejected at 90% confidence level. Generally 
speaking, Davis and Yeomans (1976) et al’s theory claims that the under-pricing is 
higher in buoyant markets. Successful test of hypothesis 15 gives empirical support to 
theory, because it shows that when average market return is higher the IPO initial 
return tends to be higher as well. The result also agrees with Yu and Tse’s (2003) 
finding in the Chinese IPO context. 
 
Hypothesis 16: The test result of hypothesis 16 is surprising. According to the 
hypothesis, a positive regression coefficient is expected because in a more volatile 
market there ought to be more ex ante uncertainty about the intrinsic value of the new 
share. A higher IPO under-pricing is hence demanded by investors to compensate for 
such ex ante uncertainty. But China’s empirical data seems to tell a different story by 
showing a negative although small regression coefficient (-0.0764) of the market 
standard deviation. And this negative regression coefficient is significant at a 99% 
confidence level. 
 
10.2.3 Summary 
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Ex ante uncertainty hypothesis is essentially a variation of information asymmetry 
hypothesis. The ex ante uncertainty is caused by the asymmetric information between 
the issuing firm and the investors. When investors do not have access to sufficient 
information, they will make their decision relying on certain publicly known 
information such as firm size. Their decision is also frequently affected by the market 
conditions before the IPO. When market is bullish, the investors will require higher 
return to compensate for potentially higher opportunity cost of giving up cash to the 
IPO investment. If the market is volatile, the investors will also expect a higher return 
from the IPO to compensate for a higher risk. Both requirements are reflected in a 
higher IPO initial return. 
 
Hypothesis 13 and 14 are based on the assumption that larger firm size or market 
capitalisation will help reduce the ex ante uncertainty. The test shows that the two 
hypotheses stand in Chinese IPO context. But when coming to market condition 
hypotheses, empirical tests give mixed signals. The average market return seems to be 
a good explanatory variable in the regression according to the test result of hypothesis 
15. But on the other hand, China’s data surprisingly shows that in more volatile 
market investors seem to require less from the IPO initial return. Although emerging 
Chinese stock market is generally more volatile than most developed markets, the 
result that contradict common sense needs more investigation especially when the 
result has very high statistic significance. 
 
In summary, ex ante uncertainty hypothesis is generally supported by empirical data. 
The exception is that the variation coefficient of market return appears to move in the 
opposite direction to the IPO initial return which contradicts assumption laid out 
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according to the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis. As pointed out earlier, ex ante 
uncertainty hypothesis is derived from information asymmetry theories. Last section 
has illustrated that information asymmetry is suitable for explaining Chinese IPO 
under-pricing. Taking into account the test results of this section, the conclusion can 
be drawn that information asymmetry hypotheses in broad sense provide useful 
insight into Chinese IPO under-pricing. 
 
10.3 Behaviour Hypotheses  
One testable behaviour hypothesis in Chinese IPO context is the information cascade 
or bandwagon hypothesis. It is assumed that the information about the quality of the 
new share is passed on from investors who have bought the IPO share to later 
investors. When more and more investors demand for an IPO share, it is going to form 
a so-called positive bandwagon effect. It possibly indicates that the IPO is under-
priced. The negative bandwagon effect, on the other hand, indicates the IPO is 
possibly over-priced.  
 
Empirical study from Amihud, Hauser, and Kirsh (2001) reveals that IPOs tend to be 
either undersubscribed or hugely oversubscribed with very few moderately 
oversubscribed. For this reason, it is possible to use subscription proxies to measure 
the bandwagon effect and in turn capture the characteristics of IPO under-pricing. As 
said earlier, because the lottery winning ratio is a good proxy of subscription rate it is 
possible to use the lottery winning ratio to measure the bandwagon effect. A lower 
lottery winning ratio means a higher oversubscription rate. A higher oversubscription 
rate indicates a higher positive bandwagon effect. In turn, a higher under-pricing is 
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expected. Hypothesis 17 is thus set up, predicting a negative relationship between the 
lottery winning ratio and the IPO initial return. 
 
Hypothesis 17 is exactly the same as hypothesis 4 and 9, because the lottery winning 
ratio has already been used as proxy to measure imbalance between supply and 
demand of new shares in speculation effect hypothesis and to measure the ballot 
allocation ratio in information asymmetry hypothesis. Since the test result of the 
hypothesis is already shown in chapter 7, only the implication of the test result will be 
discussed here. Table 11 in chapter 7 shows that the lottery winning ratio is negatively 
(-0.3031) related to the IPO initial return. Moreover, the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected at a 99% confidence level. The result agrees with Liu’s (2003) finding about 
bandwagon. 
 
In other words, the empirical test shows that the more severely the IPO is 
oversubscribed, the more possibly that the IPO is under-priced. If the oversubscription 
indicates a positive information cascade or bandwagon effect, then it is equally to say 
that Chinese IPO under-pricing is positively related to the bandwagon effect. In 
summary, Chinese IPO under-pricing can be partly explained by the behaviour 
hypothesis, more specifically, the information cascade or bandwagon hypothesis. 
 
This chapter has so far tested some existing classical hypotheses. The empirical data 
generally supports the classical hypotheses. However, the variation coefficient of 
market index return has an opposite regression coefficient sign to the hypothesis. The 
result poses a good question for future research.  
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Chapter 11 Data Analysis – China-specific Hypothesis, Privatization 
and Political Motives 
This chapter is going to test some existing China-specific hypotheses. In general, 
these hypotheses are based on unique characteristics of China’s stock market, most of 
which have been introduced in chapter 2 and 4. As discussed in literature review and 
hypothesis setting chapters, the word “China-specific” may not properly reflect the 
nature of some of these hypotheses. For example, Mok and Hui (1998) have described 
the high government retention rate as the reason of Chinese IPO under-pricing. As a 
matter of fact, state-owned IPO is not rare case in many markets and therefore 
government retention is not a unique feature of Chinese IPO's. The reason why Mok 
and Hui (1998) have put the term “Chinese characteristic” on it is only because 
China’s government retention rate is relatively high. The thesis will follow their 
convention using the same term “China-specific”. 
 
On the other hand, some earlier studies argue that certain factors are really “China-
specific”. For example, Tian (2003) suspects that the Chinese government uses the 
different time lengths of IPO listing lag to adjust market cycle and supposedly the 
long time lag has caused IPO under-pricing. Whereas Chi and Padgett’s (2005) 
predicts that government has tried to capitalize on the market cycle to achieve better 
IPO issuance. In their argument, the listing time lag is also a concern. Since the IPO 
procedure is generally standard in many markets, the listing time lag is not seen as an 
explanatory variable in literatures of other countries’ IPO's. Only in China, it is 
described as a China-specific factor of causing the IPO under-pricing. 
 
As said before, China’s IPO process helps the government to disperse the stake shares 
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of state-owned enterprises to private sectors, so the process itself is tangled with 
government’s privatization and political considerations. People believe that Chinese 
IPO pricing is inevitably affected by these factors too. Tests of hypotheses based on 
these factors will help not only search for all possible explanations of Chinese IPO 
under-pricing, but also identify whether there is a relationship between government 
influences and the under-pricing. For example, the employee shareholding appears in 
many IPO literatures as an explanatory variable for that the employee’s possible 
misgivings about IPO privatization might force the government to compensate them 
with under-priced IPO's. 
 
11.1 Model and Variables 
The general statistics of all the explanatory variables are shown in chapter 7. 
Therefore, this chapter will discuss directly the implications of the statistics based on 
tables and results in chapter 7. 
 
Table 2 shows that the average government shareholding rate in the post-issuing IPO 
firms in China is 46.8%. It is this high government retention rate that some 
researchers such as Mok and Hui (1998) have ascribed as one of the key determinants 
of Chinese IPO under-pricing. According to Perotti’s (1995) partial sale and 
government signalling model hypothesis 18 is set to assume a positive relationship 
between the government retention rate and the IPO initial return.  
 
Another thing that should be noticed in table 2 is that the average time lag for Chinese 
IPOs between the IPO announcement and the first trading day is about 33 days 
(0.3324 x 100 days). Although this is not much longer than the normal one or two 
weeks list waiting time in other markets, the time lag varies significantly in the 
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sample with the longest observation of more than one year (3.8 x 100 days) and the 
shortest of only 12 days (0.12 x 100 days). This wide range of listing time lags may 
hint the possibility of the statement that the time lag is used by the Chinese 
government as a policy tool to adjust the market cycle as some researchers such as 
Tian (2003) suggested. In fact some researchers believe that the long listing time lag 
causes the IPO under-pricing. To examine whether the time lag effect is realistic and 
whether the government has played the so-called floatation time game, hypothesis 19 
assuming that the IPO initial return is positively related to the listing time lag will be 
tested. 
 
In table 2, the average employee shareholding ratio in the post-issuing IPO firms in 
China is about 4.11%. The rate is relatively low, but Dewenter and Malatesta (1997)’s 
theory may be still enlightening in understanding Chinese IPO under-pricing. They 
advance that the under-priced IPO is used by government as a policy tool to 
compensate for employees’ misgivings about the privatisation. Accordingly, 
hypothesis 20 assumes that a higher employee shareholding (and potentially higher 
unhappy employee shareholding) in the IPO firm will lead to a higher IPO initial 
return and vice versa.  
 
Definitions of above independent variables are as follows: 
 
GOVNT The size of government shareholding in percentage of the total 
share volume in the post-issuing IPO firm. It is defined by 
formula 8. 
TIMEIPO  The listing time lag. It is calculated by formula 12. 
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EMPLYEERATE The employee shareholding ratio. It is calculated by formula 13. 
 
The regression model is modified as follows: 
Model 7: 
iMAAR  = 0α  + 1α × iGOVNT  + 2α × iTIMEIPO  + 
3α × iEEMPLYEERAT  + 4α × iMKTCAP + iε   (23) 
 
According to hypothesis 18, a positive relationship between the IPO initial return and 
the government retention rate indicates a positive 1α   in the regression. The logic is 
that the more shareholding the government has in the list firm, the higher possibility 
the government will intervene with the firm’s future operation. Investors would in 
turn require higher compensation from the IPO reflected by a higher under-pricing. 
Likewise, a positive 2α  is expected according to hypothesis 19 because the 
underlying assumption is the longer the IPO is locked after announcement, the higher 
ex ante uncertainty about the market condition when the IPO really goes to the market. 
The risk premium of a longer lock-up period between the IPO announcement date and 
IPO listing date is reflected by a higher IPO under-pricing. Again, hypothesis 20 
requires a positive 3α  to stand. The rationale could be explained by Dewenter and 
Malatesta (1997)’s employee misgiving theory. The more employee holding in the 
issuing firm, the more likely the government has to compensate for a bigger 
proportion of employees who have misgivings about the privatisation. Thus, a higher 
IPO under-pricing is expected. 
 
11.2 Analysis and Results 
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Table 2 shows that the distributions of above variables are not normal. According to 
the data transformation criterion discussed in chapter 6, data transformation methods 
are adopted. Since the original government retention rate has a distribution closer to 
normal than its transformed variables, the original variable GOVNT is used in the 
regression and so is the listing time lag TIMEIPO. While natural logarithm is applied 
to the employee shareholding rate EMPLYEERATE and the original variable is 
replaced by its transformed counterpart LNEMPLYEERATE. The white 
heteroskedasticity-consistent OLS will be used to further deal with the non-normality 
problem and results are presented in the following table: 
 
Table 27: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression with China-
specific Variables 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; ** stands for 10% significance level and *** stands 
for 1% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: MAAR; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 495. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient 
C 1.1884 (7.1920***) 
GOVNT -0.2891 (-1.9511**) 
TIMEIPO 0.5931 (1.4136) 
LNEMPLYEERATE -0.0536 (-0.6375) 
MKECAP -0.0007 (-2.1425**) 
R-squared 0.0489 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.0431 
 
 
The note in table 27 says that there are only 495 observations included in the sample. 
The main reason for the low volume of observations is that many IPO firms do not 
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have employee shares at all. As said, the average employee shareholding in Chinese 
IPO firms is only 4.11%. Therefore, the employee shareholding only occupies a very 
small proportion of the total share volume in the post-issuing IPO firms in China. 
 
Hypothesis 18: The government retention rate GOVNT is negatively (-0.2891) 
related to the IPO initial return, opposite to what has been expected based on the 
hypothesis. The t-statistic is significant at 90% confidence level. The test confirms 
Chi and Padgett’s (2005) finding but contradicts Mok and Hui’s (1998) result. 
 
Hypothesis 19: The listing time lag TIMEIPO has a satisfactory positive regression 
coefficient (0.5931) as the hypothesis has assumed. But the t-statistic is comparatively 
low, indicating that the null hypothesis may not be supported by empirical data. The 
weak test result does not give much support to Tian’s (2003) finding.  
 
Hypothesis 20: The natural logarithm of employee shareholding ratio 
LNEMPLYEERATE is negatively (-0.0536) related to the IPO initial return, which 
is opposite to the hypothesis assumption. But the t-statistic is not significant enough. 
The result supports Su and Fleisher’s (1999) finding. 
 
Generally speaking, the test results of above three hypotheses signal that the China-
specific factors, which have been put forward by previous studies as causes of 
Chinese IPO under-pricing, are not satisfactory in explaining the phenomenon. 
Especially, the regression shows that the high government retention rate is unlikely to 
introduce high IPO under-pricing but instead it seems that the IPO initial return on 
average is reduced by the high proportion of government shareholding. In the 
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meantime, the employee privatisation misgiving is trivial in the Chinese IPO context 
according to the test. 
 
11.3 Summary 
The characteristics of China’s stock market such as high government retention rate 
and long listing waiting time have been proposed by earlier researchers as causes of 
the severe under-pricing of Chinese IPOs. Chapter 4 has pointed out that in the 
Chinese literatures the empirical tests of hypotheses based on these China-specific 
factors have produced inconsistent results. Consequently, the debate of the real 
impacts of these factors on the Chinese IPO under-pricing is still going on. 
Meanwhile, as many Chinese stock market characteristics are believed to be brought 
about by the government, people claim that the government’s influences have entered 
the IPO pricing process through these China-specific factors. This chapter therefore 
goes through the existing hypotheses, trying to clarify the debates and find out the real 
influences of these factors. After the empirical test, the thesis finds that the existing 
China-specific hypotheses are not fully supported or even opposed by the market data. 
 
Specifically, the thesis finds that the high government retention rate does not 
contribute positively to the IPO initial return but instead the bigger government 
shareholding seems to make the issuing firm better off by reducing the under-pricing 
cost. Recalling that in chapter 8 the government protection appears to reduce the IPO 
under-pricing too, it is interesting to continue search for the real impacts of 
government participation in the issuing firm’s capital structure and government 
intervention in the issuing firm’s business. Although Chi and Padgett (2005) claim 
that negative link between government retention and IPO initial return means the 
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privatization is welcomed by the investors, the contradiction to the classical 
government hypotheses may deserve future research.  
 
Secondly, the listing time lag again only has relatively weak link to the IPO initial 
return although it does show a positive contribution to the IPO initial return. In this 
sense, claims about the listing time lag effect from earlier studies have is not fully 
supported by current empirical dataset. Chapter 4 has pointed out that some 
researchers believe the Chinese government plays a so-called floatation time game to 
adjust market cycle by letting long listing time lag IPOs go floatation in bearish 
market and short listing time lag IPOs go floatation in bullish market. This hypothesis 
is based fundamentally on the assumption that the listing time lag has a significant 
positive impact on the IPO initial return, which according to above test cannot be 
convincingly accepted. In result, this thesis finds that the floatation time game 
hypothesis is not supported by the empirical data. The government has not 
manipulated the IPO process in such way according to statistic result.  
 
It is not surprising to see an insignificant link between the employee shareholding and 
the IPO initial return. Empirical data shows that the employee shareholding in 
Chinese issuing firms is on average very small. As said before, the management 
shareholding is not that common either in Chinese issuing firms as in the western 
countries. Nearly half of the issuing firms in the sample of this study do not have 
employee shares at all.  Even if the firm does allocate employee shares the post-
issuing firm is still largely controlled by the state through high percentage of 
government retention. For this reason, the IPO process may not affect the employees 
too much and employee misgiving about the change of the firm’s capital structure is 
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not that significant as in full scale privatisation. Or even if there are some misgiving 
feelings, the data shows that the government has not used or does not want to use the 
under-priced IPOs to compensate for the employees’ bad feelings. After all, the 
Chinese government has little concern about being voted out as the country is ruled by 
the sole party, even if the government may have to worry a little bit about the impact 
of the employees’ misgiving feelings to the social stability. 
 
In fact, the last point may raise a very interesting question in the IPO literature in 
general. Political motivated IPO under-pricing is already predicted by many earlier 
researchers as a classical factor. However, in a country ruled by dictatorship some 
normal assumptions of political motives may collapse. Based on the data, this thesis 
would claim that employee misgiving or election related political motives are not 
sensible in Chinese IPO literature. The claim would be the first in the Chinese 
literature. 
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Chapter 12 Data Analysis – An Overview of Model and Other Issues 
Now that the hypotheses set in chapter 5 have all been tested, it is time to take an 
overview out of the box. How will the alternative angles emerging from the testing of 
the three nascent statements help increase the explanatory power of IPO under-pricing 
model? Is there any other issue that can be looked at after the whole bunch of testing? 
After answering these questions, the data analysis will have completed its task set out 
at the beginning of the thesis. 
 
Firstly, let us check how much extra explanatory power the new hypotheses emerged 
from the testing of nascent China-specific statements has added to the existing models. 
The following table compares the R-squared and adjusted R-squared parameters of 
regression equations which employs different set of independent variables. All three 
regressions are based on the same dataset and are White heteroskedasticity-consistent. 
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Table 28: Explanatory Power Comparison among Different Models 
Models Nascent China-
specific Model Classical Model 
Existing China-
specific Model 
Observations 873 878 493 
CUBEPROFSHA CUBEPROFSHA CUBEPROFSHA 
AGE AGE AGE 
LNWINNINGRATE LNWINNINGRATE LNWINNINGRATE 
LNPRICE LNPRICE LNPRICE 
LNMKECAP LNMKECAP LNMKECAP 
LNIPOSZ LNIPOSZ LNIPOSZ 
MKTRTN MKTRTN MKTRTN 
MKTSTDEV MKTSTDEV MKTSTDEV 
TRNOVER - - 
TRNSCTNTAX - - 
PROTED - - 
- - GOVNT 
- - TIMEIPO 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Used 
- - LNEMPLYEERATE 
R-squared 0.4934 0.4359 0.4484 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.4863 0.4308 0.4358 
 
The above table compares the explanatory power of three different sets of 
independent variables. The first set includes all classical hypotheses factors that 
proved to be statistically significant in our test and factors that are significant in 
testing the three nascent China-specific statements. The second set includes only all 
the classical hypotheses factors. The third model includes all classical hypotheses 
factors and the three existing China-specific hypotheses factors. The comparatively 
small observation volume (493) of the third model is still because many IPO firms do 
not have employee shareholding. 
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The result is exciting. The third model which adds existing China-specific hypotheses 
factors to classical model has higher R-squared and adjusted R-squared than the 
classical hypotheses model, but the difference is small (about 43.5% - 43.0 = 0.5%). 
By contrast, our final model which adds three new factors from the new hypotheses 
proposed by this thesis has the highest R-squared and adjusted R-squared, and hence 
the highest explanatory power. The improvement is significant (about 48.6% - 43.0% 
= 5.6%). Since the adjusted R-squared has excluded impact from changes of degree of 
freedom and it better represents the model fitness, the result is very robust. In 
conclusion, the thesis has found a better model than the existing ones which includes 
some alternative factors proposed by this thesis. 
 
Last chapter has pointed out that Tian’s (2003) floatation game hypothesis is not 
supported by the empirical data. However, every coin has two sides. Tian’s (2003) 
suggestion might be enlightening in terms of thinking about the relationship between 
market cycle and the IPO under-pricing. Let us firstly take a look at the distributions 
of IPO initial return, market cycle and IPO numbers during the sample period. 
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Table 29: Distribution of IPO Initial Return, Market Average Daily Return and 
IPO NO. During the Sample Period 
Year IPO NO. 
Mean 
MAAR 
SSE Average Daily 
Market Return 
SZSE Average Daily 
Market Return 
SSE-SZSE Average 
Daily Market Return 
1996 149 1.1252 0.0024 0.0054 0.0039 
1997 189 1.4981 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 
1998 95 1.3285 -0.000038 -0.0013 -0.000658 
1999 97 1.1287 0.00088 0.00076 0.00082 
2000 137 1.5069 0.0018 0.0015 0.0017 
2001 77 1.3851 -0.00093 -0.0016 -0.0013 
2002 69 1.3257 -0.00067 -0.00058 -0.00063 
2003 67 0.7185 0.00048 0.00078 0.00063 
 
The table shows that the average market daily return across the two exchanges is very 
small compared to the average IPO initial return. This explains why the market-
adjusted IPO initial return is not much different from the IPO raw initial return since 
the market adjustment factor is quite marginal. Let us take a look at a regression based 
on the table from above table. The dependent variable is the average market daily 
return that is the proxy of market cycle, and the independent variables are the average 
market-adjusted IPO initial return and IPO numbers during the year.  
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Table 30: White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent OLS Regression of Market Cycle 
against IPO Initial Return and IPO No. 
(Note: In parentheses are the student t-statistics; *** stands for 5% significance level.) 
Dependent Variable: Average Market Daily Return; Method: Least Squares; Included observations: 8. 
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
Variable Coefficient 
C 0.0014 (0.8427) 
Mean MAAR -0.0038 (-2.5893***) 
IPO No. 0.000037 (3.1075***) 
R-squared 0.7543 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6561 
 
The regression shows that the average market daily return is positively (0.000037) 
affected by the IPO numbers during the year at a 95% confidence level. This could be 
easily explained by the fact that almost all Chinese IPOs are under-priced, therefore 
the more IPOs are offered during the year, the more possible that the average market 
daily return will get higher. However, the average market-adjusted IPO initial return 
seem to have a negative impact on the market cycle by showing a small negative 
regression coefficient (-0.0038) at a 95% confidence level.  
 
The result could indicate that the government may have controlled for the number of 
IPOs instead of IPO listing time lags to adjust market cycle. Chi and Padgett (2003) 
have suggested that the Chinese government may have tried to capitalise on the 
market cycle to achieve maximum IPO proceeds and the test of hypothesis 15 has 
proved this. Either way, the positive relationship between market cycle and IPO 
under-pricing could give more economic implications to the regulators. 
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Chapter 13 Findings and Conclusions 
Using a Chinese IPO dataset covering the period from January 1996 to December 
2003, the thesis has now already tested classical hypotheses, existing China-specific 
hypotheses and more importantly three brand new hypotheses based on statements 
about Chinese IPO under-pricing rationale.  
 
Generally speaking, the thesis finds that the existing theories can only partly explain 
the high degree of China’s IPO under-pricing. On the one hand, the information 
asymmetry, ex ante uncertainty and information cascade hypotheses are largely 
supported by empirical data. On the other hand, existing China-specific hypotheses 
pertaining to Chinese IPO characteristics of government retention rate, listing time lag 
and employee shareholding all fail to stand the empirical test statistically.  
 
A major contribution of this thesis to the empirical study is that three statements about 
the reason of the China’s IPO under-pricing have been hypothesized and tested. With 
respect to alternative explanations, the thesis finds that the three statements have 
gained mixed support from the real market data. Especially, the speculation effect is 
strongly supported by the hypothesis test while the other two are not.  
 
The thesis has not found enough evidence to suggest government involvement in 
causing the IPO under-pricing despite various statements claim so. In particular, the 
thesis clears an existing debate by showing that the government does not play a so-
called floatation time game. Apart from the empirical test of various hypotheses, this 
thesis has made some interesting discovery during the hypothesis test. These findings 
emphasize the need of future study on Chinese IPO under-pricing and may help to 
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better understand the phenomenon because they apparently contradict existing 
hypotheses. Reflecting on the proposed contributions to the literature set out at the 
start, this chapter will summarise all the findings and conclude the thesis. 
 
13.1 Findings 
This study has made good progress at some points towards both finding the real 
causes and clarifying existing debate.  
 
13.1.1 Findings about Nascent China-specific Hypotheses 
One main goal of this study is to evaluate some unproved statements. According to 
these statements, this thesis has tested several brand new hypotheses using brand new 
proxy variables.  
 
A main factor put forward by this study to explain the Chinese IPO under-pricing is 
the speculation effect. It is claimed by practitioners that the highly speculative trading 
in China’s stock market has contributed to the high IPO under-pricing. According to 
the statement, the thesis carries out both direct and indirect investigation of the 
speculation effect hypothesis. Through the test, the hypothesis proves promising to 
explain Chinese IPO under-pricing in the sense that there is clearly a strong link 
between high level of speculation and high level of initial return of Chinese IPOs. 
 
The direct test of the speculation effect hypothesis involves defining proxy variables 
that can measure or reflect the speculation magnitude. For example, the turnover rate 
reflects the intensity of the short term speculative trading activities in the first trading 
day after IPO. The test shows that the turnover rate of the IPO share is positively 
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related to the IPO initial return, which confirms the effect of such speculative trading 
on the IPO under-pricing. The second proxy variable is the lottery winning ratio, 
which measures the imbalance between the new share supply and demand. A 
fundamental assumption of the speculation effect statement is that China’s speculative 
market is partly due to the high imbalance between the supply and demand of new 
shares. Following the logic, it is assumed that a lower probability of winning the 
lottery would mean a higher imbalance between the new share supply and demand 
and in turn a higher speculation magnitude. Consequently, a higher under-pricing is 
expected. The test again successfully proves that the lottery winning ratio is 
negatively related to the IPO initial return.   
 
Meanwhile, an indirect test of the speculation statement involves an event study of a 
government policy change. The Chinese government once increased the transaction 
stamp duty tax rate to curb speculation in the market. Under the assumption that the 
Chinese IPO under-pricing is driven by speculation, this tax rate change would have 
negatively affected the IPO initial return due to increased speculation cost. The test 
shows that this government tax policy change does have significantly negative impact 
on IPO initial return. The importance of the successful test of the tax rate change lies 
not only in proving the speculation effect but also in indirectly unveiling the 
government influence on IPO under-pricing.  
 
The speculation effect hypothesis is supported by both direct and indirect tests. 
However, there is an interesting finding in data analysis. A brand new proxy variable 
of transaction stamp duty tax rate is introduced for testing the speculation effect based 
on the whole time series of IPO initial returns in the long run. It is originally assumed 
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that a higher transaction tax rate means a higher cost of speculative trading. A lower 
IPO under-pricing is thus expected due to subdued speculation. On the contrary, the 
test shows that the transaction stamp duty tax rate is positively related to the IPO 
initial return. The thesis provides two conjectures regarding to this somehow 
surprising phenomenon. One is that the relatively stable tax rate may not be able to 
capture the short-term fluctuation characteristics of IPO initial return while the sudden 
change of the transaction stamp duty tax rate can. The investors’ decision to pursue 
short-term IPO initial return by speculative trading may not be affected too much by 
the transaction cost in the long run. The second explanation is that the variation of 
transaction cost due to varying transaction stamp duty tax has already been reflected 
in the IPO under-pricing. Extra under-pricing is needed to compensate for higher 
transaction cost and vice versa. However, the real reason of this result is still waiting 
for future research. 
 
 The second statement put to test is the Western Region Development Policy effect. 
Some claim that in order to encourage investment into companies in less developed 
western region, the Chinese government may have used the IPO under-pricing as an 
economic incentive to sweeten the offer and make it more attractive to investors. This 
study finds that a difference does exist in the IPO initial returns before and after the 
policy came into place, but the policy itself alone may not have sufficient explanatory 
power to interpret the difference. The test demonstrates that the Western Region 
Development Policy is not that influential as claimed by some statements in causing 
the IPO under-pricing or the government simply has not used the IPO under-pricing to 
facilitate Western Region Development Policy although it hinted to do so. The 
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statement about government involvement in causing the western region IPO under-
pricing is not supported. 
 
A direct test of the government protection influences on the IPO under-pricing is 
proposed by this study for the first time. Some have claimed that the government’s 
discriminative attitude towards companies in different industrial sectors may have 
caused the IPO under-pricing. The thesis finds that the government protection over 
issuing firms does have a significant influence on the IPO initial return. But opposite 
to the original hypothesis the test shows that the government protection tends to help 
the issuing firm reduce the IPO under-pricing. The reason for this phenomenon is not 
crystal clear yet but it raises a topic for possible further researches. The significant test 
result at least proves that the government protection has played active role in the IPO 
pricing process even if it has reduced the degree of the under-pricing. But on the other 
hand, the test firmly rejects the statement that the government’s involvement in terms 
of discriminative protection has caused the Chinese IPO under-pricing. 
 
13.1.2 Findings about Existing Classical Hypotheses 
Another objective of this thesis is to test hypotheses advanced in previous studies. At 
first, this study finds that the Chinese IPO data has shown general support to the 
information asymmetry theory but tests fail to prove certain hypotheses within this 
category.  This study finds a significantly negative link between the IPO initial return 
and the issuing firm’s profitability, which is consistent with the Winner’s Curse 
hypothesis. The firm age, however, only has a comparatively weak relationship with 
the IPO initial return although a correct negative regression coefficient has been found. 
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Empirical test suggests that the offer price does have a significantly positive 
relationship with the IPO initial return.  
 
The other two hypotheses that are often tested in the IPO literatures in the advanced 
markets are information revelation hypothesis and signalling hypothesis. These two 
hypotheses however are less often tested in Chinese literatures. The thesis explores 
the difference between fixed pricing and bookbuilding and finds that the information 
revelation hypothesis does partly explain Chinese IPO under-pricing. The seasoned 
offering motivated signalling hypothesis however does not stand statistical test. In 
summary, this study finds that the information asymmetry hypothesis is largely 
supported by Chinese IPO data. 
 
Secondly, regarding to the ex ante uncertainty theory this study finds that the data is 
not showing full support. The thesis finds that IPO offer size has a significant negative 
effect on the IPO initial return, which agrees with the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis. 
While the investors may care less about the issuing firm’s market capitalisation 
because the test shows it only has a relatively less significantly negative impact on the 
IPO initial return. The study finds that the average market return since the offer price 
is fixed is positively related to the IPO initial return, which confirms Davis and 
Yeomans (1976) et al’s theory that IPO under-pricing tends to be higher in more 
buoyant market. But the test appears to generate a negative regression coefficient for 
market return standard deviation, which contradicts the ex ante uncertainty 
assumption that IPO initial return is higher in more volatile market. But very small 
regression coefficients in the regressions suggest that the market return variation may 
only have a very small degree of impact on IPO under-pricing.  The study has 
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acknowledged that further study may be needed regarding to this phenomenon. In 
summary, this study finds that the Chinese IPO under-pricing is also partly explained 
by the ex ante uncertainty theory.  
 
The lottery winning ratio is also used to test information cascade or bandwagon 
hypothesis. A negative relationship between the lottery winning ratio and the IPO 
initial return proves that the Chinese IPO under-pricing may be partly explained by 
the investors’ information cascade too. 
 
13.1.3 Findings about Existing China-specific Hypotheses 
Chinese stock market has some unique characteristics which may have influenced the 
IPO under-pricing. Some previous studies have tried to investigate these 
characteristics and the conclusion is not decisive. Using more recent dataset, this 
thesis re-tests hypotheses that are set up according to the China-specific IPO 
characteristics and the test results are mixed. 
 
As the Chinese stock market is tangled with government influences, some hypotheses 
are based on the government political motives during the privatization process. High 
government retention, seen as a typical sign of government partial sale of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) especially in a country in which most of the IPOs are privatisation 
IPOs, has drawn attentions of early studies. It is believed that higher IPO under-
pricing is necessary to compensate for investors’ concern of future government 
interference when a larger government shareholding is possible to conflict with the 
transfer of the control in the gradual sale. Meanwhile, if the government is seen as an 
owner of the state-owned enterprise who holds inside information about the issuing 
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firm then a higher under-pricing signals the firm’s quality. In both cases, the IPO 
under-pricing has full government political motives embedded in the mechanism and 
the government retention rate should have a positive link with the under-pricing. 
However, the thesis finds that the impact of government shareholding on IPO under-
pricing is not straightforward as the hypothesis suggests. A negative rather than 
positive relationship shows the real impact of the government shareholding is begging 
for explanations. The result may indicate what Chi and Padgett (2005) have suggested 
that the privatization is welcomed by the investors, but the thesis has emphasized the 
need for future research on the topic.  
 
Another China-specific hypothesis in previous literature is the listing time lag 
hypothesis. It is assumed that the longer the time lag between the IPO announcement 
date and the listing date, the bigger the uncertainty about the underlying value of the 
new share is at the time of listing. A higher IPO under-pricing is required by investors. 
But this study does not find enough empirical support to this hypothesis.  
 
Around this time lag there is also a debate in the previous literature. Some researchers 
suggest that the Chinese government uses the time lag as a policy tool to adjust the 
market cycle, playing a so-called floatation time game. They also claim that this 
government floatation time game has caused the Chinese IPO under-pricing. For 
floatation time game assumption to work, the premise is that the time lag should have 
a significant impact on the IPO initial return, which this study has already statistically 
proved to be incorrect. The test result proves that the floatation time game is 
fundamentally flawed in terms of basic underlying assumptions.  
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Every coin has two sides, this study however finds that the market cycles is affected 
by both the number of IPOs issued and average IPO initial returns. This may provide 
good economic implications to the regulator, which means the IPO issuance may be a 
relatively effective measure for the government to adjust the market cycle. 
 
It has also appeared in previous literature the hypothesis that the government may use 
under-pricing to reduce the employees’ misgivings about privatisation. As most of the 
Chinese IPOs are privatization IPOs, this theory sounds promising. But this study 
does not find sufficient evidence to support this hypothesis, suggesting that the 
Chinese government may not need to do so because the employee shareholdings 
usually are very small in the post-IPO firm and the voting issue is not a realistic 
concern for the government. 
 
 To summarize, the hypothesis test results and findings of this thesis are all listed in 
the following table: 
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Table 31: Summary of Findings and Conclusions  
Category of 
Hypotheses 
Underlying 
Hypotheses 
Proxies for Hypothesis Test Test Result 
Dummy for transaction stamp 
duty tax rate change 
Significant 
Turnover rate Significant 
Lottery winning ratio Significant Speculation Effect 
Transaction stamp duty tax 
rate 
Significant but in 
opposite direction 
to hypothesis 
Western Region 
Development Effect 
Dummies for the Western 
Region Development policy 
change 
Not significant 
Nascent China-
specific 
Hypotheses 
Government Protection 
Effect 
Dummy for government 
protection 
Significant but in 
opposite direction 
to  hypothesis 
Profitability Significant 
Firm age Weakly significant 
Lottery winning ratio Significant 
Offer price Significant 
Dummy for fixed pricing vs. 
bookbuilding 
Significant 
Information 
Asymmetry 
Dummy for seasoned offering Not significant 
Market capitalisation Significant 
Offer size Significant 
Average market return Significant 
Ex Ante Uncertainty 
Variation coefficient of market 
return 
Significant but in 
opposite direction 
to hypothesis45 
Classical 
Hypotheses 
Behaviour Hypothesis – 
Information Cascade 
Lottery winning ratio Significant 
Government Signalling Government retention rate 
Significant but in 
opposite direction 
to hypothesis 
Floatation Time Game Listing time lag Not significant 
Existing China-
specific 
Hypotheses 
Employee Misgiving Employee shareholding rate Not significant 
 
                                                 
45
 The result is based on the test of ex ante uncertainty hypothesis only. 
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13.2 Conclusions, Economic Implications and Questions for Future Research 
As particularly set out at the beginning, through empirical investigations the thesis 
seeks to test whether or not there is a government involvement in the Chinese IPO 
under-pricing.  
 
Like the opening remark from the prestigious Financial Times at the beginning of this 
thesis, various statements in media reports, academic papers and even government 
archives have indicated that the Chinese government may have played active role in 
introducing the Chinese IPO under-pricing. In a country of which the industries are 
transformed from state-owned to partly private and the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
still enjoy dominant market power, it seems that the above statement has drawn broad 
support from all walks of the financial world. However, this thesis finds that in 
previous literatures there lack strong and direct evidence to prove that the government 
really has played such role. The claim is still a claim and few studies have explicitly 
pinpointed the government influences. Therefore, bearing the task to see whether or 
not the statement is true, the thesis starts the journey to look for evidence from 
empirical test. In the end, the thesis finds that the government may have not been 
directly involved in the IPO under-pricing while some evidence even suggests the 
opposite that the government influences may have helped reduce the under-pricing. 
 
The above conclusion is firstly drawn from the tests of several brand new hypotheses 
based on unproved statements that put forward various reasons for Chinese IPO 
under-pricing. During the test of speculation effect hypotheses, the thesis finds that a 
direct government transaction tax policy change has notably affected the under-
pricing magnitude. The test shows that if the government wants to it does have the 
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power to directly affect the IPO under-pricing, although the policy change has 
actually helped cut the IPO initial return. China’s speculative stock market, as said, is 
largely due to lack of investment opportunities. But at the same time, some 
government policies such as quota system and problematic unit carving out process 
have contributed to forming this speculative market. In this sense, the successful test 
of speculation effect hypothesis at least indicates that the government influences may 
have indirectly entered the IPO under-pricing no matter the government intended so 
or not. To the same end, the test of lottery winning ratio may have signified the 
impact of the imbalance between new share supply and demand which is caused by 
suppressed supply due to government control of issuing. Previous chapters have 
pointed out that the China’s stock market is full of retail investors who care less about 
fundamental analysis but instead rely heavily on speculative trading to make quick 
profit. This is largely due to the lack of investment opportunities, government control 
of new shares and problematic market practices in the country. The finding shows that 
the IPO under-pricing, particularly in a relatively isolated market like China, may be 
forced by individual investor pursuing short-term abnormal returns in the secondary 
market. 
 
The tests of the other two brand new hypotheses of Western Region Development 
Policy effect and government protection effect explicitly and directly target at 
government involvement in IPO under-pricing but both failed. Quite surprisingly, the 
test of government protection effect hypothesis shows that the government’s 
protection upon selected firms may even have helped curb the IPO under-pricing. In 
both hypothesis tests, the thesis finds that the government may have no intention to 
under-price its new shares in the issuing firms. These finding suggests that there is a 
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gap between the practitioners’ appreciation and the reality of the government 
influences. This is not surprising in a market where the government has enormous 
presence. But as said, in a country in which the government has absolute ruling power, 
there may be many other cheaper ways than IPO under-pricing for the government to 
achieve its objectives.  
 
In existing literatures, the most direct tackle of government involvement is from the 
so-called floatation time game hypothesis. The government is said to have capitalised 
on the difference of IPO listing time lags and utilize the listing time lag to adjust the 
market cycle. As discussed in last section, this thesis finds that the listing time lag is 
not even significantly related to the IPO under-pricing. In this sense, there is no way 
for the government to use an ineffective tool – the listing time lag – to adjust market 
cycle at macro level. 
 
In theory, the government retention hypothesis is promising to reveal government’s 
direct involvement in IPO under-pricing. In China, the finding indicates that the 
government does not use the IPO under-pricing to signal its commitment to the 
privatisation; either it does not use IPO under-pricing to compensate for investors’ 
concern of conflict of interest due to government shareholding. Since most issuing 
firms are still controlled by the government after the IPO, the government may be 
indifferent to both motivations. Or, the result simply indicates what Chi and Padgett 
(2005) have claimed that the privatisation in China is welcomed by investors, so the 
government has no need to compensate for investors’ concern.  
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Lastly the thesis has proved that the government does not use the under-pricing to 
compensate employees who might have misgivings about privatisation, and maybe the 
government does not even have such objective in mind. After all, the Chinese 
government has little concern about being voted out by the unhappy SOE employees. 
 
The last two points may have good economic implications to a country that is ruled by 
dictatorship. As the Chinese communist party is the sole ruling party in China, the 
normal election or voters’ misgiving related political motives for IPO under-pricing in 
other markets may not work for China’s IPOs. This is a quite unique characteristic of 
China’s IPO pricing.  
 
In summary, the thesis finds that the Chinese government has not been directly 
involved in the IPO under-pricing. It can be assumed that in the privatisation process 
of a previously highly state-owned economy, the government is like all other issuers 
who prefer their new shares to be priced as high as possible to maximize the proceeds. 
But on the other hand, the influence of government policies may indirectly enter the 
IPO pricing process without the government planning so. The general implication of 
this thesis to privatisation IPO is that in a country where the government has absolute 
control of the political issues, the government does not necessarily need to use the 
IPO under-pricing as an economic or political tool to achieve its goal.   
 
During the hypothesis tests the thesis finds some interesting phenomenon which pose 
new questions for possible future research. For example, the thesis finds that higher 
transaction tax rate tends to introduce higher IPO under-pricing. Higher market 
volatility and higher government retention rate tend to reduce the under-pricing. The 
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government protection seems to lead to lower under-pricing too. All theses empirical 
findings are inconsistent with existing hypotheses. To clarify the confusion and 
deepen our understanding of the puzzling IPO under-pricing phenomenon especially 
in China’s emerging market, the thesis calls for future researches on these questions. 
  
The thesis provides a wide range of economic implications. As said, China’s stock 
market is less efficient than its western country counterparts. The market settings of 
China render great possibility of information asymmetry between the issuing 
statement-owned enterprises (SOEs) and investors and between the government-
controlled audit agencies and investors, let alone the often distorted information flow 
in the system. Essentially, that is the reason why the information asymmetry 
hypotheses are good at explaining China’s IPO under-pricing. In the long run, a large 
magnitude of under-pricing would undermine the market efficiency and adds 
unnecessary extra costs to the issuing firms trying to raise capital from the primary 
market. Especially in China where there is literally no corporate debt market and IPO 
is the only possible channel for firms to raise cheap public funds, the long lasting high 
IPO under-pricing would in effect drag the economy growth. 
 
From the investors’ perspective, the high IPO initial return should not become the 
major motive for strategic investors. As the thesis has shown, even with the extremely 
high IPO initial return, there is still huge uncertainty about the issuing firm’s long 
term performance which is exactly the reason why many retail investors have chosen 
to pursue the short term speculative returns. However, that does not necessarily mean 
having a high initial return is a bad thing. But instead, what the thesis indicates is that 
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the long-term investors should be more focused on the fundamentals of the issuing 
firm and be less worried about the IPO’s short term returns. 
 
In order to improve market efficiency, the government needs to improve the oversight 
of corporate’ accounting, auditing and disclosing processes. Given this, the 
information flow in the market will become more effective and smooth, and the 
information asymmetry-caused IPO under-pricing will become smaller and smaller in 
the future. From the government perspective, it should improve the carving out 
process for SOEs to provide more reliable track records and hence less under-pricing 
and less cost to the SOEs will occur. Unnecessary and stubborn regulatory rules such 
as listing quota and PE cap should not be used any more. In fact, these two systems 
are both abandoned or replaced by more efficient systems such as bookbuilding. This 
thesis also finds that IPOs are still a good way for the government to shore up the 
capital market although the cost might be high because statistics show that the market 
cycle is related to both numbers of IPOs and IPO initial return but the sensitivity is 
very small. With the development of China’s market-oriented economy and financial 
system, it can be predicted that the government influences will cede to market’s 
invisible hand and China’s stock market will become more and more efficient. 
China’s high degree of under-pricing will not be sustainable and will finally decline to 
the same level as in the advanced market in the future. 
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